BARBRIE LOGAN v. MGM GRAND DETROIT CASINO - Articles

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BARBRIE LOGAN v. MGM GRAND DETROIT CASINO

Posted by: Tanja Trezise on Sep 25, 2019

Court: 6th Circuit Court (Published Opinions)

Attorneys 1:

ARGUED: Kevin M. Carlson, Plymouth, Michigan, for Appellant. Joseph E. Richotte, BUTZEL LONG, P.C., Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for Appellee. Jennifer S. Goldstein, UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae.

Attorneys 2:

ON BRIEF: Joseph E. Richotte, Brett J. Miller, BUTZEL LONG, P.C., Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for Appellee. Jennifer S. Goldstein, Paul D. Ramshaw, UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae. Barbrie Logan, Detroit, Michigan, pro se.

Judge(s): BOGGS, GIBBONS and BUSH, Circuit Judges

Court Appealed: United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Flint.

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. This case requires us to determine, as a matter of first impression, whether the statute of limitations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., may be contractually shortened for litigation. Barbrie Logan worked as a cook for MGM Grand Detroit Casino (“MGM”). As part of her job application, she agreed to a six-month limitation period to bring any lawsuit against her employer. After leaving the job, she sued MGM under Title VII, alleging employment discrimination. Her former employer asserted a statute of limitations defense: although Logan arguably brought her claim within the statutory period required by Title VII, she waited longer than the limitation period provided in her employment application. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment to MGM.

On appeal, Logan argues that the contractual limitation period cannot supersede the statutory limitation period for bringing suit under Title VII. We agree. The limitation period of Title VII is part of an elaborate pre-suit process that must be followed before any litigation may commence. Contractual alteration of this process abrogates substantive rights and contravenes Congress’s uniform nationwide legal regime for Title VII lawsuits. Therefore, we REVERSE the decision of the district court.

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