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• Legal News (12)
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Today's Opinions

• TN Workers Comp Appeals Board (1)
• TN Court of Appeals (3)
• TN Court of Criminal Appeals (6)
• 6th Circuit Court (Published Opinions) (1)

GREGORY THOMAS BROCK v. DOLLAR GENERAL CORPORATION, ET AL.

Court: TN Workers Comp Appeals Board

Attorneys:

A. Allen Grant, Nashville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellant, Dollar General Corporation

Gregory Thomas Brock, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, employee-appellee, pro se

Judge(s): GODKIN

In this interlocutory appeal, the employer questions the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment. The employee alleged he suffered injuries to his neck, back, left shoulder, and left elbow as the result of a fall, as well as a mental injury as a result of work-related communications with a supervisor that the employee asserted were harassing and bullying in nature. The employer filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the employee’s physical injuries did not arise primarily out of his employment and that his alleged mental injuries were not compensable under Tennessee law. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that the employer did not submit a proper statement of undisputed material facts to which the employee could respond and, therefore, concluded it could not find that there was no genuine issue of material fact. The court denied the employer’s motion, and the employer has appealed. After a careful review of the record, we conclude for reasons other than those expressed by the trial court that the motion for summary judgment should be denied. Thus, we affirm the court’s order and remand the case.

brockg_112922.pdf

ANGELA MARIE HEISIG v. ANDREW CARL HEISIG

Court: TN Court of Appeals

Attorneys:

Philip M. Jacobs, Cleveland, Tennessee, for the appellant, Angela Marie Heisig.

Harold L. North and Nathan L. Kinard, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellee, Andrew Carl Heisig.

Judge(s): MCCLARTY

This appeal requires interpretation of a clause in the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. The final decree, entered in January 2018, incorporated the parties’ agreement awarding the wife $130,000 from the husband’s 401(k). After several rounds of qualified domestic relation orders and other court orders, the trial court ultimately held that the wife was entitled to $130,000 plus approximately four months of statutory interest. The wife appealed, seeking earnings on the $130,000 in addition to interest. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

heisiga_112922.pdf

JESSICA MARIE FORSYTHE ET AL. v. JACKSON MADISON COUNTY GENERAL HOSPITAL DISTRICT ET AL.

Court: TN Court of Appeals

Attorneys:

W. Bryan Smith, Memphis and T. Verner Smith, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellants, Jessica Marie Forsythe and Cody Forsythe.

Russell E. Reviere and Brandon W. Reedy, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellee, Jackson Madison County General Hospital District, Pathways of Tennessee, Inc., and West Tennessee Healthcare, Inc.

Judge(s): STAFFORD

The trial court granted the defendant medical providers summary judgment on the basis of the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act’s pre-suit notice and good faith certificate requirements. On appeal, the plaintiff, an employee of the defendants, argues that her claim does not relate to the provision of health care services and that she was therefore not required to give pre-suit notice or file a good faith certificate. Because we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that the claim is related to the provision of health care services, we affirm.

forsythej_112922.pdf

LOUISE FAULKNER ET AL. v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC

Court: TN Court of Appeals

Attorneys:

Terrell L. Tooten, Cordova, Tennessee, for the appellant, Louise Faulkner.

Lauren Paxton Roberts, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, NationStar Mortgage, LLC.

Judge(s): GOLDIN

This case involves a controversy surrounding certain real property located in Memphis. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Defendant on most claims, and after a jury trial and verdict in favor of the Defendant, the remaining claim was also dismissed. Although the homeowner of the property raises a number of issues in this appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

faulknerl_112922.pdf

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JAMES BERG

Court: TN Court of Criminal Appeals

Attorneys:

Brandon Elijah White (on appeal) and John Colley, III (at trial), Columbia, Tennessee, for the Defendant-Appellant, James Berg.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; David H. Findley, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Brent A. Cooper, District Attorney General; and Gary M. Howell, Assistant District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

Judge(s): MCMULLEN

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, James Berg, entered guilty pleas to aggravated sexual battery and two counts of rape of a child. The Defendant agreed to a concurrent term of twenty-five years for the rape of a child convictions and a term of fifteen years for the aggravated sexual battery conviction, with the alignment of these terms of imprisonment to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the terms to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of forty years’ imprisonment. The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering consecutive sentencing. Upon our review, we affirm.

