DANNY HILL v. TIMOTHY SHOOP, Warden - Articles

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DANNY HILL v. TIMOTHY SHOOP, Warden

Posted by: Tanja Trezise on Aug 20, 2021

Head Comment: MOORE delivered a separate dissenting opinion, in which MERRITT, COLE, CLAY, WHITE, STRANCH, and DONALD joined. An excerpt of the panel’s 2018 opinion, see 881 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2018), is appended.

Court: 6th Circuit Court (Published Opinions)

Attorneys 1: ARGUED EN BANC: Vicki Ruth Adams Werneke, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant.

Attorneys 2: ARGUED EN BANC: Benjamin M. Flowers, OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.

Attorneys 3: ON SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF: Vicki Ruth Adams Werneke, Lori B. Riga, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant.

Attorneys 4: ON SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF: Benjamin M. Flowers, Stephen E. Maher, Michael J. Hendershot, OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.

Attorneys 5: ON SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF: Sarah K. Campbell, OFFICE OF THE TENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Nashville, Tennessee, Kevin J. Truitt, DISABILITY RIGHTS OHIO, Columbus, Ohio, for Amici Curiae.

Judge(s): SUTTON, Chief Circuit Judge; MERRITT, MOORE, COLE, CLAY, GIBBONS, GRIFFIN, KETHLEDGE, WHITE, STRANCH, DONALD, THAPAR, BUSH, LARSEN, NALBANDIAN, and READLER, Circuit Judges.

Court Appealed: United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Youngstown

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. In this death penalty habeas case, appellant Danny Hill seeks collateral review of his conviction for the murder of Raymond Fife, a twelve-year-old boy. The case has been to the Supreme Court once and before panels of this court twice. The core issue in the underlying state case was whether Hill was ineligible for the death penalty because he is intellectually disabled, a question that became pertinent after the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in Atkins v. Virginia. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Before us, the issues are whether, under governing AEDPA review principles, the state court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We conclude that the state court’s resolution of the issue does not meet either of the criteria that would permit a federal court to disturb a state conviction. Thus, we affirm the district court’s denial of Hill’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

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