ALFRED EDWARDS and wife ALISA EDWARDS, v. MARTIN McPEAKE and HELMS
John S. Colley, III, Columbia, Tennessee, for appellants.
John M. Lehman and Mary Beth Hagan, Nashville, Tennessee, for
In this action arising from a motor vehicle accident, plaintiffs
claimed damages for personal injuries and the jury returned a verdict
finding defendants 100% at fault for the accident, but awarded no
damages for personal injuries to plaintiffs. On appeal, we affirm.
IN RE H.A.L.
WITH CONCURRING OPINION
Billy K. Tollison, III, Sparta, Tennessee, for the appellant, R.W.L.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore,
Solicitor General; and Michael B. Schwegler, Assistant Attorney
General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children's
This appeal involves the parental rights of a father who has been
incarcerated off and on for most of this fourteen-year-old daughter's
life. The Tennessee Department of Children's Services filed a petition
to terminate the father's parental rights in the White County Juvenile
Court while he was serving a fifteen-year-sentence for first degree
robbery. The juvenile court, relying on the grounds contained in Tenn.
Code Ann. SS 36-1-113(g)(1), (3), (9) (Supp. 2004), terminated the
father's parental rights. The father has appealed. We have determined
that the Department has presented clear and convincing evidence that
the father abandoned his daughter as proscribed by Tenn. Code Ann. S
36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) (Supp. 2004), that he failed to remedy conditions
as required by Tenn. Code Ann. S 36-1-113(g)(3)(A), and that
terminating his parental rights is in his daughter's best interests.
Accordingly, we affirm the order terminating the father's parental
GEORGE HUTSELL AND TERESA HUTSELL, v. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF ZONING
Clinton R. Anderson, Morristown, Tennessee, for appellant.
S. Douglas Drinnon, Jeffrey L. Jones, and Larry Ray Churchwell,
Dandridge Tennessee, for Appellee
Plaintiffs obtained a permit and built a "garage and storage building"
on their property. The zoning officer received complaints after the
building was built, and the Board of Zoning Appeals determined that
plaintiffs' use of the building was not allowed in the zoning
classification. On certiorari, the Trial Judge affirmed the Board of
Zoning Appeals' decision and enjoined plaintiffs from using the
building in violation of the zoning ordinance. On appeal, we affirm.
SUSAN DIANE JONES v. STEVEN TRAVIS DORROUGH, ET AL.
John O. Threadgill, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the Appellants, Steven
Travis Dorrough and Jayme Dorrough
L. Caesar Stair and W. Tyler Chastain, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the
Appellee, Susan Diane Jones
This case arises out of a long-running dispute between Steven Travis
Dorrough and his former wife, Susan Diane Jones over possession of the
parties' former residence which was awarded to Ms. Jones in the
divorce, but was subsequently leased to Mr. Dorrough. Ms. Jones first
filed suit against Mr. Dorrough and his new wife for possession of the
residence and for unpaid rents, penalties, interest and attorney's
fees. The Dorroughs counterclaimed asserting that Ms. Jones had agreed
to sell them the property and that they had paid her in full and were
entitled to specific performance. The trial court granted a summary
judgment in favor of Ms. Jones, awarded her possession of the
property, judgment for unpaid rents and attorney's fees, and dismissed
the counterclaim. The Dorroughs appealed and we affirmed the trial
court's decision as to the dismissal of the Dorroughs' counterclaim
and remanded for further findings as to the funds allegedly paid by
Mr. Dorrough. The Dorroughs then filed suit against Ms. Jones and this
suit was consolidated with the remanded suit. In the second suit, the
Dorroughs alleged breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation,
and outrageous conduct. The trial court granted Ms. Jones' motion for
summary judgment on the contract and tort claims. The trial court held
an evidentiary hearing on the remanded issue as to whether Mr.
