Each morning I start my workday by reading TBA Today, and I read with interest all the summaries of the recently released opinions from our state appellate courts. Lately, I have been struck by the number of civil appeals dismissed because an appeal as of right was not permissible due to the lack of a final judgment.

While some of the dismissed appeals involve pro se litigants, many involve litigants who are represented by counsel. In some cases, certain claims remain unresolved by the trial court that prevent an appeal as of right from being taken due to the lack of a final judgment; in others, the assertion of an exception to the final judgment rule is unsuccessful.

A primer on the final judgment rule — and its exceptions — in Tennessee civil actions seems timely.

The Final Judgment Rule

The general rule in Tennessee “is now, and always has been,” that an appeal as of right lies only from a final judgment.¹ This rule, commonly known as the “final judgment rule,” is enshrined in Rule 3(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.² “In civil actions every final judgment entered by a trial court from which an appeal lies to the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals is appealable as of right . . . ”³

A “final judgment” for purposes of appeal under Rule 3(a), as discussed in more detail below, is one that that resolves all the issues in the case. In contrast, an order that adjudicates fewer than all the claims, rights or liabilities of the parties is not final, but interlocutory or interim in nature, and generally cannot be appealed as of right.⁴

Under Rule 3(a), an appellate court has no subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate an appeal as of right if the order is not a final one. “Unless an appeal from an interlocutory order is provided by the rules or by statute, appellate courts have jurisdiction over final judgments only.”⁵

The final judgment rule serves several purposes. First, the rule promotes judicial efficiency. Confining the review of appellate courts to final judgments protects these courts from considering issues that may become moot with the final disposition of the case in the trial court. For instance, a party who appeals a trial court’s decision denying a motion may ultimately win the case, and the appeal becomes unnecessary.⁶ Second, the rule avoids the delay and expense associated with piecemeal litigation.⁷ Third, the rule protects the dignity of the trial court’s rulings during the course of the proceedings. “Until a judgment becomes final, it remains within the trial court’s control and may be modified any time prior to the entry of a final judgment.”⁸

Under the final judgment rule, a judgment is final when it “adjudicate[s] all of the claims, rights and liabilities of all the parties.”⁹ Put another way, a final judgment is one that “decides and disposes of the whole merits of the case leaving nothing for the further judgment of the court.”¹⁰ In short, “[a] final judgment is one that resolves all the issues in the case, ‘leaving nothing else for the trial court to do.’”¹¹

Accordingly, an order that leaves more “for the trial court to do” is typically not final. For instance, an order overruling a motion to dismiss is not a final judgment because denial of a motion to dismiss does not end the lawsuit.¹² Likewise, an order overruling a motion for summary judgment is not final within the meaning of Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a) because it “leaves the entire suit for later trial and disposition . . .”¹³

Moreover, courts have found the lack of a final appealable order when a counterclaim remains unadjudicated,¹⁴ and when an outstanding contempt petition has not been addressed.¹⁵ Similarly, prejudgment motions for discovery sanctions cannot be left unaddressed without affecting the finality of a judgment.¹⁶ And an order that fails to address an outstanding request for attorney’s fees is generally not final and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction.¹⁷

Only when an aspect of the case is not viewed as part of the “whole merits of the case” may it be left unresolved by the trial court without preventing the finality of the judgment. For instance, “[a] post-trial motion for discretionary costs does not ‘arrest the finality’ of the trial court’s judgment for purposes of appellate jurisdiction, regardless of whether the motion is filed prior to the entry of final judgment,” because such a motion is not viewed as part of the “whole merits of the case” that must be adjudicated in order to make a judgment final.¹⁸ Similarly, post-judgment contempt proceedings are not part of the “whole merits of the case” that must be resolved before an otherwise final order in the underlying case will be considered final for the purposes of Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a).¹⁹

In sum, when an order fails to address an issue that is part of the “whole merits of the case” and leaves more “for the trial court to do,” the order is not final, but merely interlocutory, and an appeal as of right does not lie under Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). For the appellate court to exercise jurisdiction over an interlocutory order as an appeal as of right, a statute or rule must provide an exception to the final judgment rule and authorize the appeal, or the order must be one that courts have determined to be “collateral” to the underlying case, as explained below.²⁰

Exceptions to the Final Judgment Rule

A sampling of statutes and rules that authorize appeals as of right of interlocutory orders follows, along with a discussion of some of the more noteworthy cases examining whether an exception to the final judgment rule exists because the interlocutory order is collateral to the underlying case. The list is robust, but not intended to be exhaustive.

