In Chapman v. Brentlinger Enterprises,[1] the 6th Circuit clarified the meaning of “in loco parentis parent” as used in the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA).[2] Here, Celestia Chapman’s sister Sharon was dying from non-Hodgkin lymphoma, and she asked Chapman to be her “primary caregiver” in her final stages.[3] When Sharon reached this point, Chapman honored Sharon’s request.[4] Chapman’s care was not only physical, but also financial.[5] Alecia, the third sibling, also shared in providing care to Sharon.[6]

Chapman used up her paid time off caring for Sharon.[7] Chapman’s employer, Brentlinger Enterprises, d/b/a Midwestern Auto Group (MAG), allowed her to take unpaid leave.[8] At the end of the unpaid leave, Chapman requested FMLA leave.[9] MAG denied the request because it believed the FMLA did not cover leave to take care of siblings.[10] MAG approved a modified schedule that reduced Chapman’s hours.[11] Chapman was late the first day of the modified schedule because Alecia’s plane was late.[12] Chapman texted the HR manager explaining the situation with Alecia’s plane.[13] Although the parties dispute when Chapman gave notice, the HR manager received Chapman’s text at 9:21 a.m. on the day Chapman was late.[14] Sixty-six minutes later, MAG fired Chapman.[15]

When Chapman’s lawyer told MAG that Chapman planned to file an FMLA lawsuit, MAG responded that the suit would be frivolous, and MAG might pursue sanctions.[16] MAG also opposed Chapman’s application for unemployment benefits, telling the agency that Chapman abandoned her job by quitting and not showing up.[17] Chapman sued MAG for, among other things, interfering with her FMLA rights and benefits and retaliating against her.[18] Chapman alleged that MAG retaliated by firing her, threatening Rule 11 sanctions, and dishonestly opposing her application for unemployment benefits.[19] The district court granted MAG summary judgment on the FMLA claims.[20]

The elements of an FMLA retaliation claim are that (1) Chapman was an eligible employee, (2) MAG was a covered employer, (3) Chapman was entitled to FMLA leave, (4) she provided proper notice to MAG of her intent to take FMLA leave, and (5) MAG denied her the FMLA rights or benefits granted by the FMLA.[21] The dispute was over the third element.[22] Although the FMLA allows unpaid leave to care for certain relatives, siblings are not on the list.[23] Chapman argued that caring for her sister falls into leave to care for an “‘in loco parentis’ parent or child.”[24]

The 6th Circuit first addressed “whether the FMLA recognizes the kind of in loco parentis relationship alleged [by Chapman], which formed when the dependent was over 18, her condition developed in adulthood and the purported parental relationship originated after the onset of the disabling condition.”[25] The court began, as it should,[26] with the plain text of the statute.[27] Under this analysis, the 6th Circuit held that the FMLA covers more than adoptive and biological families.[28] The statute defines “‘parent’ [as one] who stood in loco parentis to an employee when the employee was a son or daughter. An employee can also be an in loco parentis parent. Either way, the statute defines ‘son or daughter’ to mean ‘a biological, adopted or foster child, a stepchild, a legal ward, or child of a person standing in loco parentis, who is (A) under 18 years of age; or (B) 18 years of age or older and incapable of self-care because of a mental or physical disability.’”[29] Under the statute, those involved in “a special relationship where one person acts ‘in loco parentis’ ... to a dependent person or ‘child,’” can take leave to provide care.[30] The FMLA’s plain text shows that Congress intended to protect “parental relationships, whether biological, legal or their functional equivalents.”[31] Unanswered questions, however, remained. Must the in loco parentis relationship or the disability start before the child reaches majority? And must the in loco parentis relationship begin before the child’s incapacity?

Because the statute does not address “in loco parentis relationships under these circumstances,” the court looked to the common-law meaning of “‘in loco parentis.’”[32] The court found that under the common law, “‘in loco parentis’ relationships can form after the dependent is 18 or after the onset of the disability.”[33] Chapman still had to prove that “she intended to, and did, assume a parental role of Sharon.”[34] Although the district court would have to answer this question, the 6th Circuit provided it with guidance.[35] Looking to the common law, the court concluded that the in loco parentis relationship can begin “during adulthood when one adult becomes unable to care for themself.”[36] Because merely caring for one who is seriously ill is not enough to create the in loco parentis relationship,[37] the court looked to the common law for the elements of the relationship between two adults.[38] The court held that under common law the in loco parentis relationship “can form between adults, including adults who [are] siblings.”[39]

The primary element of the relationship is intention.[40] Determining intent requires evidence that the “person [took] on the role of a parent by ‘assuming obligations’ of a parental nature, [and] whether they have done so ‘with the intention of serving as a parent.’”[41] The fact that one “has provided for another as a parent might” creates a strong inference in favor of finding the relationship exists.[42] “The person ‘must still have intended to assume’ that role.”[43] This relationship “‘must reside in the minds and hearts of the parties involved.’”[44]  Evidence of this relationship can be direct by showing “that the parties thought of themselves as parent and child, including their internal communications and statements to others” showing that they viewed themselves as being in a parent-child relationship.[45] “Courts look for ‘objective manifestations’ of a parent-child relationship, including ‘the kind of service done and the kind of thing given.’”[46]

In summary, the in loco parentis relationship under the FMLA, as informed by the common law, can arise after one reaches the age of majority and when the disabling condition arises post-majority. There is no checklist of “acts or conduct . . . necessary to show a parental relationship.”[47] Factors to consider are assisting with day-to-day activities and providing financial assistance, how the parties think of the relationship, and whether the in loco parentis parent assumes a parental role, such as “exercising control over or assuming obligations toward the in loco parentis child.”[48] The 6th Circuit remanded for the district court to apply the court’s guidance and determine if the sisters had an in loco parentis relationship.[49]

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Dale Conder Jr. is a partner with Rainey, Kizer, Reviere & Bell PLC, and has been with the firm since graduating in 1992 from the University of Tennessee College of Law. His practice focuses on governmental tort liability, employment law and §1983 litigation.

NOTES

[1] 124 F.4th 382 (6th Cir. 2024).

[2] Id. at 390-91.

[3] Id. at 388.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] Id. at 388-89.

[14] Id. at 389.

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] Id.

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Id. at 390.

[22] Id.

[23] Id.

[24] Id.

[25] Id.

[26] Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe v. BlueCross BlueShield, 32 F.4th 548, 557 (6th Cir. 2022).

[27] Chapman, 124 F.4th at 391.

[28] Id.

[29] Id.

[30] Id.

[31] Id.

[32] Id. at 390-91.

[33] Id. at 391.

[34] Id.

[35] Id.

[36] Id. at 395 and 397.

[37] Id. at 392.

[38] Id. at 395 and 397.

[39] Id. at 397.

[40] Id.

[41] Id.

[42] Id.

[43] Id.

[44] Id. at 398.

[45] Id.

[46] Id.

[47] Id.

[48] Id. at 399.

[49] Id. at 400.