Dorrough was entitled to a set-off based on alleged payments by him to
Ms. Jones of $192,000. The trial court denied the set-off and awarded
judgment to Ms. Jones for rents, late fees, prejudgment interest and
attorney's fees. The Dorroughs appealed this adverse decision. After a
careful review of the record, we hold that 1) the trial court's grant
of summary judgment to Ms. Jones was proper as to the breach of
contract claim because the Dorroughs' contract claim was a compulsory
counterclaim that they were required to have presented in the original
case, 2) the trial court's grant of summary judgment was proper as to
the claims for outrageous conduct and fraudulent misrepresentation
since the claims were time barred by the applicable statutes of
limitation, 3) the evidence does not preponderate against the trial
court's finding of fact regarding the rents due, payments made by Mr.
Dorrough, and the award of attorney's fees. Accordingly, we affirm the
decision of the trial court.
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JESSE LEE CREASMAN
Ardena J. Garth, District Public Defender; and Donna Robinson Miller
(on appeal) and Danny Hill (at trial), Assistant District Public
Defenders, for the appellant, Jesse Lee Creasman.
Paul G.Summers, Attorney General &Reporter; Renee W.Turner, Assistant
Attorney General; and Rodney C. Strong, Assistant District Attorney
General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
The defendant, Jesse Lee Creasman, entered a plea of guilt to burglary
of a business. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court imposed a
Range I sentence of two years and ordered probationary supervision for
a period of four years. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
directed restitution as follows: $207.05 for the replacement of the
store window, $239.90 for stolen cigarettes, and $6,300 for increased
insurance premiums. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that
the amount of restitution is excessive. Restitution is reduced by
$6,300 to $436.95. Otherwise, the judgment of the trial court is
JACKIE F. CURRY v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
Jackie F. Curry, Appellant, Pro se.
Mark A. Fulks, Assistant District Attorney General, for the Appellee,
State of Tennessee.
The petitioner, Jackie F. Curry, petitioned the Johnson County Circuit
Court for habeas corpus relief from his three 2000 Knox County
convictions of aggravated rape. The court dismissed the petition, and
the petitioner appealed. The state has moved this court to affirm the
convictions pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.
We sustain the state's motion and affirm the order of dismissal.
ERIC GILMORE v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
Albert John Newman, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Eric
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michelle Chapman
McIntire, Assistant Attorney General; Randall E. Nichols, District
Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
The petitioner, Eric Gilmore, appeals the trial court's order
dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed
a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of
relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
The petition fails to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus
relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. THEODORE F. HOLDEN
I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that the
defendant did not open the door to cross-examination concerning other
felonies involving dishonesty. This defendant's record is extensive,
and all but one of his thirteen convictions involve acts of
dishonesty. The defendant's credibility was an issue when he chose to
testify. For me, it is a close question of whether the questions asked
by the defendant's attorney opened the door for further examination.
By this I mean it appears that defense counsel was clearly trying to
convey the defendant's record consisted only of misdemeanor offenses.
I trust the trial court heard the inflections in defense counsel's
voice that he used to emphasize "misdemeanor" in his questioning.
Although his questions contained true statements, the inflections used
in asking the questions by defense counsel could surely place an undue
emphasis on "misdemeanor," creating a misimpression on a jury. I
believe the cavalier answers given by the defendant further opened the
door when he answered, "I guess, yeah," and "O.K." The defendant had
an extensive criminal record. His first arrest was at age nineteen,
and he is now thirty-two. The record reveals that the defendant had
never accumulated more than three years of good conduct without being
arrested. His answers to the specific questions by defense counsel
were answered in such a way that a jury could mistakenly believe that
his brushes with the law were so infrequent or minor that he had
difficulty remembering them. I believe this line of questions was
designed to convey a false impression to the jury. Tennessee Rule of
Evidence 609 envisions impeachment by the State of a criminal
defendant if he or she chooses to testify. Here, defense counsel
sought to lessen the sting of the state's impeachment or to steal the
state's thunder, a permissible tactic. However, this permissible trial
tactic must be employed with the utmost caution or the door will be
opened for the State to cross-examine on his entire record. Under the
facts of this case, I conclude the trial court was correct in ruling
that the defendant opened the door to further impeachment.
