WILLIAM A. GLOVER v. NATIONAL MEDICAL HOSPITAL OF WILSON COUNTY, INC.
d/b/a UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER
Court:TSC - Workers Comp Panel
Thomas J. Dement, II, Nashville, Tennessee, for the
defendant/appellant, National Medical Hospital of Wilson County, Inc.,
d/b/a University Medical Center.
Henry D. Fincher, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the plaintiff/appellee,
William A. Glover.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special
Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance
with the Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing
and reporting to the Supreme Court of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The issues of this case are as follows: (1)
whether the trial court erred in finding medical causation; and (2)
whether the trial improperly denied employer's motion in limine to
exclude the testimony of George Barnard and Dr. David Bradley
Seitzinger. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial
TERRY RUDDLE MAHONEY v. NATIONSBANK OF TENNESSEE, N.A.
Court:TSC - Workers Comp Panel
Raymond J. Lepone and Robin H. Rasmussen, Memphis, Tennessee, for the
Appellant, NationsBank of Tennessee, N.A.
William M. Jeter, Memphis, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Terry Ruddle
We granted review in this workers' compensation case to determine
whether the trial court erred in awarding benefits against the
defendant employer where the employee was first injured and missed
work while employed by a previous employer. After reviewing the
record and applicable authority, we conclude that the trial court
erred in awarding benefits against the defendant employer because the
preponderance of the evidence is that the employee's
gradually-occurring injury became compensable while working for the
prior employer and did not progress while working for the defendant
employer. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment.
JOHN EDWARD BELL, JR. v. VICKIE LEE BELL
Linda L. Holmes, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Vickie Lee
Duke H. Brasfield, Covington, Tennessee, for the appellee, John Edward
This is a child custody dispute. The parties were married and had one
child. When the child was approximately three years old, the father
filed a petition for divorce and was granted temporary custody. A
year and a half later, the trial court granted the parties a divorce
by stipulation, but reserved the issue of permanent custody. After a
hearing, the trial court granted the father primary residential
custody, with the child to reside with the mother three weekends out
of the month plus additional time. The mother now appeals, arguing
that the trial court failed to engage in a comparative fitness
analysis and failed to consider evidence that the father had abused
the mother during their marriage. After a careful review of the
record, we affirm.
GARY DEWAYNE FINN v. MARY LOUISE SUMMER BUNDY
M. Allen Ehmling, Gallatin, Tennessee, for the appellant, Mary Louise
Clark Lee Shaw, for the appellee, Gary Dewayne Finn.
This appeal involves enforcement of a divorce decree incorporating a
marital dissolution agreement and the obligation of a parent to
support a child beyond the child's majority in certain circumstances.
The trial court determined that the former husband's alimony
obligation had terminated upon the payment of the entire amount of
alimony in solido created in the order and MDA. The court also held
that the father had a continuing obligation to support his adult son
because the son was disabled. We affirm both holdings.
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. GREG HARRIS
Barbara W. Clark, Knoxville, Tennessee (on appeal), Greg Harris, Pro
Se (at trial), William B. Lawson, Erwin, Tennessee (advisory counsel
at trial), for the appellant, Greg Harris.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Kathy D. Aslinger,
Assistant Attorney General; H. Greeley Wells, Jr., District Attorney
General; and Joseph Eugene Perrin, Assistant District Attorney
General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
A Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Greg
Harris, of criminal conspiracy to sell or deliver more than 300 grams
of cocaine, a Class A felony; possession of more than 300 grams of
cocaine for resale within 1000 feet of a school, a Class A felony; and
two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor.
The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to
consecutive sentences of twenty-five years for each felony conviction,
and concurrent sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days for each
misdemeanor conviction, for an effective sentence of fifty years. The
jury fined him a total of $1,005,000. The defendant appeals, claiming
that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress
evidence; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions;
(3) the trial court erred by admitting irrelevant evidence and
allowing prosecutorial misconduct without declaring a mistrial; (4)
the jury verdict lacked unanimity because the state failed to elect
either sale or delivery in count one of the indictment; (5) his right
to a fair trial was violated by the fact he lacked certain materials
necessary to prepare for trial, i.e., a map depicting the area
surrounding the location of his arrest, a transcript of the
suppression hearing, and a list of potential jurors; and (6) the trial
court erred by imposing excessive and consecutive sentences. We
affirm the defendant's convictions. However, we hold the record is
insufficient to justify the trial court's imposition of consecutive
sentences and, in light of the rule announced in Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), we modify the
defendant's sentences to twenty-four years for each felony conviction.
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. EDWARD E. KEATHLEY
Michael G. Hatmaker, Jacksboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, Edward
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Renee W. Turner,
Assistant Attorney General; William Paul Phillips, District Attorney
General; and Scarlett W. Ellis, Assistant District Attorney General,
for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
A jury convicted the defendant, Edward E. Keathley, of simple
possession of a Schedule II controlled substance and of possession of
drug paraphernalia, Class A misdemeanors. Following a sentencing
hearing, the defendant was fined a total of $900.00 and sentenced to
eleven months and twenty-nine days for each offense. The trial court
ordered the defendant to serve the sentences in concurrent split
confinement with ninety days in the county jail and the balance of the
sentence on probation. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial
court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Based upon our review,
we affirm the decision of the trial court.