MEMPHIS CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH; PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF TENNESSEE AND NORTH MISSISSIPPI; KNOXVILLE CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH; FEMHEALTH USA, INC., D/B/A CARAFEM; DR. KIMBERLY LOONEY; DR. NIKKI ZITE v. HERBERT H. SLATERY, III; LISA PIERCEY, M.D.; RENE SAUNDERS, M.D., W. REEVES JOHNSON, JR., M.D.; AMY P . WEIRICH; GLENN R. FUNK; CHARME P. ALLEN; TOM P. THOMPSON, JR. - Articles

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Posted by: Karen Belcher on Sep 10, 2021

Court: 6th Circuit Court (Published Opinions)

Attorneys 1: ARGUED: Sarah K. Campbell, OFFICE OF THE TENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellants.

Attorneys 2: ARGUED: Rabia Muqaddam, CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, New York, New York, for Appellees.

Attorneys 3: ON BRIEF: Sarah K. Campbell, OFFICE OF THE TENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellants.

Attorneys 4: ON BRIEF: Rabia Muqaddam, Jessica Sklarsky, Jen Samantha D. Rasay, CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, New York, New York, Thomas H. Castelli, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, Nashville, Tennessee, Susan Lambiase, PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION OF AMERICA, New York, New York, Brigitte Amiri, Andrew Beck, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, New York, New York, for Appellees.

Attorneys 5: ON BRIEF: David E. Fowler, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT DEFENSE FUND, Franklin, Tennessee, Michelle K. Terry, AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW & JUSTICE, Franklin, Tennessee, Edward L. White III, AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW & JUSTICE, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Mathew W. Hoffman, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM, Ashburn, Virginia, John J. Bursch, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM, Washington, D.C., S. Chad Meredith, OFFICE OF THE KENTUCKY ATTORNEY GENERAL, Frankfort, Kentucky, Priscilla J. Smith, YALE LAW SCHOOL, Brooklyn, New York, Sarah A. Hunger, OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL, Chicago, Illinois, Janice Mac Avoy, Alexis R. Casamassima, FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS, SHRIVER & JACOBSON LLP, New York, New York, Rachel Thorn, Marc Suskin, Caroline Pignatelli, Kaitland Kennelly, Ashlesha Srivastava, Allison Kutner, COOLEY LLP, New York, New York, Darina Shtrakhman, COOLEY LLP, San Francisco, California, Kelly M. Dermody, Tiseme G. Zegeye, Nigar A. Shaikh, LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP, San Francisco, California, Carles Anderson, SISTERREACH, Memphis, Tennessee, Zachary W. Martin, Boston, Massachusetts, Geoffrey M. Wyatt, Washington, D.C., Jon Greenbaum, LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, Washington, D.C., Melissa Cassel, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP, San Francisco, California, Zhao Liu, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP, Washington, D.C., Stuart M. Sarnoff, Christopher P. Burke, O’MELVENY & MYERS, New York, New York, for Amici Curiae.

Judge(s): DAUGHTREY, MOORE, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges

Court Appealed: United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville

MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge. In the early hours of June 19, 2020, the last day of the Tennessee General Assembly’s session, the state legislature passed one of the strictest abortion regulations in the country, House Bill 2263. There are two provisions of the Act at issue in this appeal. Section 216 criminalizes the performance of pre-viability abortions at cascading intervals of two to three weeks, beginning with the detection of a “fetal heartbeat” and continuing through a gestational age of 24 weeks. The scheme provides that if any earlier restriction is found to be invalid, the others remain in effect. Section 217 criminalizes the performance of an abortion if the physician “knows” the reason for the abortion is “because of” the race, sex, or a Down syndrome diagnosis of the fetus. Both sections contain an affirmative- defense provision when the abortion was performed because, “in the physician’s good faith, reasonable medical judgment,” the abortion was necessary to avoid a medical emergency. Plaintiffs—four reproductive-health centers and two physicians, suing on behalf of themselves and their patients—challenged the constitutionality of sections 216 and 217 and requested a preliminary injunction. They argued that both sections 216 and 217 substantively violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution as an undue burden on pre-viability abortions, that section 217 is also void for vagueness, and that the medical-emergency affirmative-defense provisions are insufficient because they are unconstitutionally vague. The district court evaluated the submitted declarations and arguments and determined that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. The court issued a preliminary injunction banning implementation of sections 216 and 217 but declined to address the substantive due process challenge to section 217 because it found that the section was unconstitutional under the void-for-vagueness doctrine. The State1 now appeals the issuance of the preliminary injunction, including the legal conclusions and factual findings on which it is based, and asks us to address, in the first instance, whether section 217 violates substantive due process principles. Because access to pre-viability abortion is a constitutionally protected right, we affirm.