INNER CITY CONTRACTING, LLC v. CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF NORTHVILLE, MICHIGAN; FLEIS & VANDENBRINK ENGINEERING, INC. dba Fleis & Vandenbrink - Articles

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INNER CITY CONTRACTING, LLC v. CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF NORTHVILLE, MICHIGAN; FLEIS & VANDENBRINK ENGINEERING, INC. dba Fleis & Vandenbrink

Posted by: Karen Belcher on Nov 30, 2023

Court: 6th Circuit Court (Published Opinions)

Attorneys 1: ARGUED: Cindy Rhodes Victor, THE VICTOR FIRM, PLLC, Southfield, Michigan, for Appellant.

Attorneys 2: ARGUED: Kevin J. Campbell, CUMMINGS, MCCLOREY, DAVIS & ACHO, PLC, Livonia, Michigan, for Appellee Charter Township of Northville. Michelle A. Thomas, DICKIE, MCCAMEY & CHILCOTE, P.C., Grosse Pointe Farms, Michigan, for Appellee Fleis & Vandenbrink.

Attorneys 3: ON BRIEF: Cindy Rhodes Victor, KUS RYAN, PLLC, Southfield, Michigan, on the merits brief, THE VICTOR FIRM, PLLC, Southfield, Michigan, on the reply brief, for Appellant.

Attorneys 4: ON BRIEF: Kevin J. Campbell, CUMMINGS, MCCLOREY, DAVIS & ACHO, PLC, Livonia, Michigan, for Appellee Charter Township of Northville. Michelle A. Thomas, DICKIE, MCCAMEY & CHILCOTE, P.C., Grosse Pointe Farms, Michigan, for Appellee Fleis & Vandenbrink.

Judge(s): CLAY, KETHLEDGE, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges

Court Appealed: United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff, a government contractor, brought suit against Defendants, a township and a consulting company, claiming racial discrimination after the consulting company allegedly made false and inaccurate statements about Plaintiff, leading Defendant township to award a government contract to a rival firm. The suit alleged violations of Plaintiff’s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, and Michigan law. The district court dismissed the case on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to state a claim under either 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by failing to allege the racial composition of its ownership. Further, the district court held that Plaintiff lacked standing to assert its constitutional claims, and that Defendant consulting company was not a state actor for purposes of § 1983. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE in part and AFFIRM in part the district court’s order dismissing the case and REMAND the case for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

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