Statutes

Tennessee Public Participation Act (TPPA). Under the TPPA, which is Tennessee’s version of an anti-SLAPP statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-106 provides that a trial court’s “order dismissing or refusing to dismiss a legal action pursuant to a petition filed under [the TPPA] is immediately appealable as a matter of right to the court of appeals.”²¹ Based on the plain language of the statute, the Court of Appeals has found orders involving the disposal of TPPA petitions are “immediately appealable,” even when issues regarding attorney’s fees, costs or sanctions remain unaddressed by the trial court. Moreover, an immediate appeal to the Court of Appeals is available regardless of whether the case is appealed from general sessions or circuit court.²²

Tennessee News Reporter’s Privilege/Shield Law. Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-208(a), “a newsman, etc., gathering information for publication shall not be required” to disclose “any information or the source of any information procured for publication or broadcast,” subject to the exception in “subsection (b) . . . which excludes the source of information from the privilege in a civil action for defamation where defendant asserts a defense based on that source . . . .”²³ When someone seeks disclosure of information or the source of information that is protected under Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-208, subsection (c) provides for a right of appeal to the Court of Appeals of any order divesting a newsgatherer of the benefits of Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-208, and “[t]he execution of or any proceeding to enforce a judgment divesting the protection of this section shall be stayed pending appeal . . . .”²⁴

Class certifications. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-125 provides: “The court of appeals shall hear appeals from orders of trial courts granting or denying class certification under Rule 23 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, if a notice is filed within 10 days after entry of the order. All proceedings in the trial court shall be automatically stayed pending the appeal of the class certification ruling.” The Court of Appeals has acknowledged that Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-125 provides a mechanism by which decisions regarding class certification may be immediately appealed but has observed that such an order remains interlocutory and nothing in the statute renders the otherwise non-final order final for the purposes of issue or claim preclusion.²⁵

Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim that are granted. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-12-119(c) provides that when a trial court grants a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court shall award reasonable costs and attorney’s fees to the party or parties against whom the dismissed claims were pending. The statute further provides in subsection (c) that “[a]n award of costs pursuant to this subsection (c) shall be made only after all appeals of the issue of the granting of the motion to dismiss have been exhausted[.]” Based on this language, the Court of Appeals has concluded that it has subject matter jurisdiction to review a trial court’s decision on a Rule 12.02(6) dismissal, despite the outstanding issue of recoverable attorney’s fees, when those fees are awarded by virtue of § 20-12-119(c).²⁶

Claims against estates. By statute, a liquidated claim against an estate must be resolved prior to resolving all of the outstanding issues in an estate matter.²⁷ Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-315(a)(2) provides that when an exception to a claim is filed, the trial court should promptly “hear and determine all issues arising upon all the exceptions,” and Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-315(b) states that “[a] judgment upon the findings of the court shall be entered in the court and from the judgment an appeal may be perfected within 30 days from the date of entry of the judgment.” Accordingly, the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained that “[a] party dissatisfied with the outcome of a trial regarding a disputed claim must file a timely appeal without waiting for a final order closing the probate proceeding.”²⁸ The court has also recognized a similar rule applicable to claims in which no exception has been filed, explaining that “‘claims unexcepted to become the equivalent of judgments against the estate excepting of course that the right to execution thereon does not follow’ and the issue of the claim is immediately appealed as a final order, rather than an interlocutory order.”²⁹

Arbitration. The Uniform Arbitration Act creates limited exceptions to the final judgment rule. Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5-329(a), an appeal may be taken from: (1) an order denying a motion to compel arbitration; (2) an order granting a motion to stay arbitration; (3) an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award; (4) an order modifying or correcting an award; (5) an order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or (6) a final judgment entered pursuant to this part.³⁰ Accordingly, courts have found that an order denying a motion to compel arbitration, for instance, is immediately appealable based on the express terms of the statute,³¹ while an order compelling arbitration is not because none of the bases in the foregoing code section is met.³²

Appeal as of right by state or state official from interlocutory order relating to injunctive relief. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-101 provides: “In an action brought against this state, a department or agency of this state, or an official of this state in their official capacity that challenges the constitutionality of a state statute, the state may appeal as of right from an interlocutory order of a circuit or chancery court of this state that: (1) Grants, continues or modifies an injunction; or (2) Denies a motion to dissolve or modify an injunction.”

Rules

Order granting or denying a motion to intervene. Both Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.05 and Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02(2) provide: “Any order granting or denying a motion to intervene filed [pursuant to Rule 24 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure] shall be a final judgment for purposes of Tenn. R. App. P. 3.”  The Advisory Commission Comments to both rules state that “a timely appeal of that final judgment shall be the only method to appeal the grant or denial of a motion to intervene.”

