SARAH R. LEE, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED v. OHIO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION; AVON LAKE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION - Articles

All Content


Posted by: Karen Belcher on Feb 24, 2020

Court: 6th Circuit Court (Published Opinions)

Attorneys 1: ARGUED: Jonathan F. Mitchell, MITCHELL LAW, PLLC, Austin, Texas, for Appellant.

Attorneys 2: ARGUED: Leon Dayan, BREDHOFF & KAISER, P.L.L.C., Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

Attorneys 3: ON BRIEF: Jonathan F. Mitchell, MITCHELL LAW, PLLC, Austin, Texas, for Appellant.

Attorneys 4: ON BRIEF: Leon Dayan, John M. West, Jacob Karabell, BREDHOFF & KAISER, P.L.L.C., Washington, D.C., Eben O. McNair, IV, Timothy Gallagher, SCHWARZWALD MCNAIR & FUSCO, LLP, Cleveland, Ohio, Jason Walta, NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. William L. Messenger, NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEFENSE FOUNDATION, INC., Springfield, Virginia, for Amicus Curiae.

Judge(s): DAUGHTREY, CLAY, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges

Court Appealed: United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Sarah Lee seeks a refund of “fair-share” fees she was required to pay to her public-sector union. Shortly after Lee filed suit, the Supreme Court held that such fees violate the First Amendment as a form of compelled speech. Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459–60 (2018). Nevertheless, the district court granted the union’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the union, as a private actor sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was entitled to rely on its good faith in following existing Ohio law and prior Supreme Court precedent, which had expressly permitted fair-share fees.

We now affirm the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s federal cause of action because the union’s good-faith defense bars the claim. We also affirm the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s state-law conversion claim because she failed to state a plausible claim for relief.

Attachments: