The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently held in Trezevant v. Trezevant that the 12-month statute of limitations applicable to misdemeanors under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-102(a) does not apply to all criminal contempt allegations and actions brought under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-102 arising from domestic relations orders.²

In Trezevant v. Trezevant, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed a Shelby County trial court’s finding that a husband was guilty of four counts of criminal contempt due to his failure to comply with a previous order awarding the wife Cayman Island properties and accounts associated with the same.³

The Claims

In late September 2021, the wife filed a petition for mandatory injunctive relief and for civil and criminal contempt, claiming that the husband falsely asserted that he sold the properties awarded to the wife in violation of a January 2021 order.⁴ In early February 2022, approximately four months later, the wife filed an amended petition for willful civil and criminal contempt. Following the husband’s filing of a motion to bifurcate and for a more definite statement, the wife clarified that she would proceed with criminal contempt charges related to an account awarded to the wife, and specifically for: (1) the husband’s failure to add her name to the account, (2) the husband closing the account and (3) the husband making non-business withdrawals from the account.⁵

Following the close of wife’s proof at the March 2023 trial on her amended petition, the husband made an oral motion for judgment of acquittal, asserting that the wife failed to initiate her contempt claims within the 12-month statute of limitations.⁶ In its April 2023 order, the trial court found that the amended petition was not barred by the statute of limitations and related back to the wife’s original petition before finding the husband guilty of four counts of criminal contempt, which included three withdrawals from the account at issue in addition to failing to add the wife’s name and closing the account.⁷ The trial court sentenced the husband to 40 days of incarceration to be served consecutively, and the husband timely appealed.⁸

The Appeal

On appeal, and pursuant to the Tennessee Supreme Court’s instruction, the appellate court considered the sub-argument headings in the husband’s brief and deduced several issues surrounding the filing of the wife’s amended petition, which included (1) whether the charges raised for the first time in the amended petition could “relate back” to the date of filing, (2) whether a one-year statute of limitations applicable to misdemeanors applied to the charges of criminal contempt, (3) whether the wife’s prosecution commenced before the statute of limitations ran, (4) whether the one-year statute of limitations tolled, (5) whether the one-year statute of limitations was waived, and (6) whether the husband was provided proper notices of the charges against him.⁹

Before addressing the substantive issues before it, the appellate court outlined and summarized the differences between civil and criminal contempt, noting that contempt proceedings are “unique and incidental to the case out of which they arise” and further, that “whether a contempt proceeding is civil or criminal is determined by its character and purpose.”¹⁰

The Definition

While Tennessee courts hold “the power to inflict punishments for contempt of court when a party willfully disobeys or resists any order, rule or decree of the court” pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-102, the limited purpose of criminal contempt proceedings is not to punish a contemnor pursuant to general criminal laws but to vindicate the authority of the court.¹¹ “Contempt is not a defined criminal offense under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-102,” and in criminal contempt proceedings, courts sanction the conduct that violates the specific duties imposed by the court and “arising directly from the parties’ participation in judicial proceedings.”¹²

Unlike criminal contempt, civil contempt is remedial and “brought to force compliance” and “thereby secure private rights.”¹³ Civil contempt is coercive in nature and designed to compel compliance, and upon compliance the contemnor will be immediately released.¹⁴

On appeal, the husband argued that because criminal contempt is punishable by a fine, imprisonment, or both, not to exceed $50 or 10 days, that criminal contempt qualifies as a misdemeanor offense, making the 12-month statute of limitations set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-102(a) applicable to his case.¹⁵ Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-102(a), “… all prosecutions for misdemeanors shall be commenced with the twelve (12) months after the offense has been committed.”¹⁶ Further, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-110 (e) states, “… all violations of law punishable by fine or confinement for less than one (1) year, or both, are denominated misdemeanors.”¹⁷

The wife argued that since the criminal contempt charges related to a domestic relations order that Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-110 (e) applied.¹⁸ Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-110(e) states, “…there is no time within which a judgment or decree in a domestic relations matter issued by a court with domestic relations jurisdiction pursuant to Title 36 must be acted upon, unless otherwise specifically provided for under Title 36.”¹⁹

The Intent

In deciding which statute(s) should govern, the appellate court looked to the legislative intent behind the statutes at issue.”²⁰ The court first analyzed the general contempt statute in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-102, noting that each subsection authorizes courts to “hold person in contempt when they behave in such a way as to obstruct the administration of justice” not for “violations of the general criminal laws.”²¹ The court found such distinction important as the husband relied upon Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-110, which applies only to “violations of law.” Contemptuous conduct is not a “violation of law,” but rather an obstruction of the administration of justice.²³

