PORTER SMITH v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; STATE OF MICHIGAN - Articles

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PORTER SMITH v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; STATE OF MICHIGAN

Posted by: Azya Thornton on Nov 21, 2025

Court: 6th Circuit Court (Published Opinions)

Attorneys 1: ARGUED: James B. Rasor, RASOR LAW FIRM PLLC, Royal Oak, Michigan, for Appellant.

Attorneys 2: ARGUED: Kendell S. Asbenson, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellees.

Attorneys 3: ON BRIEF: James B. Rasor, Amanda G. Washburn, RASOR LAW FIRM PLLC, Royal Oak, Michigan, for Appellant.

Attorneys 4: ON BRIEF: Kendell S. Asbenson, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellees.

Judge(s): BATCHELDER, BUSH, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges

Court Appealed: United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents a question of first impression: Does a private cause of action for retaliation exist in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794? For at least the last 25 years, we have assumed that it does, often analyzing Rehabilitation Act retaliation claims based on precedent interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Those statutes, unlike the Rehabilitation Act, have express anti-retaliation provisions. But we have never addressed—nor seemingly had reason to address—whether, and if so where, a retaliation cause of action lies in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. We are now faced with that question. Porter Smith sued the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) and the State of Michigan under § 504 for (1) failing to provide him with a reasonable accommodation for his disability, and (2) retaliating against him for making an accommodation request and challenging its denial through legal action. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on the failure-to-accommodate claim, but the retaliation claim proceeded to trial. The jury found for Defendants. On appeal, Smith brings a handful of challenges stemming from the trial itself, one of which begs the question before us. Most relevantly, he argues that the district court erred as a matter of law when it instructed the jury that the causation standard for a retaliation claim under the Act was “sole causation.” As explained below, we hold that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does not provide a cause of action for retaliation. Based on this conclusion and for other reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

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