Appeal involving separate claims or parties. Rule 54.02(1) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, which addresses appeals in cases involving multiple claims of relief or parties, serves as “exception to Rule 3 that permits the trial court, without permission from the appellate court, to certify an order as final and appealable, even if parts of the overall litigation remain pending in the trial court.”³³ Specifically, Rule 54.02(1) allows a trial court to “direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.” Accordingly, two prerequisites exist for the certification of a final judgment appealable as of right: (1) the order must be dispositive of “an entire claim or party;”³⁴ and (2) the order must expressly direct the entry of a final judgment upon an express finding of “no just reason for delay.”³⁵ If Rule 54.02(1) certification is deemed improper for either reason, the appellate court will vacate the judgment and remand for further disposition.³⁶

As the Court of Appeals has observed, “[t]he determination of whether Rule 54.02(1) certification is proper is not always easy.”³⁷ For purposes of this rule, a “claim” is a set of facts giving rise to one or more legal rights enforceable in court. Thus, when a complaint asserts several causes of action that are alternative theories in pursuit of one recovery, multiple claims for purposes of 54.02(1) do not exist. Similarly, a complaint asserting only one legal right, even if seeking multiple remedies for the alleged violation, states only a single claim for relief.³⁸ And when a claim and counterclaim are present, Rule 54.02(1) authorizes final judgment only when the two claims do not arise out of the same set of facts.³⁹

In short, if an issue “is inextricably linked with the remaining issues not yet decided,” an order resolving that issue may not be properly certified as final under Rule 54.02(1).⁴⁰

Order denying motion for recusal or disqualification of judge. An order denying a motion for the recusal or disqualification of a judge can be appealed immediately in an “accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right” pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 2.01. Such an appeal may be sought by filing a “petition for recusal appeal” with the appropriate appellate court “within 21 days of the trial court’s entry of order,” as provided in § 2.02. The petition must contain the requisite components set forth in § 2.03 for an accelerated interlocutory appeal to lie.⁴¹

Appeal as of right in case involving termination of parental rights. While Tenn. R. App. P. 8A “govern[s] any appeal as of right in a termination of parental rights proceeding,” it does not dispense with the requirement that a final judgment must exist. For instance, the Court of Appeals has found that an order of termination is not a final appealable judgment when outstanding issues involving attorney fees,⁴² parenting plans⁴³ and counterclaims⁴⁴ remain.

Collateral Orders

Finally, courts will sometimes determine that Tenn. R. App. P 3(a) does not stand as a barrier to an appeal as of right if the order is “collateral” to the underlying case. The “collateral order doctrine” was established by the United States Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. Under this doctrine, an otherwise interlocutory order can be immediately appealable when it is “a final disposition of a claimed right which is not an ingredient of the cause of action and does not require consideration with it.”⁴⁵

An application of the collateral order doctrine is Mitchell v. Forysyth, a United States Supreme Court decision that held that an order denying a motion for qualified immunity in a civil rights action is immediately appealable. Relying on Mitchell, Tennessee courts have held that a denial of claim for qualified immunity is appealable as of right under the collateral order doctrine.⁴⁶

Tennessee courts have also found that contempt orders that fix punishment are final appealable orders.⁴⁷ While the courts have not expressly stated that these orders are immediately appealable under the “collateral order doctrine,” the articulated rationale for allowing the appeal as of right is the same:  “Contempt proceedings are sui generis and are incidental to the case out of which they arise. . . . [Thus,] [i]t matters not that the proceedings out of which the contempt arose are not complete. An order that imposes punishment for contempt is a final appealable order in its own right even though the proceedings in which the contempt arose are ongoing.”⁴⁸

Tennessee courts, however, have rejected arguments that certain other interlocutory orders are collateral and therefore immediately appealable. For instance, courts have found that an attorney disqualification order is not immediately appealable,⁴⁹ nor is an order awarding discovery sanctions.⁵⁰ Similarly, there is no right to immediately appeal an order for an interim accounting in an estate proceeding.⁵¹ And there is no right to immediately appeal an interlocutory Rule 60.02 order granting a litigant relief from a default judgment or otherwise granting a new trial, even if the motion seeking such relief is alleged to be untimely.⁵²

Conclusion

Before filing a Rule 3(a) appeal or upon receiving notice of such an appeal, take the time to determine whether the appellate court can exercise jurisdiction over the appeal. Examine the purported final order(s) and the record to make sure that all aspects of the “whole merits of the case” have been considered by the court to assure that a final judgment exists. If a final judgment does not exist, determine whether an exception to the final judgment rule provides the requisite jurisdiction for the appellate court to entertain the interlocutory order. |||

---

LAURA T. KIDWELL works at the Office of the Tennessee Attorney General and Reporter in the Solicitor General’s Office. She is a graduate of Furman University and the Wake Forest University School of Law. This article represents the opinions of the author and not necessarily those of the Office of the Tennessee Attorney General and Reporter.

