LIVINGSTON EDUCATIONAL SERVICE AGENCY; WAYNE-WESTLAND COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v. XAVIER BECERRA, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; JOOYEUN CHANG, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ASSISTANT SECRETARY AND PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES; ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES; BERNADINE FUTRELL, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF HEAD START - Articles

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Posted by: Karen Belcher on May 20, 2022

Court: 6th Circuit Court (Published Opinions)

Attorneys 1: ON MOTION FOR INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL AND REPLY: Daniel R. Suhr, LIBERTY JUSTICE CENTER, Chicago, Illinois, Amy E. Murphy, Rebecca L. Strauss, MILLER JOHNSON, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellants.

Attorneys 2: ON RESPONSE: Alisa B. Klein, Sarah J. Clark, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

Judge(s): CLAY, ROGERS, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges

Court Appealed: On Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit

This case concerns the COVID-19 vaccine mandate for Head Start program staff, contractors, and volunteers imposed by an interim final rule of the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”). See Vaccine and Mask Requirements To Mitigate the Spread of COVID-19 in Head Start Programs, 86 Fed. Reg. 68,052 (Nov. 30, 2021). Head Start is a federal program that funds early childhood education for low-income children and provides other resources and education to the children’s families. See 42 U.S.C. § 9831. Plaintiffs Livingston Educational Service Agency and Wayne-Westland Community Schools, both Head Start grantees in Michigan, brought suit to challenge the interim final rule under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Congressional Review Act, and several provisions of the United States Constitution. The district court granted a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) but later denied a preliminary injunction and dissolved the TRO. Plaintiffs appeal the denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction. At issue here is plaintiffs’ motion for an injunction pending appeal.

Because the plaintiffs do not show a likelihood of prevailing on the merits, we do not address the other factors that govern whether plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction pending appeal. The motion for an injunction pending appeal is DENIED.

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