In 2015, a Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Michael Bland, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court imposed a life sentence. On February 20, 2020, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, alleging that newly discovered evidence exists. After a hearing on the petition, the coram nobis court issued an order denying the petition. The Petitioner appeals, arguing that the coram nobis court erred by denying relief. The Petitioner asserts that newly discovered evidence would have changed the outcome of the trial. After review, we affirm the coram nobis court’s judgment.

Week of April 11, 2022 - April 15, 2022

BOGGS, Circuit Judge. Attorney Craig Romanzi referred a lucrative personal injury case to his employer, the law firm of Fieger & Fieger, P.C. (the “Firm”); meanwhile, creditors were winning hundreds of thousands of dollars in default judgments against him. The personal injury case settled for $11.9 million about $3.55 million of which was awarded as attorney’s fees after Romanzi had quit the Firm. Romanzi’s employment at Fieger & Fieger entitled him to a third of the fees as the originating attorney, his intervening departure notwithstanding. But before Romanzi could claim his due, his creditors forced him into involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The appointed trustee, Kenneth Nathan (the “Trustee”), commenced this adversary proceeding against the Firm to recover Romanzi’s third of the settlement fees on behalf of the bankruptcy estate.

Neither party’s critique of the lower courts is persuasive. As to Fieger & Fieger’s claims, none of the grounds for vacating an arbitral decision apply, and remand was appropriate under the clarification exception to functus officio. As to Nathan, he failed to present evidence for a key element of his statutory conversion claim. We therefore affirm the judgments of the district court and bankruptcy court.

LARSEN, Circuit Judge. The Rice family devised a two-part plan to annex their eighty-acre farm into the Village of Johnstown and have it zoned for a residential development. But it was not to be. After working for eighteen months with various Johnstown officials, the Johnstown Planning and Zoning Commission (P&Z Commission) rejected the family’s application at the preliminary stage. Unhappy with the process, the Rice family sued. The family claimed that Johnstown had unlawfully delegated legislative authority to the P&Z Commission, violating its due process rights under the United States and Ohio Constitutions. The family sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.

The district court was skeptical. Because the farm was not located in Johnstown, but in adjacent Monroe Township, the court held that the Rice family lacked standing to bring its claim and granted summary judgment to the Village. We disagree. Whatever the merits of the claim, the Rice family has standing to bring it. But because the Johnstown ordinance at issue has since been amended, the family’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot. Only the claim for damages survives. Therefore, we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Defendants, Officers Mikael Ziegler (“Officer Ziegler” or “Ziegler”) and Brice Kerschen (“Officer Kerschen” or “Kerschen”), appeal the district court’s order denying their motion for summary judgment in Plaintiff William LaPlante’s (“Plaintiff” or “LaPlante”) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force action. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights when Ziegler threw him to the ground in a takedown maneuver and Kerschen failed to intervene to prevent that use of force. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of qualified immunity as to Defendant Ziegler and REVERSE the district court’s denial of qualified immunity as to Defendant Kerschen and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

As a matter of administrative grace, this court granted to Roberto Hernandez-Serrano no fewer than 14 extensions of time to file a petition for rehearing en banc in this case—thereby affording him up to 510 days to file such a petition, rather than the usual 45 days prescribed by Appellate Rule 40(a)(1). Hernandez-Serrano never filed such a petition, because he chose not to file one. Instead, with the help of our mediation office, Hernandez-Serrano eventually obtained complete relief from the Board of Immigration Appeals, which rendered further proceedings in our court moot. Hernandez-Serrano now comes to us with a motion to vacate our panel decision in this case, asserting that—“by the vagaries of circumstance”—he was denied “a chance” to seek review of our opinion. Mot. at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). But for 450 days—before his case here became moot—Hernandez-Serrano could have sought review of our decision at any time he liked. His failure to seek that review was a matter of choice, not chance. We deny his motion.

The Petitioner, Billy Gene DeBow, appeals the Hickman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition seeking habeas corpus relief from his first-degree murder conviction. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the habeas corpus court abused its discretion by dismissing his petition without ruling on the merits of his claims and that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief1 because his judgment is void and his sentence is illegal. Upon review, we affirm the judgment summarily dismissing the petition.

This appeal concerns the enforceability of an arbitration agreement in a wrongful death lawsuit. James Williams (“Plaintiff”), individually as next of kin and on behalf of the wrongful death beneficiaries of Granville Earl Williams, Jr., deceased (“Decedent”), sued Smyrna Residential, LLC d/b/a Azalea Court and Americare Systems, Inc. (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Rutherford County (“the Trial Court”). Decedent was a resident of Azalea Court, an assisted living facility. Plaintiff alleged his father died because of Defendants’ negligence. Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration, citing an arbitration agreement (“the Agreement”) entered into by Decedent’s daughter and durable power of attorney Karen Sams (“Sams”) on behalf of Decedent when the latter was admitted to Azalea Court. Notably, the durable power of attorney (“the POA”) did not cover healthcare decision-making. The Trial Court held that Sams lacked authority to enter into the Agreement and that, in any event, the wrongful death beneficiaries would not be bound by the Agreement even if it were enforceable. Defendants appeal. We affirm.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Jeanne King, a former employee of Defendant Steward Trumbull Memorial Hospital (the “Hospital”), sued the Hospital alleging violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq.; the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112, et seq.; and Ohio Revised Code § 4112, et seq. The Hospital filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted. King v. Steward Trumbull Mem. Hosp., Inc., No. 19-cv-720, 2021 WL 1578076, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 22, 2021). For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the district court’s order and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. This case presents this Court with two purely legal questions: (1) whether a FaceTime call constitutes a “visual depiction” under U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(c)(1), and (2) whether responding to a notice or advertisement “involved” “offering or seeking by notice or advertisement” under that same provision. The district court found that a FaceTime call does constitute a “visual depiction” and that the provision is broad enough to cover responding to a notice or advertisement. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.