DONNA W. SHERWOOD; JEROME D. PINN; VANCE SHERWOOD; ANTHONY BILLINGSLEY; JENNIFER PEET; RICHARD EUGENE WILLIAMS; FRANK L. OAKBERG; BONNIE E. OAKBERG; GERRY M. WILLIAMS; HAROLD P. SLOVES; FELICITAS K. SLOVES; SHEILA D. BOOE; THOMAS R. WARREN, JR.; JEFFREY G. SEE v. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - Articles

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Posted by: Karen Belcher on Aug 22, 2022

Court: 6th Circuit Court (Published Opinions)

Attorneys 1: ARGUED: Donald K. Vowell, THE VOWELL LAW FIRM, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellants.

Attorneys 2: ARGUED: Frances Regina Koho, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee.

Attorneys 3: ON BRIEF: Donald K. Vowell, THE VOWELL LAW FIRM, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellants.

Attorneys 4: ON BRIEF: Frances Regina Koho, David D. Ayliffe, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee.

Judge(s): ROGERS and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges, and MALONEY, District Judge

Court Appealed: Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville

ROGERS, Circuit Judge. This appeal is the latest installment in a decade-long dispute over the way in which the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) clears trees in the rights-of-way it holds on the plaintiffs’ private property. The district court enjoined TVA from practicing a particular tree-clearance practice, referred to as the “15-foot rule,” until TVA prepared an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) as required by the National Environmental Policy Act. At issue here is the district court’s dissolution of that injunction, which was based in part on the court’s finding that TVA complied with the injunction by completing an EIS and, in the alternative, on equitable grounds because the new TVA policy adopted following completion of the EIS is different from the 15-foot rule. The injunction should not have been dissolved, however, because the district court has not yet determined, in light of the administrative record, whether TVA took a hard look at the environmental consequences of its action, and the agency’s action has not been shown to be so different from the 15-foot rule as to warrant a whole new suit to obtain judicial review.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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