bergj_112922.pdf

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DANIEL J. JAMISON

Court: TN Court of Criminal Appeals

Attorneys:

Mitchell A. Raines, Assistant Public Defender, Tennessee District Public Defenders Conference (on appeal) and Brian Beldin, Assistant Public Defender (at trial), for the appellant, Daniel J. Jamison.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Robert Carter, District Attorney General; and Holly Hewgley, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

Judge(s): AYERS

Defendant, Daniel J. Jamison, entered an open plea of guilty to aggravated burglary, theft of property valued at less than $1,000, aggravated criminal trespass, and public intoxication. The trial court imposed an effective six-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction, followed by a consecutive sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail with all but ninety days to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, Defendant argues that his sentence was excessive. Following our review of the entire record, oral arguments, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

jamisond_112922.pdf

TIMOTHY L. JEFFERSON v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Court: TN Court of Criminal Appeals

Attorneys:

Timothy L. Jefferson, Hartsville, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Brent C. Cherry, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Jason L. Lawson, District Attorney General for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

Judge(s): MCMULLEN

The Petitioner, Timothy L. Jefferson, appeals the Trousdale County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his pro se petition seeking habeas corpus relief from his conviction for second degree murder, for which he received an effective sentence of forty years in prison. On appeal, the Petitioner argues he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because he was illegally restrained as a result of a procedurally defective juvenile petition. After review, we affirm the judgment summarily dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

jeffersont_112922.pdf

WILLIAM COLEY v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Court: TN Court of Criminal Appeals

Attorneys:

Ana Escobar (at trial) and Kevin McLean Kelly (on appeal), Nashville, Tennessee, for the Petitioner, William Coley.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Samantha L. Simpson, Assistant Attorney General; Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney General; and Sarah Davis and Rob McGuire, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

Judge(s): MCMULLEN

The Petitioner, William Coley, appeals the denial of his petition seeking post-conviction relief from his convictions of first-degree felony murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. The Petitioner argues for the first time on appeal that the post-conviction court violated his due process rights by conducting his post-conviction hearing jointly with the post-conviction hearing of his then co-defendant, now Petitioner Markreo Quintez Springer. He additionally claims ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to file a pretrial severance motion based on Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136-137 (1968), and trial counsel’s failure to challenge the chain of custody regarding the State’s DNA evidence. Upon our review, we affirm.

MELVIN A. ODOM v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Court: TN Court of Criminal Appeals

Attorneys:

Vakessha Hood-Schneider, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellant, Melvin A. Odom.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Richard D. Douglas, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kim Helper, District Attorney General; and Jessica N. Borne, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

Judge(s): AYERS

Petitioner, Melvin A. Odom, appeals the summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition as time-barred. On appeal, he contends that the correct date to determine the statute of limitations is the day the trial court filed an amended judgment on one of his convictions and by that date, his petition was timely filed. Alternatively, he contends that due process considerations warrant the tolling of the one-year statute of limitations and requests that the case be remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he is entitled to equitable tolling. Following our review of the entire record, oral arguments, and the parties’ briefs, the dismissal is affirmed.

odomm_112922.pdf

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JOSEPH ANTHONY SZOSTAK, III

Court: TN Court of Criminal Appeals

Attorneys:

Brandon E. White, Columbia, Tennessee, for the appellant, Joseph Anthony Szostak, III.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; T. Austin Watkins, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Brent Cooper, District Attorney General; and Gary Howell, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

Judge(s): HOLLOWAY

Defendant, Joseph Anthony Szostak, III, claims that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for alternative sentencing and ordering him to serve his sentence of three years and six months in confinement. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

szostakj_112922.pdf

HUNTER DOSTER; JASON ANDERSON; MCKENNA COLANTANIO; PAUL CLEMENT; JOE DILLS; BENJAMIN LEIBY; BRETT MARTIN; CONNOR MCCORMICK; HEIDI MOSHER; PETER NORRIS; PATRICK POTTINGER; ALEX RAMSPERGER; BENJAMIN RINALDI; DOUGLAS RUYLE; CHRISTOPHER SCHULDES; EDWARD STAPANON, III; ADAM THERIAULT; DANIEL REINEKE, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated v. HON. FRANK KENDALL, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Air Force; LT. GENERAL ROBERT I. MILLER, in his official capacity as Surgeon General of the Air Force; LT. GENERAL MARSHALL B. WEBB, in his official capacity as Commander, Air Education and Training Command; LT. GENERAL RICHARD W. SCOBEE, in his official capacity as Commander, Air Force Reserve Command; LT. GENERAL JAMES C. SLIFE, in his official capacity as Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Court: 6th Circuit Court (Published Opinions)

Attorneys:

ARGUED: Casen B. Ross, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellants.

