Following a bench trial, Ronald Wayne Gilbert (“Petitioner”) was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault, for which he received an effective sentence of thirteen and one-half years’ incarceration. This court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal. State v. Ronald Wayne Gilbert, No. E2017-00396-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 2411835, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 29, 2018), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 13, 2018). Petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction petition and an amended petition following the appointment of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to argue that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping based on State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012). Petitioner further argues that his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping constitutes plain error. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

This appeal concerns a dispute over insurance coverage. Amy Higgs (“Higgs”) individually and on behalf of her deceased son, Cayson Emmit Turnmire (“Cayson”), sued David Payne (“Payne”) for the negligent maintenance of his property in relation to Cayson’s death by drowning in Payne’s swimming pool. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Tennessee Farmers”), Payne’s homeowners’ insurance carrier, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”) against Payne and Higgs. Tennessee Farmers argued that, due to an exclusion in Payne’s homeowners’ insurance policy against claims “arising from or in connection with the swimming pool,” it is not obligated to defend or indemnify Payne. Tennessee Farmers and Higgs filed cross motions for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted Tennessee Farmers’ motion and denied Higgs’ motion. Higgs appeals. Citing the concurrent cause doctrine, Higgs argues that Tennessee Farmers must defend and indemnify Payne as, apart from the pool, certain non-excluded causes contributed to Cayson’s death—namely, Payne’s failure to fence or gate his property. We hold, inter alia, that each of Higgs’ alleged non-excluded concurrent causes are bound up inextricably with Cayson’s tragic drowning in Payne’s pool, an excluded cause under Payne’s insurance policy. We affirm.

A husband and wife divorced after a long marriage. They disputed whether certain assets were marital or separate property and whether the wife was entitled to alimony. The trial court found that the disputed assets were the husband’s separate property. And it awarded the wife alimony in futuro, as well as attorney’s fees as alimony in solido. Upon our review, we find the evidence preponderates against the finding that the assets are separate property. So, with those assets included in the marital estate, we remand for a new property division. And, because the division of marital property is a factor in awarding alimony, we vacate the alimony awards. On remand, the court should consider whether alimony is still appropriate under its new property division and, if so, the type, amount, and duration of the award.

This case arises from the seizure of property owned by Appellants and the ensuing forfeiture action brought against them by Appellee Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security. After Appellee voluntarily dismissed the forfeiture action, the Administrative Law Judge awarded Appellants a portion of their requested attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-325(a). The Chancery Court of Davidson County reversed the award of fees on its finding that Appellee did not issue a “citation” as required for recovery of attorney’s fees under section 4-5-325(a). The trial court also held that Appellants were not entitled to recover attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Question 1: Does Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-5-101 prohibit an unsuccessful primary candidate for one division of a circuit court from appearing on the ballot in the general election for a different division of the circuit court?

Opinion 1: Tennessee Code Annotated § 2-5-101(f) prohibits an unsuccessful primary candidate for one division of a circuit court from appearing on the subsequent general election ballot for a different division of the circuit court as an independent candidate or as a candidate of a different political party.

Question 2: Does Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-5-101 prohibit an unsuccessful primary candidate for one division of a circuit court from running as the same party’s nominee in the general election for a different division of the circuit court when a primary election has been conducted for that different division of the circuit court and the party’s nominee for that election was subsequently removed as the party’s nominee?

Opinion 2: No.

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Petitioner KenAmerican Resources, Inc. challenges an order of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission upholding a citation issued by the Secretary of Labor. We DENY the petition for review.

In this seizure and forfeiture action, we do not reach the substantive issues because the order granting the forfeiture does not comply with the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58 for entry of judgments. Nonetheless, we exercise our discretion under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 to take jurisdiction of the appeal for the limited purpose of instructing the trial court to enter an order on remand that not only complies with Rule 58, but also makes sufficient findings to enable this Court to make a meaningful review as required under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01. Vacated and remanded.

The Petitioner, Darrell Wren, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief as time-barred. He asserts on appeal that his petition was timely filed or alternatively that due process considerations warranted the tolling of the one-year statute of limitations mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102(a). He further asserts that post-conviction counsel’s violation of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28 section 6(C) requires remand. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner, Leah Ward, appeals the dismissal of her petition for writ of error coram nobis, which petition challenged her 2005 Shelby County Criminal Court Jury conviction of first degree murder, arguing that the coram nobis court should have held a hearing on her petition. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, David Frazier, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which petition challenged his Shelby County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded conviction of rape of a child, arguing that the trial court’s order denying habeas corpus relief does not contain sufficient factual and legal findings to facilitate appellate review. Discerning no error, we affirm.