---

NOTES

1. Ruckart v. Schubert, 223 Tenn. 215, 218-19, 443 S.W.2d 466, 468 (1969).
2. See Levitt, Hamilton and Rothstein, LLC v. Asfour, 587 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019).
3. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a).
4. In re Estate of Henderson, 121 S.W.3d 643, 645 (Tenn. 2003).
5. Bayberry Assocs. v. Jones, 783 S.W.2d 553, 559 (Tenn. 1990); c.f. Tenn. R. App. P. 9 (governing discretionary interlocutory appeals for which no final judgment is necessary); Tenn. R. App. P. 10 (governing discretionary extraordinary appeals for which no final judgment is necessary).
6. Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, 15A Fed. Prac. and Proc. § 3907 (3d ed. 2023).
7. Id.; see Josyln v. Sappington, 1 Tenn. 222 (Tenn. Super. L. & Eq. 1806).
8. State ex rel. McAllister v. Goode, 968 S.W.2d 834, 840 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Stidham v. Fickle Heirs, 643 S.W.2d 324, 328 (Tenn. 1982)).
9. Discover Bank v. Morgan, 363 S.W.3d 479, 488 n. 17 (Tenn. 2012) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a)).
10. Richardson v. Tennessee Bd. of Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446, 460 (Tenn. 1995) (quoting Saunders v. Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville, 214 Tenn. 703, 709, 383 S.W.2d 28, 31 (1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis original).
11. In re Estate of Henderson, 121 S.W.3d at 645 (quoting State ex rel. McAllister, 968 S.W.2d at 840).
12. C.O. Christian & Sons Co. Inc. v. Nashville P.S. Hotel Ltd., 765 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
13. In re Estate of McCord, 661 S.W.2d 890, 891 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).
14. Perry v. Brockway, No. M2021-00532-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 471677, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2022); Britt v. Usery, No. W2021-00137-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 153186, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2022).
15. Fuller v. Fuller, No. E2022-00701-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 7853527, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2022).
16. See Thompson v. Logan, No. M2005-02379-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 2405130, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2007); see also Menche v. White Eagle Property Group LLC, No. W2018-01336-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 4016127, at *5-*6 (Aug. 26, 2019).
17. Nandigam Neurology PLC v. Beavers, 639 S.W.3d 651, 661 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021); City of Jackson v. Hersh, No. W2008-02360-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 2601380, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2009) (collecting cases observing such). But see New v. Dumitrache, 604 S.W.3d 1, 20 (Tenn. 2020) (“Requests for attorney’s fees are collateral and have a distinct and independent character from the underlying suit. Courts should view a request for attorney’s fees as an independent proceeding supplemental to the original proceedings and not a request for modification of the original decree.”)  (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Tennessee Supreme Court made this statement, however, in the context of a case where the trial court had dismissed the underlying suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In such a case, the court explained that the trial court still retains the power to award attorney’s fees and costs since requests for attorney fees are collateral and have a distinct and independent character from the underlying suit. The court did not address, much less overrule, any of the multiple Tennessee Court of Appeals decisions that state that a trial court’s failure to rule on a request for attorney’s fees renders an order nonfinal and deprives the appellate court of subject matter jurisdiction.
18. Gunn v. Jefferson Cnty. Econ. Dev. Oversight Comm. Inc., 578 S.W.3d 462, 465, 468 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Richardson, 913 S.W.2d at 460) (citations omitted); see Tenn. R. App. P. 4 advisory committee’s cmt. to 1995 amend. (“A motion for discretionary costs does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal.”).
19. See Poff v. Poff, No. 01-A-01-9301-CV00024, 1993 WL 73897, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 1993).
20. See Bayberry Assocs., 783 S.W.2d at 559.
21. The term “SLAPP” stands for “strategic lawsuits against public participation,” which refers to lawsuits which might be viewed as preventing citizens from exercising their political rights or punishing those who have done so. See Nandigam Neurology PLC, 639 S.W.3d at 657. SLAPPs use the threat of money damages or the prospect of the cost of defending against the suits to silence citizen participation. Id. at 658.
22. Id. at 662-63, 667.
23. Austin v. Memphis Pub. Co., 655 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Tenn. 1983).
24. Funk v. Scripps Media Inc., M2017-00256-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 5952914, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2017) (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-208(c)(3)(B)).
25. Emergency Medical Care Facilities P.C. v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn. Inc., No. M2021-00174-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 4574772, at *6-7 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 18, 2023).
