The Appellant, Tarrance Jershun Perry, was convicted in the Madison County Circuit Court of rape, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years to be served at one hundred percent release eligibility. On appeal, the Appellant contends that a constructive amendment of the indictment and a fatal variance occurred when the indictment charged him with rape by force or coercion but the proof at trial showed rape without consent and that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A jury convicted Defendant, Jesse D. Moses, of one count of Class B felony unlawful possession of a firearm after being convicted of a felony involving the use or attempted use of force, violence, or a deadly weapon. See Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17- 1307(b)(1)(A) (2017). The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty years’ incarceration with a thirty-five percent release eligibility. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that his prior conviction for aggravated burglary was a felony involving the use of force, violence, or a deadly weapon and that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that a “[p]rior ‘crime of violence’ includes any degree of burglary.” Upon review, we determine that Defendant’s prior aggravated burglary was a felony involving the use of force, violence, or a deadly weapon and that the trial court’s jury instruction was not prejudicially erroneous. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Christopher Scott Montella, was convicted by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2018). He received a sentence of eleven years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction, (2) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to sever, (3) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search, (4) the Defendant suffered a violation of Brady v. Maryland 373 U.S. 83 (1963) when the State failed to inform the Defendant the victim’s trial testimony would be different than the victim’s previous testimony, (5) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on juror misconduct, and (6) the trial court erred by sentencing the Defendant to eleven years. We conclude that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to sever; however, the error was harmless. We reverse the Defendant’s conviction based on juror misconduct and remand the case for a new trial.

The defendant, Ernest G. McBrien, appeals the order of the trial court denying his motion to dismiss, revoking his probation, and ordering him to serve his original six-year sentence in confinement. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss both the original and amended probation violation warrants against the defendant.

The Petitioner, Michael Dillon Lambdin, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition seeking relief from his conviction for first degree felony murder and life sentence. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because ( 1) counsel failed to file a motion to suppress the Petitioner's police statement due to the Petitioner's intoxication; (2) counsel failed to object to crime scene and autopsy photographs; (3) counsel introduced a prejudicial crime scene photograph of the victim; (4) counsel failed to object to an improper statement made during the State's rebuttal argument; and (5) counsel failed to request an accomplice jury instruction in writing. The Petitioner also asserts that the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of a fair trial. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Gerald N. Crawford, pleaded guilty to delivery of heroin, a Class B felony, and possession with the intent to sell heroin, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17- 417(a)(2), (4) (2018) (subsequently amended). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant received concurrent twelve-year, Range I sentences, and after a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve the sentences in the Department of Correction. The Defendant filed a motion to modify the manner of service of the sentences, which the court denied. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion. We affirm.

Petitioner, Kristina Cole, appeals the denial of her post-conviction petition arguing that the post-conviction court erred in its denial of her petition. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal arises from a divorce action in which the trial court determined that both the husband and the wife had proven their grounds for divorce and declared the parties divorced pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-129(b). The trial court also (1) declined to adopt the wife’s proposed permanent parenting plan, (2) determined that the separate assets she contributed to the marriage had become marital property through transmutation, and (3) declined to award attorney’s fees to her as alimony in solido. The wife has appealed, and the husband seeks attorney’s fees and costs on appeal, characterizing the wife’s appeal as frivolous. We affirm the trial court’s final order of divorce but modify the order to prohibit the husband from consuming alcohol during his co-parenting time. We decline to award the husband attorney’s fees and costs on appeal.

This appeal involves an award of attorney fees after a remand from this Court. The appellant argues that the statute authorizing such fees is inapplicable by its terms and also unconstitutional as a violation of her right to access the courts. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

This is a declaratory judgment action in which the plaintiff developer objected to the defendant town’s enforcement of a new energy code after the developer received preliminary plat approval. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant town. We affirm.