MISTY COLEMAN v. HAMILTON COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, CHARMAINE MCGUFFEY; BETHANIE DREW; COLINA YATES; MORGAN BOLEN; TIMOTHY SCHOLZ; FRITZ ELSASSER; NAPHCARE, INC.; MICHAEL J. PEGRAM, JR.; LAUREN A. SLACK; JENNA N. WARD; DONALD L. HAUN - Articles

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MISTY COLEMAN v. HAMILTON COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, CHARMAINE MCGUFFEY; BETHANIE DREW; COLINA YATES; MORGAN BOLEN; TIMOTHY SCHOLZ; FRITZ ELSASSER; NAPHCARE, INC.; MICHAEL J. PEGRAM, JR.; LAUREN A. SLACK; JENNA N. WARD; DONALD L. HAUN

Posted by: Azya Thornton on Mar 7, 2025

Court: 6th Circuit Court (Published Opinions)

Attorneys 1: ARGUED: Lydia A. Caylor, CORS & BASSETT, LLC, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant.

Attorneys 2: ARGUED: James S. Sayre, HAMILTON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Cincinnati, Ohio, for the Hamilton County Appellees.

Attorneys 3: ARGUED: Michael P. Foley, RENDIGS, FRY, KIELY & DENNIS, LLP, Cincinnati, Ohio, for the NaphCare Appellees.

Attorneys 4: ON BRIEF: Lydia A. Caylor, CORS & BASSETT, LLC, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant

Attorneys 5: ON BRIEF: James S. Sayre, HAMILTON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Cincinnati, Ohio, for the Hamilton County Appellees.

Attorneys 6: ON BRIEF: Michael P. Foley, RENDIGS, FRY, KIELY & DENNIS, LLP, Cincinnati, Ohio, for the NaphCare Appellees.

Attorneys 8: SUTTON, Chief Judge; BUSH and MURPHY, Circuit Judges

Judge(s): SUTTON, Chief Judge; BUSH and MURPHY, Circuit Judges

Court Appealed: United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Misty Coleman alleges that she fell and broke her ankle after slipping on the wet shower floor of a county jail. This accident led Coleman to pursue constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and negligence claims under Ohio law against the county and many corrections officers and medical personnel. The district court dismissed all claims against all parties. Coleman’s appeal raises a mix of substantive and procedural questions. As for the substantive: Did Coleman adequately allege that the slippery shower violated the Due Process Clause? Did she adequately allege that a county policy or custom was behind her poor medical care? And may the county invoke state-law immunity from her negligence claim at the pleading stage? As for the procedural: When did Coleman’s claims accrue and start the running of the statute of limitations? Did her amended complaint (which named actual corrections officers and medical personnel) “relate back” to the date of her original complaint (which named “John Doe” and “Jane Doe” defendants) for statute-of-limitations purposes? And can Coleman rely on equitable tolling to delay the running of the limitations period? We agree with the district court on the answers to all six questions. We thus affirm its dismissal of Coleman’s complaint. In sum, Coleman identifies nothing in the relevant factual and legal sources—her complaint and Ohio law—that justifies her equitable-tolling request. She thus has not met her burden to show that she qualifies for this doctrine. See Saalim, 97 F.4th at 1012; Roach, 2022 WL 2211529, at *2. We affirm.

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