Accordingly, the appellate court held that criminal contempt charges should not be treated as misdemeanors under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-110 and that the statute of limitations for misdemeanors did not apply.²⁴ The appellate court also cited Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-104 in support of its finding, as such statute provides a roadmap for how the prosecution of a misdemeanor may be commenced, such as by finding an indictment or presentment or the issuing of a warrant, unlike a criminal contempt proceeding that is often initiated by the court or upon the filing of a petition by a private party.²⁵

The appellate court further reasoned that “[i]f the legislature intended for criminal contempt charges to be classified and treated as substantive criminal offenses, it would have enacted a statute to reflect that intent.”²⁶ “The Tennessee Supreme Court has explained that some statutes ‘defin[e] certain types of contemptuous conduct as substantive criminal offenses.”²⁷ The appellate court cited the Tennessee Supreme Court’s holding in Brown v. Latham, wherein the court determined that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-104(a), regarding the failure to comply with a child support order, “define[d] a criminal offense” such that the “respondents were entitled to jury trials.”²⁸

After determining that the statute of limitations for criminal misdemeanors did not apply, the appellate court looked at the wife’s assertion that the statute of limitations for domestic relations orders in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-110(e) should apply.²⁹ Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-110(e) provides “…there is no time within which a judgment or decree in a domestic relations matter issued by a court with domestic relations jurisdiction pursuant to Title 36 must be acted upon, unless otherwise specifically provided for under Title 36.”³⁰

The husband unsuccessfully argued that Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-110(e) applied only to civil contempt actions and not criminal contempt matters.³¹ In support of his position, the husband cited to Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-101, which provides “‘[a]ll civil actions … shall be commenced after the cause of action has accrued [] within the periods prescribed in this chapter.”³²

In affirming the trial court’s finding of contempt, the appellate court determined that Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-101 and § 28-3-110(e) were applicable, and as such, there was no statute of limitations within which the wife was required to bring her contempt allegations. In rejecting the husband’s argument, the appellate court noted that “civil and criminal contempt proceedings may arise out of both civil and criminal cases,” and “the legislature has explicitly provided that [the] court ‘has appellate jurisdiction over civil or criminal contempt [proceedings] arising out of a civil matter.’”³³ “What makes a case a civil or criminal action in the context of § 28-3-101 is whether the underlying proceeding, out of which the contempt allegations arose, was a civil or criminal matter.”³⁴

Following entry of the appellate court’s Oct. 2, 2024, ruling, the former husband timely appealed. The Tennessee Supreme Court denied the appeal in February 2025.³⁵

Practice Point

It is clear from the Court of Appeals’ holding, in the context of domestic relations orders, that if a contemnor’s conduct is not also subjective criminal offense there is no statute of limitations applicable to such violations absent an explicit mandate providing otherwise in Title 36. In the Trezevant case, the fact that the husband’s contemptuous actions were brought under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-102 and were not a substantive criminal offense are points of distinction that should not be overlooked by family law practitioners, as there may be instances, such as in the context of violations of orders of protection or the failure to comply with a child support order, where contemptuous conduct may be a substantive criminal offense subject to a statute of limitations.³⁶ |||

MARLENE ESKIND MOSES is a partner at Gullett Sanford Robinson & Martin, and formerly was manager and founder of MTR Family Law PLLC, a family and divorce law firm in Nashville. She is a past president of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers. She has held prior presidencies with the Tennessee Board of Law Examiners, the Lawyers’ Association for Women and the Tennessee Supreme Court Historical Society. She is the immediate past president of the International Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers and is on the executive committee of the American College of Family Trial Lawyers. The National Board of Trial Advocacy has designated Moses as a Family Law Trial Specialist.

ANSLEY OWENS TILLETT is a graduate of Belmont University College of Law and is part of the family law practice at Gullett Sanford Robinson and Martin in Nashville and co-chair of the NBA Domestic Committee.