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. BROOKS JONATHAN LEE
William Cameron, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Brooks
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Jennifer L. Bledsoe,
Assistant Attorney General; William E. Gibson, District Attorney
General; and Thomas Tansil, Assistant District Attorney General, for
the appellee, State of Tennessee.
The Defendant was found guilty by jury verdict of second offense
driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), simple possession
of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia, all Class A
misdemeanors. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of eleven
months and twentynine days with eighty-five days to be served, had his
driver's license suspended for two years, and was fined a total of
$3,150. The Defendant now appeals his DUI conviction claiming: 1) the
trial court erred in admitting testimony from an expert witness; and
2) the evidence was insufficient to support his DUI conviction. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. FRANK PETER PINCHAK
Jerry H. Summers, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellant, Frank
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; John H. Bledsoe,
Assistant Attorney General; William H. Cox, III., District Attorney
General; and Steven H. Strain, Assistant District Attorney General,
for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
The defendant, Frank Peter Pinchak, entered a nolo contendere plea to
vehicular assault, aggravated assault, and violation of the implied
consent law. The trial court deferred the imposition of two concurrent
two-year sentences for vehicular assault and aggravated assault,
placing the defendant on judicial diversion for a term of six years.
For violating the implied consent law, the trial court suspended the
defendant's license for one year. The trial court then dismissed sua
sponte the implied consent law violation, noting that the indictment
failed to charge a criminal offense. The State appeals the single
issue of whether the trial court erred in dismissing the implied
consent violation and argues that diversion is inappropriate if the
offense is reinstated. Concluding that an indictment is not a
necessary prerequisite to adjudication of a civil implied consent law
violation, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of the charge,
remand the case for reinstatement of the trial court's original
imposition of a one-year suspension of the defendant's driver's
license, and conclude that diversion is not appropriate for this civil
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ROBERT WAYNE PRYOR
Gregory D. Smith, Clarksville, Tennessee (on appeal) and Andrew
Jackson Dearing, III., Assistant Public Defender (at trial), for the
appellant, Robert Wayne Pryor.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael Markham,
Assistant Attorney General; W. Michael McCown, District Attorney
General; and Michael Randles and Ann Filer, Assistant District
Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
A Bedford County jury convicted the defendant, Robert Wayne Pryor, of
robbery, a Class C felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial
court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to five years and
six months in the Department of Correction consecutive to sentences in
another case for which he was on probation. In this appeal, the single
issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient
to support the conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CHARLES TAWWATER
Norris A. Kessler, III, and Joseph S. Bean, Jr., Winchester, Tennessee
(on appeal), and Michelle M. Benjamin, Winchester, Tennessee (at
trial), for the appellant, Charles Tawwater.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Kathy D. Aslinger,
Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Taylor, District Attorney
General; and William Bobo Copeland, Assistant District Attorney
General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
The defendant, Charles Tawwater, pled guilty in Franklin County
Circuit Court to facilitation of the manufacture of methamphetamine, a
Class D felony, and received two years probation in the Community
Corrections Program. The defendant appeals upon certified questions of
law from the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant
to a warrantless search of his car. He claims the trial court should
have granted his motion because (1) the officers lacked probable cause
or reasonable suspicion to believe he had committed a criminal offense
when stopping his vehicle; (2) his consent to the search of his car
was not voluntary; and (3) statements made by him to officers during
his detention were inadmissible because he was not advised of his
rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
We affirm the trial court.
JAMES WILLIAM TAYLOR, a/k/a LUTFI SHAFQ TALAL v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
Judge: PER CURIAM
Appellant, James William Taylor, has timely filed a Petition to
Rehear. Upon review of this petition, it is denied.