GREG ADKISSON et al., v. JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP, INC. - Articles

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Posted by: Stacey Shrader Joslin on Jun 14, 2022

Court: 6th Circuit Court (Published Opinions)

Attorneys 1: ARGUED: Theane Evangelis, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Appellant.

Attorneys 2: ARGUED: Mark E. Silvey, MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellees.

Attorneys 3: ON BRIEF: Theane Diana Evangelis, Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Peter S. Modlin, Jeremy S. Smith, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, Los Angeles, California, Dwight E. Tarwater, Catherine Williams Anglin, PAINE TARWATER BICKERS LLP, Knoxville, Tennessee, J. Isaac Sanders, William J. Harbison II, NEAL & HARWELL, PC, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant.

Attorneys 4: ON BRIEF: Mark E. Silvey, Louis W. Ringger, III, William A. Ladnier, MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellees.

Attorneys 5: ON BRIEF: David D. Ayliffe, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Amicus Curiae.

Judge(s): SUTTON, Chief Judge; GILMAN and ROGERS, Circuit Judges

Court Appealed: United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. This consolidated action involves a group of individuals (Plaintiffs) who worked, or had spouses or next of kin who worked, on the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA’s) coal-ash cleanup, removal, and recovery project at the Kingston Fossil Fuel Plant (the Plant) in Roane County, Tennessee. Plaintiffs sued Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc. (Jacobs)—an entity that has served as the TVA’s prime contractor for the coal-ash cleanup since February 2009—for numerous common-law torts. None of the Plaintiffs were employees of Jacobs; they instead worked for various subcontractors.

After this court reversed and remanded the district court’s initial decision to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, the district court bifurcated the case and proceeded with Phase I to determine whether Jacobs should be held generally liable to Plaintiffs. A jury found that Jacobs had a duty to Plaintiffs, that Jacobs breached that duty, and that Jacobs’s actions were a potential cause of Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. Phase II, which has not yet occurred, is intended to assess specific causation with respect to individual Plaintiffs and the extent to which they are entitled to damages.

Both before and after Phase I of the trial, Jacobs filed motions seeking derivative immunity from suit based on its status as a government contractor. The district court denied Jacobs’s motions. Jacobs subsequently filed yet another motion seeking derivative immunity based on what it claimed were intervening changes in the applicable law. The district court construed the motion as one for reconsideration under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It again denied Jacobs’s motion. This interlocutory appeal concerning Jacobs’s alleged immunity followed. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of derivative contractor immunity.

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