IN RE: AUTOMOTIVE PARTS ANTITRUST LITIGATION AND IN RE: ANTI-VIBRATIONAL RUBBER PARTS CASES, END-PAYOR ACTIONS v. YAMASHITA RUBBER COMPANY, CORPORATION; DTR INDUSTRIES, INC.; BRIDGESTONE CORPORATION; BRIDGESTONE APM COMPANY; TOYO TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, LTD.; TOYO TIRE NORTH AMERICA OE SALES LLC; TOYO AUTOMOTIVE PARTS (USA), INC., SUMITOMO RIKO COMPANY LIMITED, FNA TOKAI RUBBER INDUSTRIES, LTD., - Articles

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IN RE: AUTOMOTIVE PARTS ANTITRUST LITIGATION AND IN RE: ANTI-VIBRATIONAL RUBBER PARTS CASES, END-PAYOR ACTIONS v. YAMASHITA RUBBER COMPANY, CORPORATION; DTR INDUSTRIES, INC.; BRIDGESTONE CORPORATION; BRIDGESTONE APM COMPANY; TOYO TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, LTD.; TOYO TIRE NORTH AMERICA OE SALES LLC; TOYO AUTOMOTIVE PARTS (USA), INC., SUMITOMO RIKO COMPANY LIMITED, FNA TOKAI RUBBER INDUSTRIES, LTD.,

Posted by: Karen Belcher on May 14, 2021

Court: 6th Circuit Court (Published Opinions)

Attorneys 1: ARGUED: Zachary D. Tripp, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellants.

Attorneys 2: ARGUED: David H. Fink, FINK BRESSACK, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for Appellees.

Attorneys 3: ON BRIEF: Zachary D. Tripp, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, Washington, D.C., Adam C. Hemlock, David Yolkut, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, New York, New York, Frederick R. Juckniess, JUCKNIESS LAW FIRM PLC, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Matthew J. Turchyn, HERTZ SCHRAM PC, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, Robert N. Hochman, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, Chicago, Illinois, Joanne G. Swanson, KERR, RUSSELL AND WEBER, PLC, Detroit, Michigan, J. Clayton Everett, Jr., MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, Washington, D.C., Larry J. Saylor, MILLER, CANFIELD, PADDOCK & STONE P.L.C., Detroit, Michigan, for Appellants.

Attorneys 4: ON BRIEF: David H. Fink, Nathan J. Fink, FINK BRESSACK, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for Appellees.

Judge(s): BATCHELDER, GRIFFIN, and BUSH, Circuit Judges

Court Appealed: Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Under federal antitrust law, a private plaintiff generally must be a “direct purchaser” to have suffered injury and thus have standing to sue a manufacturer or supplier. In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, however, the Supreme Court recognized an exception to the direct-purchaser rule, holding that an “indirect purchaser” might have standing to sue if it purchased from an intermediary that was “owned or controlled” by the ultimate seller. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). The present dispute raises the question whether Illinois Brick has any effect on the interpretation of certain antitrust class-action settlement agreements under Michigan law.

Specifically, we consider Illinois Brick to address whether Plaintiffs, who purchased automotive anti-vibration rubber parts, are barred from maintaining a purported direct-purchaser class-action lawsuit against the manufacturers and sellers of those parts. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs settled all their claims as part of a class composed of certain “persons and entities” that “indirectly purchased” anti-vibration rubber parts. Plaintiffs argue that, in accordance with Illinois Brick, they are not part of the settlement class because they purchased “directly” from subsidiaries of a manufacturer. As explained below, regardless of whether Illinois Brick applies to Plaintiffs’ underlying claims, Plaintiffs fit within the class definition because they “indirectly purchased” parts under the plain meaning of the settlement agreements. Their suit is therefore barred by those agreements. We reverse the district court’s contrary holding.

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