The right of a criminal defendant “to present a defense” is a fundamental tenant of the criminal justice system in the United States. That seems fair. In an adversary system, no one would argue that one side should not have a right to put on a case. But what does it mean “to present a defense?”

In Chandler v. Brown, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit granted habeas corpus relief after a trial in which defense counsel was truly prevented from putting on exculpatory evidence.¹ Along the way, the court addressed every important case that counsel would need to address in making an argument about the right to present a defense.

The most interesting thing about this theory is that a criminal defendant can be denied his or her constitutional right to present a defense even if the trial court follows the rules of evidence perfectly. The Tennessee Supreme Court has explained that “[e]xclusions of evidence may violate the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution even if the exclusions comply with rules of evidence.”² The right to present a defense acknowledges that full disclosure of facts is the basis for the integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system.³

A History of False Allegations

The Chandler case is worth reading because of the facts alone. It is amazing that the defendant was convicted. Chandler was convicted of two counts of first-degree sexual assault in Ohio and sentenced to 25 to 75 years in prison.

Mr. Chandler and his wife had cared for more than 20 foster children without incident. When the foster care agency then placed the alleged victim in this case with the Chandlers, the agency warned that the 8-year-old had a history of making false allegations. As feared, the child made allegations, but no charges were placed because the claims were deemed not to be credible, but the child was removed from the home. Four years later, the child was interviewed again, made inconsistent allegations against Chandler, but this time the district attorney decided to prosecute.

Chandler was arrested and pled not guilty. Despite defense counsel repeatedly asking for a continuance to investigate prior false allegations and to obtain an expert, the trial was held 75 days later. Although the state was providing discovery up until the eve of trial, the trial court struck the defendant’s proposed expert testimony and refused to allow 20 defense witnesses to testify. The witnesses could have detailed the complaining witnesses’ prior false allegations, but the trial court excluded them because their names had not been disclosed 10 days before trial.

At trial, the complaining child witness first testified that she did not recognize the defendant and that he never touched her. Then she changed her testimony and said he touched her sexually twice, for which he was convicted.

Showing A Violation of a Clearly Established Right

After Chandler exhausted his direct appeals, the 6th Circuit granted relief. The standards are tough for a defendant under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and because the defendant has to show a violation of a clearly established right, the 6th Circuit clearly and methodically set out the most important precedents explaining what it means to be allowed to present a defense.⁴ That makes Chandler v. Brown a treatise on application of the theory of the right to put on a defense.⁵

The court first noted that the “Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” This guarantee is rooted in the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment and the trial rights of the Sixth Amendment. According to the panel decision, the first case to examine is Washington v. Texas, in which the U.S. Supreme Court found that a rule that prohibited a defendant from calling an accomplice arbitrarily denied the defendant a fair trial.⁶

The court next cited a more commonly known U.S. Supreme Court case, Chambers v. Mississippi.⁷ In Chambers, the trial court had applied a state rule of evidence to prevent defense counsel from calling a suspect who had previously confessed and impeaching him with his prior confession. The Supreme Court found that application of the state rule deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to present witnesses in his defense.

Next on the list of “key precedents” is another United States Supreme Court case that we should all know (but for some reason I didn’t): Ungar v. Sarafite.⁸ There, the Supreme Court noted that a denial of a continuance in some cases could render the right to defend with counsel a mere formality.

Finally, the opinion noted two important 6th Circuit cases on the right to present a defense. First, in O’Neal v. Balcarcel, the court held that the defendant was denied the right to present a defense when a jailhouse confession by another suspect and the victim’s dying declaration identifying the alternate suspect were excluded.⁹ Second, the 6th Circuit had analyzed the right to present a defense in granting relief in Ferensic v. Birkett because a witness questioning the identification and an eyewitness identification expert were excluded.¹⁰

Applying the extremely restrictive standards for granting federal habeas corpus relief, the 6th Circuit concluded it had grave doubts about the reliability of the verdict and granted relief.¹¹

When examining whether the application of a state procedural rule might conflict with the Constitution, we should also note Davis v. Alaska,¹² although it was not mentioned in Chandler v. Brown. In Davis v. Alaska, the Sixth and 14th Amendments to effective cross-examination of an adverse witness for bias outweighed the state’s interest in a rule that protected the juvenile record of a witness. Chandler v. Brown doesn’t mention Davis v. Alaska, probably because it is a confrontation clause case rather than due process, but it is an important example of how the application of a rule of evidence can result in an unconstitutional conviction.

I should note that all of these cases point out that it is exceedingly rare that a state procedural rule, properly applied, would result in a constitutional violation. It seems to happen only when the jury is truly presented with a skewed view of the facts as a result of the application of the rule.

Using the Right to Present a Defense

The Tennessee Supreme Court has summarized the requirements for a defendant to show that the constitutional right to present a defense requires admission of defense proof:

(1) Whether the excluded evidence is critical to the defense; (2) whether the evidence bears sufficient indicia of reliability; and (3) whether the interest supporting exclusion of the evidence is substantially important.¹³

If defense evidence is excluded under the rules of evidence, depending on the circumstances, defense counsel should consider saying something like, “Your honor, I understand the court’s ruling under the rule of evidence, but under the unique circumstance of this case, admission of this evidence is required in order to satisfy the defendant’s right to present a defense under the federal and state constitutions.”

Prosecutors and defense counsel should be prepared to argue the three factors above. |||

WADE DAVIES is the owner of The Davies Law Firm in Knoxville. He is a 1993 graduate of the University of Tennessee College of Law. The majority of his practice has always been devoted to criminal defense. Davies is a member of the Tennessee Bar Journal Editorial Board.  

NOTES
1. Chandler v. Brown, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 1589, 2024 FED App. 0017P (6th Cir. 2025).
2. State v. Flood, 219 S.W.3d 307, 315-316 (Tenn. 2007).
3. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988)
4. Chandler, Slip op. at 12, quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984).
5. Id. at 12.
6. Id. at 13, citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019, 1967 U.S. LEXIS 1083 (1967).
7. Id. at 13, citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 107 (1973).
8. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964)
9. O’Neal v. Balcarcel, 933 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2019).
10. Ferensic v. Birkett, 501 F.3d 469 (6th Cir. 2007).
11. Chandler, Slip op. at 28-29.
12. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 104 (1974).
13. Flood, 219 S.W.3d at 316.