26. Irvin v. Green Wise Homes LLC, No. M2019-02232-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 709782, at *5–6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2021) (citing Donovan v. Hastings, No. M2019-01396-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 6390134, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2020, rev’d on other grounds, 652 S.W. 3d 1 (Tenn. 2022)).
27. When the claim involves unliquidated damages, i.e., a claim involving unresolved independent litigation concerning the estate, the probate court holds the estate action in abeyance. See In re Estate of Meadows, No. M2017-01062-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 1920378, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2018) (citing Herring v. Estate of Tollett, 550 S.W.2d 660, 662 (Tenn. 1977); Coin Automatic Co. v. Estate of Dixon, 213 Tenn. 311, 317, 375 S.W.2d 858, 861 (1963)). A claim based upon a pending independent action does not become final; instead, the trial court is directed to “hold in abeyance any action on the claim until the final determination of the independent suit.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-315(c)(1).
28. In re Estate of Trigg, 368 S.W.3d 483, 497 (Tenn. 2012).
29. In re Estate of Meadows, 2018 WL 1920378, at *4 (quoting Warfield v. Thomas’ Estate, 185 Tenn. 328, 334-35, 206 S.W.2d 372 (1947)).
30. The Cotton Arbitration Act contains a nearly identical provision. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5-219(a).
31. Benton v. Vanderbilt Univ., 137 S.W.3d 614, 617 n. 4 (Tenn. 2004); Erwin v. Moon Prods. Inc., No. 2002-00877-COA-R9-CV, 2003 WL 21797584, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2003).
32. T.R. Mills Contractors Inc. v. WRH Enters. LLC, 93 S.W.3d 861, 864-65 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002); Peters v. Commonwealth Assocs., No. 03A01-9508-CV-00295, 1996 WL 93768, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 1996).
33. Johnson v. Nunis, 383 S.W.3d 122, 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).
34. Bayberry Assocs., 783 S.W.2d at 558 (emphasis added).
35. Fox v. Fox, 657 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Tenn. 1983); Lokey-Kinser Realty Co. v. Allen Co. Inc., 655 S.W.2d 162, 163-64 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).
36. See Bayberry Assocs., 783 S.W.2d at 559; Lokey-Kinser Realty Co., 655 S.W.2d at 164.
37. Ingram v. Wasson, 379 S.W.3d. 227, 238 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011).
38. Infinity Homes Inc. v. Horizon Land Title Inc., No. M2022-00829-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 3884723, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 8, 2023); see, e.g., Johnson v. Tanner-Peck LLC, No. W2009-02454-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 1330777, at *6 n. 8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2011) (finding trial court inappropriately certified an order as final under Rule 54.02 because it did not dispose of a request for treble damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees arising out of the same claim).
39. See FSGBank N.A., v. Anand, No. E2011-00168-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 554449 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2012); see, e.g., Georgia Boot Inc. v. Owings, No. 01-A-019207CH00282, 1992 WL 386289, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1992) (finding certification proper when breach-of-contract counterclaim involved a different set of transactions than those at issue in complaint).
40. Ingram, 379 S.W.3d at 238.
41. Slaughter v. Stillwagon, No. E2023-01531-COA-T10B-CV, 2023 WL 7326357 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2023); Goodine v. Goodine, No. E2022-00151-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL1025013 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2022).
42. See In re Kendall K., No. M2021-00204-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL 4192320 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2021).
43. In re Sophia P., No. M2015-01978-COA-R3-PT, 2016 WL 3090788 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2016).
44. In re Brennan T., No. M2013-01451-COA-R3-PT, 2014 WL 2841078 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 19, 2014).
45. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949).
46. See Cantrell v. DeKalb Cnty., 78 S.W.3d 902, 904 n. 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); Fann. v. Brailey, 841 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).
47. Stark v. Stark, No. W2019-00650-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 507644, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020) (citations omitted); Ballard v. Cayabas, No. W2016-01913-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 2471090, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 8, 2017) (citations omitted).
48. In re Brown, 470 S.W.3d 433, 441 n. 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
49. In re Estate of Meadows, 2018 WL 1920378, at *5 (collecting cases determining that an attorney disqualification order is not immediately appealable).
50. Ibsen v. Summit View of Farragut LLC, No. E2018-01249-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 6790291, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2019).
51. In re Estate of Schorn, 359 S.W.3d 192, 196-97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011).
52. Levitt, Hamilton and Rothstein, LLC, 587 S.W.3d at 9.