The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed in Boatman v. Odziana that a trial court may order equal (50/50) parenting time, despite “substantial family dysfunction” and an “extremely poor” parent-child relationship; that trial courts must include provisions for holiday parenting time in residential parenting schedules; and that bans on a parent’s ability to obtain passports and travel internationally with minor children cannot be ordered absent a finding of “a credible risk of abduction” pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-604 (a).¹

In Boatman v. Odziana, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part a trial court’s modification of a permanent parenting plan for two minor children, ages 11 and 15. The modified permanent parenting plan at issue shifted primary custody from the mother to the father, who previously had significantly less residential parenting time, and awarded father sole decision-making authority for all major decisions except for religious upbringing, which was awarded equally to allow each party to engage and encourage the children in the religion of his or her choosing during his or her parenting time. The residential parenting schedule provided equal (50/50) parenting time,² following a week-on/week-off schedule under the day-to-day schedule, with no carveouts for holidays or school breaks. The modified permanent parenting plan further prevented both parties from obtaining passports for both children and traveling internationally with the children.³

The trial court made “extensive findings of fact” in its final memorandum and order, including a specific finding that the mother “[could not] properly provide for [the older child’s] needs” when specifically considering the seventh best interest factor concerning “[t]he emotional needs and developmental level of the child[.]”⁴ In support of its ruling modifying the permanent parenting plan, the trial court cited examples of the “substantial family dysfunction.” Notably, throughout its opinion, the trial court made explicit credibility findings that were adverse to the mother, citing that the mother was dishonest as to several matters and issues, and that the testimony of the father and the older daughter was more credible, even though the trial court did not condone or approve the older daughter’s conduct towards her mother.⁵

At trial, the mother requested a 120-day period in which the father would have limited contact with the parties’ children, under the claim that such would allow mother and the older daughter to work on healing their relationship. The trial court found such request was an example of the mother’s “unwillingness to foster a good relationship” between the father and children, and evidence of the mother’s “desire to intervene” in that relationship.⁶

On appeal, the mother claimed the trial court erred in: (1) changing custody and the parenting schedule as to both children; (2) awarding sole decision-making authority to the father as to educational decisions and non-emergency health care decisions; (3) restricting the parents’ ability to obtain passports for and take the children out of the country; (4) failing to designate holiday parenting time; (5) its provision concerning the children’s practice of their preferred religion; and (6) awarding Father $30,000 in attorney fees.”⁷

The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding of a material change in circumstances based on: (1) the “substantial family dysfunction” and (2) the “extremely poor relationship” between the mother and older daughter, and its modification of custody and the permanent parenting plan pursuant to the best interest factors under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106 (a), as “in effect at the time of the filing” of the post-divorce petitions.⁸

On appeal, the mother failed to show how the trial court’s ruling fell “outside the range of ‘rulings that might reasonably result from an application of the correct legal standards to the evidence.’”⁹ As cited by the Appellate Court in its opinion, the Tennessee Supreme Court has repeatedly held that specific provisions provided for in parenting plans are “’peculiarly within the broad discretion of the trial judge.’”¹⁰ The court further noted that its function was not to “tweak” a residential schedule on appeal “in hopes of achieving a more reasonable result than the trial court.”¹¹

The Appellate Court noted that while another trial court might agree with some of the mother’s arguments on appeal and make different findings of facts, such as to whether the father was “at least partially at fault for the deterioration” of the relationship between the mother and older daughter, such would not justify a different conclusion, as there was a material change in circumstances to justify a change in custody.¹² It is also important to note that factual disputes, especially in domestic matters, hinge on credibility determinations, and the Appellate Court reiterated throughout its opinion and analysis that such “credibility assessments” could not be reevaluated “[a]bsent clear and convincing evidence,” a threshold which the mother failed to show on appeal, and that the trial court’s “credibility determinations were crucial to many of the trial court’s factual findings.”¹³ As to decision-making authority, the Appellate Court cited the trial court’s findings following Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-407(c) showed that the parties had not “demonstrated the ability and desire to cooperate with one another,” especially in the areas of educational and health related categories, and that the trial court clearly found the mother to be “particularly at fault in the level of conflict,” even though the mother correctly asserted that, historically, the father participated very little in comparison to the mother as to both areas.¹⁴

While the mother was not successful on all issues raised on appeal, the Appellate Court did agree with the mother that the trial court failed to comply the Uniform Child Abduction Prevention Act as well as Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-402(5), regarding holiday parenting time.

