JOHN DOE v. UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN; BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN; PAMELA HEATLIE; ROBERT SELLERS; MARTIN PHILBERT; ERIK WESSEL; LAURA BLAKE JONES; E. ROYSTER HARPER; SUZANNE MCFADDEN; PAUL ROBINSON - Articles

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Posted by: Karen Belcher on Aug 21, 2023

Court: 6th Circuit Court (Published Opinions)

Attorneys 1: ARGUED: Amanda K. Rice, JONES DAY, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant.

Attorneys 2: ARGUED: Molly Savage, DEBORAH GORDON LAW, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for Appellee.

Attorneys 3: ON BRIEF: Amanda K. Rice, Stephen J. Cowen, Andrew J. Clopton, JONES DAY, Detroit, Michigan, Joshua W. B. Richards, Patrick F. Nugent, SAUL EWING ARNSTEIN & LEHR LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellant.

Attorneys 4: ON BRIEF: Molly Savage, Deborah L. Gordon, Elizabeth Marzotto Taylor, Sarah Gordon Thomas, DEBORAH GORDON LAW, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for Appellee.

Judge(s): MOORE, CLAY, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges

Court Appealed: United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. On its surface, this appeal concerns an award of attorney fees. It presents, however, issues of ripeness, standing, and mootness that have gone unaddressed through more than five years of litigation. John Doe was an undergraduate student at the University of Michigan (“the University”) who was accused of sexual assault in 2018. Before the University’s investigation had concluded and before any discipline had been issued, he filed a lawsuit alleging that the University’s disciplinary procedures for cases involving sexual assault violated his due-process rights. The district court granted him a preliminary injunction enjoining the disciplinary process from moving forward, and the University appealed, arguing that Doe did not have standing to file his lawsuit and therefore the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. We remanded for reconsideration in light of our decision in Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2018), in which we held that the University’s disciplinary procedures violated due process, and in light of the University’s new disciplinary policy implemented in response to that decision. The district court granted in part and denied in part the University’s motion to dismiss and granted in part Doe’s motion for partial summary judgment. The University appealed again, renewing its jurisdictional arguments. Before the appeal could be heard, the complainant decided she no longer wished to participate in the disciplinary process. We determined that the appeal had become moot and vacated the district court’s order granting summary judgment. Doe then moved for attorney fees, which the district court granted, and the University appealed once again. We hold that Doe had standing to sue to seek the release of his transcript, but that the district court lacked jurisdiction over his remaining claims. We further hold that Doe was the prevailing party only as to his due-process claim seeking the release of his transcript. We therefore VACATE the district court’s order and REMAND for recalculation of attorney fees.

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