Defendant, Noah Cassidy Higgins, pled guilty as a Range I standard offender to vehicular homicide by recklessness with the sentence to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion and probation and sentenced Defendant to five years’ incarceration with a thirty percent release eligibility. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court: (1) improperly denied judicial diversion; (2) improperly denied probation; (3) considered facts outside the record; and (4) erred in applying and balancing certain enhancement and mitigating factors. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Quincy Lamont Collins, was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury for one count each of attempted first degree premeditated murder, aggravated assault, especially aggravated robbery, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony having been previously convicted of a dangerous felony. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged, and he received an effective sentence of 31 years. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statement to police; that the trial court should have suppressed the gun located as a result of information obtained during Defendant’s interrogation; that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight; and that his convictions for attempted first degree premeditated murder and aggravated assault violate double jeopardy. Following our careful review of the record, the arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A gunshot victim filed a tort action against a county, alleging misconduct on the part of a sheriff’s deputy. The plaintiff asserted that the county was liable under both the Governmental Tort Liability Act and Tennessee Code Annotated 8-8-302. The county moved to dismiss the complaint. The county argued that it was immune from liability under either the discretionary function exception or the public duty doctrine. The trial court dismissed the complaint. We conclude that, because the deputy sheriff’s actions as alleged in the complaint were operational in nature, the county is not immune from liability under the Governmental Tort Liability Act. The complaint also contains sufficient factual allegations of reckless misconduct such that the special duty exception to the public duty doctrine could apply. So we vacate the dismissal.

In proceedings between ex-spouses long after the entry of their final divorce decree, the trial court concluded that it lacked authority to order the division of service-related disability benefits. The court also declared void a portion of the divorce decree that divided military retirement as marital property. As a result of the rulings, one of the parties sought relief from the divorce decree, arguing that she should be awarded alimony. The trial court denied relief. We affirm with modifications.

This appeal arises from an action to recover personal property. The plaintiff, who is the former fianc of the defendant, claimed the defendant retained some of her personal property after he forced her to vacate the premises where they previously resided. This action was initiated with the filing of a civil warrant in the general sessions court. After the general sessions court awarded the plaintiff a judgment in the amount of $7,500, the defendant appealed to the circuit court. Following a trial, the circuit court awarded the plaintiff a judgment of $4,745.30. This appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm.

Week of April 18, 2022 - April 22, 2022

Question: Does Tenn. Code Ann. 13-7-114 exempt from county zoning regulation cotton gins, grain elevators, slaughterhouses, processing plants, and milk bottling plants?

Opinion: No, there is no blanket exemption from county zoning regulation for cotton gins, grain elevators, slaughterhouses, processing plants, or milk bottling plants. A structure housing these operations is exempt from county zoning regulations only if the structure is located on lands devoted to agricultural purposes and is incidental to the underlying agricultural enterprise.

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. Delek, a fuel producer, contends that it overpaid its income taxes and seeks a refund. The IRS counters that what Delek really wants to do is double dip. Delek earned a tax credit by mixing renewables into its products. Since that credit applies against the fuel excise tax, Delek ended up paying less in excise taxes. But Delek insists it should be deemed to have paid the full, unreduced amount of excise tax. Why would it say that? When calculating its gross income, a producer can include its excise tax liability in its cost of goods sold. And a higher cost of goods sold means a lower gross income, which means a lower income tax liability.

To that end, Delek offers a novel theory: The credit is a “payment” that satisfies, but does not reduce, its excise tax liability. But the statute’s plain meaning says otherwise, and we AFFIRM summary judgment in the government’s favor.

Marcus Roshone Perry, Defendant, appeals his convictions for two counts of premeditated first degree murder, one count of first degree felony murder, and one count of felon in possession of a firearm, claiming that the trial court erred (1) in admitting hearsay evidence, (2) in admitting discoverable evidence that was not provided to Defendant, and (3) by empaneling a jury which was not representative of Defendant’s peers. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

William Cole Nicholson, Petitioner, was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual battery, and this court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. State v. William Cole Nicholson, No. M2017-01761-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 4203549, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 4, 2018), no perm. app. filed. Petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction petition and an amended petition through counsel, arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and Petitioner now appeals. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.