This extraordinary appeal arises from a school bus crash in November 2016, which resulted in the tragic death of six children attending Woodmore Elementary School in Chattanooga. Plaintiff, a fourth grade math and science teacher at Woodmore, sued the employer of the bus driver for, inter alia, reckless infliction of emotional distress (“RIED”). The teacher alleged that the employer’s failure to address the bus driver’s dangerous driving despite receiving numerous warnings disregarded the children’s safety, constituted reckless and outrageous conduct, and caused her serious mental injuries. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss the claim, finding that the teacher had sufficiently alleged outrageous conduct on the part of the employer and that she had met all other pleading requirements to sustain her RIED claim. Employer appeals. Although we agree with the trial court that the teacher sufficiently alleged conduct so outrageous by the employer that it cannot be tolerated by civilized society, we hold that the teacher is not a person who falls within the reasonably foreseeable scope of the particular substantial and unjustifiable risk consciously disregarded by the employer and, therefore, cannot recover under a reckless infliction of emotional distress claim. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s finding on this latter issue and remand the case for dismissal of the action against employer.

This extraordinary appeal arises from a school bus crash in November 2016, which resulted in the tragic death of six children attending Woodmore Elementary School in Chattanooga. Plaintiff, a computer teacher at Woodmore, sued the employer of the bus driver for, inter alia, reckless infliction of emotional distress (“RIED”). The teacher alleged that the employer’s failure to address the bus driver’s dangerous driving despite receiving numerous warnings disregarded the children’s safety, constituted reckless and outrageous conduct, and caused her serious mental injuries. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss the claim, finding that the teacher had sufficiently alleged outrageous conduct on the part of the employer and that she had met all other pleading requirements to sustain her RIED claim. Employer appeals. Although we agree with the trial court that the teacher sufficiently alleged conduct so outrageous by the employer that it cannot be tolerated by civilized society, we hold that the teacher is not a person who falls within the reasonably foreseeable scope of the particular substantial and unjustifiable risk consciously disregarded by the employer and, therefore, cannot recover under a reckless infliction of emotional distress claim. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s finding on this latter issue and remand the case for dismissal of the action against employer.

This appeal arises from the denial of parole to an inmate by the Tennessee Board of Parole. The Tennessee Board of Parole denied the inmate parole in March 2020. The inmate’s administrative appeal was also denied. Thereafter, the inmate filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the chancery court. However, the chancery court dismissed the petition without prejudice due to outstanding costs in prior civil cases. The inmate then filed a second petition with the chancery court. The chancery court dismissed the second petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it was not filed within sixty days of the Tennessee Board of Parole’s final decision in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-9-102. The inmate appeals. We affirm.

This extraordinary appeal arises from a school bus crash in November 2016, which resulted in the tragic death of six children attending Woodmore Elementary School in Chattanooga. Plaintiff, an educational assistant at Woodmore, sued the employer of the bus driver for, inter alia, reckless infliction of emotional distress (“RIED”). The educational assistant alleged that the employer’s failure to address the bus driver’s dangerous driving despite receiving numerous warnings disregarded the children’s safety, constituted reckless and outrageous conduct, and caused him serious mental injuries. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss the claim, finding that the educational assistant had sufficiently alleged outrageous conduct on the part of the employer and that he had met all other pleading requirements to sustain his RIED claim. Employer appeals. Although we agree with the trial court that the educational assistant sufficiently alleged conduct so outrageous by the employer that it cannot be tolerated by civilized society, we hold that the educational assistant is not a person who falls within the reasonably foreseeable scope of the particular substantial and unjustifiable risk consciously disregarded by the employer and, therefore, cannot recover under a reckless infliction of emotional distress claim. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s finding on this latter issue and remand the case for dismissal of the action against employer.