ARGUED: Christopher Wiest, CHRIS WIEST, ATTY AT LAW, PLLC, Crestview Hills, Kentucky, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF: Casen B. Ross, Charles W. Scarborough, Lowell V. Sturgill Jr., Sarah J. Clark, Anna O. Mohan, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellants.

ON BRIEF: Christopher Wiest, CHRIS WIEST, ATTY AT LAW, PLLC, Crestview Hills, Kentucky, Aaron Siri, Elizabeth A. Brehm, Wendy Cox, SIRI AND GLIMSTAD LLP, New York, New York, Thomas B. Bruns, BRUNS CONNELL VOLLMAR & ARMSTRONG, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF: Matthew F. Kuhn, OFFICE OF THE KENTUCKY ATTORNEY GENERAL, Frankfort, Kentucky, Frederick R. Yarger, WHEELER TRIGG O’DONNELL LLP, Denver, Colorado, Ilya Shapiro, New York, New York, Gene C. Schaerr, Kenneth A. Klukowski, SCHAERR | JAFFE LLP, Washington, D.C., John Eidsmoe, FOUNDATION FOR MORAL LAW, Montgomery, Alabama, for Amici Curiae.

Judge(s): KETHLEDGE, BUSH, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges

Court Appealed: Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. The Department of the Air Force has ordered all of its over 500,000 service members to get vaccinated against COVID-19. Some 10,000 members with a wide array of duties have requested religious exemptions from this mandate. The Air Force has granted only about 135 of these requests and only to those already planning to leave the service. Yet it has granted thousands of other exemptions for medical reasons (such as a pregnancy or allergy) or administrative reasons (such as a looming retirement). The 18 Plaintiffs who filed this suit allege that the vaccine mandate substantially burdens their religious exercise in violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). Finding that these claims would likely succeed, the district court granted a preliminary injunction that barred the Air Force from disciplining the Plaintiffs for failing to take a vaccine. But its injunction did not interfere with the Air Force’s operational decisions over the Plaintiffs’ duties. The court then certified a class of thousands of similar service members and extended this injunction to the class.

The Air Force appeals the individual and class injunctions. Its briefs across the two appeals work at cross-purposes. In its challenge to the class-action certification, the Air Force (correctly) states that RFRA adopts an individual-by-individual approach: the Air Force must show that it has a compelling interest in requiring a “specific” service member to get vaccinated based on that person’s specific duties and working conditions. Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431 (2006). In its challenge to the Plaintiffs’ injunction, however, the Air Force fails to identify the specific duties or working conditions of a single Plaintiff. It instead seeks to satisfy RFRA with the “general interests” underlying its vaccine mandate. Id. at 438. We are thus asked to deny that common questions exist for purposes of certifying a class but to accept that common answers exist for purposes of rejecting all 18 Plaintiffs’ claims on their merits.

We decline this inconsistent invitation. Under RFRA, the Air Force wrongly relied on its “broadly formulated” reasons for the vaccine mandate to deny specific exemptions to the Plaintiffs, especially since it has granted secular exemptions to their colleagues. Id. at 431. We thus may uphold the Plaintiffs’ injunction based on RFRA alone. The Air Force’s treatment of their exemption requests also reveals common questions for the class: Does the Air Force have a uniform policy of relying on its generalized interests in the vaccine mandate to deny religious exemptions regardless of a service member’s individual circumstances? And does it have a discriminatory policy of broadly denying religious exemptions but broadly granting secular ones? A district court can answer these questions in a “yes” or “no” fashion for the entire class. It can answer whether these alleged policies violate RFRA and the First Amendment in the same way. A ruling for the class also would permit uniform injunctive relief against the allegedly illegal policies. We affirm.

dosterh_112922.pdf