ANTONIO HOWARD v. STATE OF TENNESSEE - Articles

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Posted by: Tanja Trezise on Jul 16, 2020

Court: TN Supreme Court

Attorneys 1: Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée Sophia Blumstein, Solicitor General; Caitlin Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Leslie Byrd and Jamie Kidd, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellant, State of Tennessee.

Attorneys 2: Patrick E. Stegall, Memphis, Tennessee (at post-conviction hearing); and William D. Massey, Memphis, Tennessee (on appeal), for the appellee, Antonio Howard.

Judge(s): PAGE

In this post-conviction appeal, we clarify the appropriate standard to be applied when a criminal defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to file a timely motion for new trial. The petitioner, Antonio Howard, was convicted of several offenses, including aggravated rape, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. Following the conviction and sentencing, the petitioner’s trial counsel admittedly failed to file a timely motion for new trial. Consequently, the petitioner was found to have waived several issues on direct appeal. The petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief claiming, among other things, that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely motion for new trial. However, the post-conviction court denied his request, concluding that trial counsel was deficient but that the petitioner was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s deficiency. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the post-conviction court that counsel was deficient for failing to file a timely motion for new trial but, relying on Wallace v. State, 121 S.W.3d 652, 658 (Tenn. 2003), held that the petitioner was presumptively prejudiced by the deficiency. The intermediate appellate court, therefore, concluded that the petitioner was entitled to post-conviction relief in the form of a delayed appeal. We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal to address whether the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly determined that the petitioner was presumptively prejudiced under these circumstances. We conclude that trial counsel’s failure to file a timely motion for new trial does not require a presumption of prejudice, overruling this Court’s previous decision in Wallace. We have determined, therefore, that the post-conviction court properly considered whether the petitioner was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s deficiency, and we find no error in the post-conviction court’s conclusion that he was not. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

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