This extraordinary appeal arises from a school bus crash in November 2016, which resulted in the tragic death of six children attending Woodmore Elementary School in Chattanooga.1 Plaintiff, the school principal at Woodmore, sued the employer of the bus driver for, inter alia, negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) and reckless infliction of emotional distress (“RIED”). With respect to her NIED claim, the principal alleged that by breaching its duty to keep the students safe, the employer foreseeably caused her severe emotional distress. As to her RIED claim, she averred that the employer’s failure to address the bus driver’s dangerous driving, despite receiving numerous warnings, disregarded the children’s safety, constituted reckless and outrageous conduct, and caused her serious mental injuries. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss as to both claims, finding that the principal’s allegations satisfied the pleading requirements to sustain the claims. Employer appeals. We conclude that the principal did not allege the type of relationship to the injured or deceased party required for a plaintiff who did not witness the injury-producing event to recover under a NIED claim. The principal’s allegations also failed to show conduct so outrageous by the employer that it cannot be tolerated by civilized society. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s judgment as to both issues and remand the case for dismissal of the action against the employer.

This extraordinary appeal arises from a school bus crash in November 2016, which resulted in the tragic death of six children attending Woodmore Elementary School in Chattanooga. Woodmore’s school secretary sued the employer of the bus driver for, inter alia, reckless infliction of emotional distress (“RIED”). The school secretary alleged that the employer’s failure to address the bus driver’s dangerous driving despite receiving numerous warnings disregarded the children’s safety, constituted reckless and outrageous conduct, and caused her serious mental injuries. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss the claim, finding that the school secretary had sufficiently alleged outrageous conduct on the part of the employer and that she had met all other pleading requirements to sustain her RIED claim. Employer appeals. Although we agree with the trial court that the school secretary sufficiently alleged conduct so outrageous by the employer that it cannot be tolerated by civilized society, we hold that the secretary is not a person who falls within the reasonably foreseeable scope of the particular substantial and unjustifiable risk consciously disregarded by the employer and, therefore, cannot recover under a reckless infliction of emotional distress claim. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s finding on this latter issue and remand the case for dismissal of the action against employer.

RALPH B. GUY, JR., Circuit Judge. Defendant Erik Cromer was formerly a “managing loan officer” for plaintiff Union Home Mortgage. He agreed to several restrictive covenants, including that he would “not become employed in the same or similar capacity” with a competitive entity. Cromer left Union Home and started working for defendant Homeside Financial as a “non-producing” branch manager. It was not long before Union Home brought suit and sought a preliminary injunction to enforce Cromer’s restrictive covenants. The district court issued an injunction—without any time limitation—prohibiting Cromer, and anyone acting in concert, from inter alia “competing with Union Home.” Defendants argue that the injunction fails to satisfy the specificity requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(1), is overbroad, and was otherwise improperly granted under the standard for preliminary injunctions. Because we agree, we VACATE the injunction and REMAND.

Because appellant failed to comply with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B with regard to filing a recusal appeal, and the order appealed does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

A grandfather commenced this action for grandparent visitation after his daughter and two granddaughters moved out of his house. While the action was pending, the trial court entered an agreed order that granted temporary visitation to the grandfather. When the mother refused to comply with the agreed order, the grandfather filed a motion for civil contempt. Following several delays, the petition for grandparent visitation and the motion for contempt came on for hearing on the same day. After the final hearing, the trial court denied both the petition for grandparent visitation and the motion for civil contempt. The court found that the grandfather failed to prove that losing his relationship with the children would create a risk of substantial harm to the children. The court also found that the mother’s failure to comply with the agreed order was not willful because she had been coerced into the agreement by her former attorney. This appeal followed. We affirm the dismissal of the petition for grandparent visitation. With regard to the motion for civil contempt, we find the issue is moot because the grandfather no longer had any right to visitation after this petition was dismissed. Thus, the contempt issue is pretermitted on the basis of mootness.

In this divorce case, Husband contests the trial court’s division of marital property and debt and the award of alimony to Wife. We affirm.