This appeal arose from a dispute between relatives concerning the ownership of improved real property. The property at issue was conveyed in 2000 via warranty deed to a married couple, William and Jewel Nunley, and their adult son, Anthony Gene Nunley, each as tenants in common. Following William Nunley’s death in 2007, Anthony Nunley purchased his mother’s interest in the property, executing a promissory note in the amount of $112,509.00 and a deed of trust secured by title to the property. In 2015, Jewel Nunley and Anthony Nunley executed a document stating that the remaining balance on the note was $37,509.00. Anthony Nunley (“Decedent”) died intestate in June 2016. Decedent’s surviving spouse, Tiny Nunley, filed a petition in the probate division of the Carter County Chancery Court (“probate court”) and was granted letters of administration to act as the personal representative (“Personal Representative”) of Decedent’s estate (“the Estate”). Jewel Nunley filed a claim against the Estate for the balance owed on the promissory note, which was later settled and released by agreement. Personal Representative filed an action in the probate court to reform the deed and quiet title to the subject real property. Two of Decedent’s three adult sisters objected and filed an action in the Carter County Chancery Court (“trial court”) to partition the property. The probate court transferred the reformation action to the trial court, treating Personal Representative’s petition to reform the deed and quiet title as a compulsory counterclaim to the partition action. The plaintiffs asserted that via the 2000 deed, the property was conveyed in part to William Nunley as a tenant in common with his one-third interest in the property then passing to his wife, Jewel Nunley, and their four children, including Decedent, through intestate succession. Personal Representative contended that the use of the phrase, “tenants in common,” in the 2000 deed had constituted a mutual mistake and that the parties had intended for William and Jewel Nunley to own one-half of the property as tenants by the entirety and for Decedent to own the other half as a tenant in common. Averring that her position was supported by evidence of an oral agreement between Decedent and his parents, Personal Representative maintained that upon transfer of Jewel Nunley’s interest to Decedent, he became the sole owner of the property. The plaintiffs moved for a judgment on the pleadings and filed a motion in limine, requesting that the trial court exclude any testimony or parol evidence related to alleged oral agreements among the parties to the 2000 deed. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motion in limine, finding that the deed was unambiguous and that admission of additional evidence of Decedent’s intent would violate the parol evidence rule, the Dead Man’s Statute, and the Statute of Frauds. Accordingly, the trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the deed conveyed title to the property at issue to Decedent and each of his parents as tenants in common and that William Nunley’s one-third interest had transferred to his wife and children upon his death. Upon Personal Representative’s motion, the trial court certified the judgment as final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. Personal Representative has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.