SCOTT A. HARDIN v. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES, an agency of the Department of Justice; STEVEN M. DETTELBACH, Director Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States - Articles

All Content


Posted by: Karen Belcher on Apr 25, 2023

Court: 6th Circuit Court (Published Opinions)

Attorneys 1: ARGUED: Jason Todd Hardin, HARDIN LAW, PLLC, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellant.

Attorneys 2: ARGUED: Brad Hinshelwood, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

Attorneys 3: ON BRIEF: Jason Todd Hardin, HARDIN LAW, PLLC, Louisville, Kentucky, J. Allan Cobb, COBB LAW PLLC, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellant.

Attorneys 4: ON BRIEF: Brad Hinshelwood, Abby C. Wright, Kyle Edwards, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

Judge(s): GILMAN, McKEAGUE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges

Court Appealed: Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. The placement of a bump stock on a semiautomatic rifle causes the rifle to function essentially like a machinegun by dramatically increasing the rate of fire. And the possession of a machinegun is a criminal offense under the Gun Control Act of 1968. This raises the question of whether a bump stock is a machinegun “part” as defined by the National Firearms Act of 1934. The question is a close one on which reasonable jurists have disagreed, a disagreement caused by ambiguities in how the applicable statute defines the term “machinegun.”

An Act of Congress could clear up the ambiguities, but so far Congress has failed to act. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (the ATF) has been on both sides of this issue, with its current regulation (the Rule) banning bump stocks as a machinegun part. In this situation, the rule of lenity that is applicable to criminal offenses requires us to rule in favor of Hardin. We therefore REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Attachments: