JOSHUA KELLER v. JANICE CASTEEL ET AL. - Articles

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Posted by: Tanja Trezise on Jun 12, 2020

Court: TN Supreme Court

Attorneys 1: Ronald D. Wells, Stacy Lynn Archer, and Philip Aaron Wells, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellants, Janice Casteel, City of Cleveland, Tennessee, and Steve Haun.

Attorneys 2: James R. McKoon, Chattanooga, Tennessee, and Sarah M. Block, Washington, D.C., for the appellee, Joshua Keller.

Attorneys 3: John T. Batson, Jr., Emily C. Taylor, and Brian R. Bibb, Knoxville, Tennessee, for amicus curiae Public Entity Partners, and Melanie E. Davis, Maryville, Tennessee, for amicus curiae Tennessee Municipal Attorneys Association.

Judge(s): KIRBY

We granted permission to appeal in this case to address when an employee handbook may create a property interest entitled to due process protection. After the petitioner municipal firefighter pled guilty to a criminal charge, his employment was terminated. The firefighter filed a complaint for judicial review of the termination, asserting a due process claim based on the municipality’s personnel manual. The trial court and the Court of Appeals both held that the personnel manual gave the firefighter a property interest entitled to due process protection. We reverse that holding. In Tennessee, employment is presumed to be at-will. Employers, including governmental employers, may adopt policies and procedures to promote efficiencies and fair, consistent treatment of employees, and may put those policies and procedures in employee manuals or handbooks. In the absence of specific language showing the employer’s intent to be contractually bound, such policies and procedures do not change employees’ at-will status and do not create a constitutionally protectable property interest. In this case, the municipality’s personnel manual included an explicit statement that the municipality did not intend the procedures to be binding or constitute any type of contract. Such disclaimers preclude any finding that the employer intended to be bound by the terms of the employee handbook. Accordingly, we decline to hold that the employee handbook converted the employee’s at-will employment into a property interest entitled to due process protection.

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