NOTES
1. Chaos ride entrance announcement, Opryland Theme Park, Nashville, 1989-1997.
2. Trezevant v. Trezevant, No. W2023-00682-COA-R3-CV, — S.W.3d —, 2024 WL 4369252, 2024 Tenn. App. LEXIS 433 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2024).
3. Trezevant, 2024 Tenn. App. LEXIS 433 at *3.
4. Trezevant, 2024 Tenn. App. LEXIS 433 at *4.
5. Trezevant, 2024 Tenn. App. LEXIS 433 at *5-6.
6. Trezevant, 2024 Tenn. App. LEXIS 433 at *7-8.
7. Trezevant, 2024 Tenn. App. LEXIS 433 at *8.
8. The husband’s appeal was initially dismissed but came back before the Tennessee Court of Appeals on remand from the Tennessee Supreme Court. See Trezevant v. Trezevant, No. W2023-00682-SC-R11-CV, 2024 WL 3407466 (Tenn. July 8, 2024). The Tennessee Court of Appeals initially dismissed the appeal due to the husband’s failure to designate issues more specifically in the Statement of the Issues section of his brief in violation of Rule 27(a)(4) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Trezevant v. Trezevant, No. W2023-00682-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 980755 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2024), which was the third appeal in this matter. See also Donald Capparella & Jacob Vanzin, ‘Waiving’ Goodbye to Worries About Issue Statements?, Tennessee Bar Journal, Vol. 61, No. I (Jan./Feb. 2025).
9. Trezevant, 2024 Tenn. App. LEXIS 433 at *10-11.
10. Trezevant, 2024 Tenn. App. LEXIS 433 at *11-12 (citing Doe v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, 104 S.W.3d 465, 474 (Tenn. 2003) and Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911)).
11. Trezevant, 2024 Tenn. App. LEXIS 433 at *11-12 (citing Baker v. State, 417 S.W.3d 428, 437-438 (Tenn. 2013); See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-102(3).
12. Trezevant, 2024 Tenn. App. LEXIS 433 at *11-12 (citing Baker, 417 S.W.3d 428 at 438).
13. Trezevant, 2024 Tenn. App. LEXIS 433 at *12. (citing Baker, 417 S.W.3d 428 at 436)
14. Id.
15. Trezevant, 2024 Tenn. App. LEXIS 433 at *15.
16. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-102(a).
17. Tenn. Code Ann. §39-11-110.
18. Trezevant, 2024 Tenn. App. LEXIS 433 at *15-16.
19. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-110 (e).
20. Trezevant, 2024 Tenn. App. LEXIS 433 at *16.
21. Trezevant, 2024 Tenn. App. LEXIS 433 at *17-18 (citing Baker, 417 S.W.3d 428 at 437) (internal quotations omitted) see Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-102.
22. Trezevant, 2024 Tenn. App. LEXIS 433 at *18.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Trezevant, 2024 Tenn. App. LEXIS 433 at *18-20.
26. Trezevant, 2024 Tenn. App. LEXIS 433 at *20.
27. Trezevant, 2024 Tenn. App. LEXIS 433 at *20 (citing Baker, 417 S.W.3d 428 at 437 n.8 (emphasis added)).
28. Trezevant, 2024 Tenn. App. LEXIS 433 at *20 (citing Brown v. Latham, 914 S.W.2d 887, 888 (Tenn. 1996)); see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-104(a) (a person who does not comply with a child support order “may, in the discretion of the court, be punished by imprisonment in the county workhouse or county jail for a period not to exceed six (6) months”).
29. Trezevant, 2024 Tenn. App. LEXIS 433 at *23.
30. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-110(e). There was previously a 10-year statute of limitations on domestic relations decrees and judgments prior to the legislature amending Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-110(e) to remove such limitation, effective March 20, 2020.
31. Trezevant, 2024 Tenn. App. LEXIS 433 at *25.
32. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-101.
33. Trezevant, 2024 Tenn. App. LEXIS 433 at *25 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-4-108(b)).
34. Trezevant, 2024 Tenn. App. LEXIS 433 at *25.
35. Trezevant v. Trezevant, 2025 Tenn. LEXIS 62 at *1 (Tenn. Feb. 24, 2025).
36. The Tennessee Supreme Court held in Brown v. Latham that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-104(a) “defined a criminal offense” and states the essential indicia of a criminal offense, regarding the failure to comply with a child support order. “The penalty imposed, imprisonment for a period of time not to exceed six months, conforms with the definition of a misdemeanor stated in [Tenn. Code Ann. §] 39-11-110.” Trezevant, 2024 Tenn. App. LEXIS 433, *20-21 (citing Brown v. Latham, 914 S.W.2d 887, 888 (Tenn. 1996). See also Gafford v. Gafford, No. 01-A-01-9404-CV00178, 1994 WL 687077 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1994) (criminal contempt allegations under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-104 for failure to pay child support). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-610 (a) regarding violations of an order of protection (“the court may hold the defendant in civil or criminal contempt and punish the defendant in accordance with the law.”) See also Baker v. State, 417 S.W.3d at 437 n.8 (The Tennessee Supreme Court held that a defendant’s violation of an order of protection was “conduct qualifying as contempt” and “constitute[d] a violation of the general criminal laws”).