At trial the mother sought permission to obtain passports for the minor children to travel to India.¹⁵ The trial court denied such request and prohibited both parties from obtaining passports for the children and leaving the country, which the Appellate Court found to be in err. The Appellate Court specifically found that such prohibitions were not supported by a finding of a “credible risk of abduction,” pursuant to the Uniform Child Abduction Prevention Act found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-601 – 612, and that the Act was not cited in the trial court’s order.¹⁶ Evidence to be considered when determining if there a credible risk of abduction is specifically outlined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-607. Further, the specific content to be included in abduction prevention orders is addressed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-608, and Tennessee courts are to give “due consideration to the custody and visitation rights of the parties.”¹⁷

Regarding holiday parenting time, the Appellate Court found that the trial court erred in failing to designate parenting time for holidays and by ordering the day-to-day schedule to apply, such that the chips will fall where they may.” The Appellate Court vacated the parenting schedule and remanded for “the limited purpose of designating the parenting time for holidays.”¹⁸ The court cited the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-402(5) in support of its decision, which provides, that a “… residential schedule must designate in which parent’s home each minor child shall reside on given days of the year, including provisions for holidays, birthdays of family members, vacations, and other special occasions….”¹⁹

Practice Point

It is clear from the Appellate Court’s holding that adverse credibility findings are extremely difficult to overcome and will almost certainly prevent a litigant from being successful on appeal, as credibility determinations are decisive and pivotal to factual findings, especially those made pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a).²⁰ Boatman v. Odziana is a lengthier opinion, and while the reasonable minds of family law practitioners may differ in opinion as to the weight that was placed on certain facts or the terms of this modified, equal (50/50) permanent parenting plan, the Appellate Court’s straight forward application of the standard of review and Tennessee law is well-reasoned and reminder that the trial court is the trier of fact with a presumption of correctness. |||

MARLENE ESKIND MOSES is a partner at Gullett Sanford Robinson & Martin, and formerly was manager and founder of MTR Family Law PLLC, a family and divorce law firm in Nashville. She is a past president of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers. She has held prior presidencies with the Tennessee Board of Law Examiners, the Lawyers’ Association for Women and the Tennessee Supreme Court Historical Society. She is the immediate past president of the International Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers and is on the executive committee of the American College of Family Trial Lawyers. The National Board of Trial Advocacy has designated Moses as a Family Law Trial Specialist.

ANSLEY OWENS TILLETT is a graduate of Belmont University College of Law and a partner in the family law practice at Gullett Sanford Robinson and Martin in Nashville. She is co-chair of the Nashville Bar Association (NBA) Family Law Committee.

NOTES
1. Boatman v. Odziana, No. M2024-00677-COA-R3-CV, 2025 WL 2814800, 2025 Tenn. App. LEXIS 369 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2025).
2. Odziana, 2025 Tenn. App. LEXIS 369, *23.
3. Odziana, 2025 Tenn. App. LEXIS 369, *58.
4. Odziana, 2025 Tenn. App. LEXIS 369, *11 and *46. See Tenn. Code Ann. Sec. 36-6-106 (a)(7).
5. Odziana, 2025 Tenn. App. LEXIS 369, *13 and *38.
6. Odziana, 2025 Tenn. App. LEXIS 369, *19. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106 (a)(2).
7. Odziana, 2025 Tenn. App. LEXIS 369, *24-25.
8. Odziana, 2025 Tenn. App. LEXIS 369, *35, FN 3.
9. Odziana, 2025 Tenn. App. LEXIS 369, *55. (quoting Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 693 (Tenn. 2013).
10. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 693 (Tenn. 2013) (quoting Suttles v. Suttles, 748 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tenn. 1988)).
11. Id. (quoting Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001)).
12. Odziana, 2025 Tenn. App. LEXIS 369, *33.
13. Odziana, 2025 Tenn. App. LEXIS 369, *36-37 (citing Wells v. Tenn. Bd. of Regents, 9 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 1999)(emphasis added). The Appellate Court notes in its opinion that the trial court’s interpretation of the mother’s testimony being dishonest regarding the specific family members who lived in India or the minor child jumping from a window, instead of threatening to jump, were inconsistent with the translated and actual testimony of the mother, whose first language was not English. Irrespective, the Appellate Court notes that there were other adverse credibility findings supported by the record.
14. Odziana, 2025 Tenn. App. LEXIS 369, *58 (internal quotations omitted).
15. Odziana, 2025 Tenn. App. LEXIS 369, *59.
16. Odziana, 2025 Tenn. App. LEXIS 369, *61.
17. Odziana, 2025 Tenn. App. LEXIS 369, *61-62.
18. Odziana, 2025 Tenn. App. LEXIS 369, *63.
19. Odziana, 2025 Tenn. App. LEXIS 369, *62. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-402(5).
20. See Easley v. City of Memphis, 699 268, 270 (Tenn. 2024). Credibility assessments will not be reevaluated absent clear and convincing evidence.