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Posted by: Landry Butler on Apr 24, 2017

Court: TN Court of Criminal Appeals

Attorneys 1:

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Lacy Wilber, Assistant Attorney General; Charme Allen, District Attorney General; and Ta Kisha M. Fitzgerald, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

Attorneys 2:

Leslie M. Jeffress, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Josh L. Bowman.

Judge(s): WILLIAMS

The Petitioner, Josh L. Bowman, was convicted by a jury of three counts of first degree felony murder, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of especially aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated burglary, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After the verdict, the Petitioner pled guilty to one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony when he had previously been convicted of a felony. The trial court merged the murder convictions, merged the burglary convictions, and merged the firearms convictions. This court on appeal reversed the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and remanded for a new trial, affirming all other judgments. See State v. Josh L. Bowman, No. E2012-00923-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 4680402, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 29, 2013), overruled in part by State v. Teats, 468 S.W.3d 495 (Tenn. 2015). The Petitioner filed a timely post-conviction petition, alleging that his trial counsel was deficient in allowing him to enter a guilty plea to the firearms offense and deficient in failing to object to the racial composition of the jury venire. The post-conviction court granted relief on the firearms conviction, finding that the Petitioner did not have a qualifying prior “dangerous felony” and dismissing the charge. The post-conviction court found that the Petitioner could not show deficiency or prejudice on the jury issue. Both parties filed notices of appeal in this court. The State asserts that the post- conviction court misinterpreted Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324 (2008) in granting relief and argues that the prior felony need not be a dangerous felony according to statute. The Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to relief from all his convictions based on the jury composition. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. We remand for the post-conviction court to enter judgment on the merged conviction which survives the dismissal of the firearms offense.