In 1986, the Petitioner, Nicholas Todd Sutton, was convicted of the January 15, 1985 first degree murder of Carl Estep, which occurred while both were inmates at the Morgan County Regional Correctional Facility. At sentencing, the jury imposed the death penalty based upon the weight of three aggravating circumstances. The Petitioner’s conviction and death sentence were affirmed on appeal. State v. Sutton, 761 S.W.2d 763 (Tenn. 1988), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1031 (1990). The Petitioner unsuccessfully pursued post-conviction relief, the denial of which was affirmed by this court. Nicholas Todd Sutton v. State, No. 03C01-9702-CR-00067, 1999 WL 423005 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 25, 1999), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 20, 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1216 (2000). The Petitioner then unsuccessfully pursued federal habeas corpus relief, the denial of which was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Sutton v. Bell, 645 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 933 (2012).

On June 8, 2016, the Petitioner filed a motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings, alleging that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2251 (2015), announced a new constitutional rule requiring retrospective application to reopen post-conviction proceedings that invalidates the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance in his case. See T.C.A. § 40-30- 117(a)(1) (2018). Based upon the post-conviction court’s finding that the Petitioner had stated a colorable claim, the Petitioner amended the post-conviction petition with additional claims. Id. §§ 40-30-106 (2018), -107 (2018), 117(b) (2018). Upon prehearing consideration, the post-conviction court summarily denied relief. Id. § 40-30- 109(a) (2018). The Petitioner now appeals from the post-conviction court’s order summarily denying relief on the amended post-conviction petition and argues that (1) the decision in Johnson invalidated the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance; (2) the post-conviction court’s summary denial following the amendment of the post-conviction petition was improper because (a) the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), invalidated the death sentence; (b) the Petitioner’s appearance in shackles before the jury at the original trial violated his due process rights; (c) the jury selection process produced a jury skewed in favor of a death sentence; (d) trial counsel rendered the ineffective assistance of counsel relative to the investigation and the presentation of evidence concerning the Petitioner’s mental health; (e) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct when placing the knives on trial counsel’s table within reach of the Petitioner and his codefendants, causing officers to “reach[] for their weapons” and trial counsel were ineffective for not seeking a mistrial based upon the display of the knives; (f) the Petitioner’s experience of mistreatment and unsafe conditions while incarcerated at Brushy Mountain State Prison and Morgan County Regional Correctional Facility violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment; (g) the death sentence in this case was arbitrarily sought following the State’s offering a sentence of life imprisonment during pretrial plea negotiations; (h) the State’s reliance on a prior murder conviction that was committed when the Petitioner was eighteen years of age to establish the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance violated the Eighth Amendment; (3) the Assistant District Attorney General’s previous representation of the victim, Carl Estep, creates an actual conflict of interest and an appearance of impropriety requiring disqualification and a rehearing of the post-conviction proceedings; and (4) the cumulative errors render unconstitutional the imposition of the death penalty in this case. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.