The State filed this action against the defendants for judicial enforcement of an order and assessment entered by the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation concerning violations of the Water Quality Control Act. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the State as to the defendants’ liability for upfront civil penalties and damages due under the order. We affirm.

Daniel Greenberg appeals the order of the Circuit Court for Williamson County (the “trial court”), enrolling a California judgment under which Mr. Greenberg is obligated to pay child support to his ex-wife. Because his brief is not in compliance with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27, Father’s issues are waived and his appeal must be dismissed.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Bretton Westmoreland was arrested and detained at the Butler County Jail, where he was attacked by another detainee for being a “snitch.” Westmoreland sued the jail and Rocky Tyree, an employee, for failure to protect under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to the Butler County Jail and Tyree, holding that because Westmoreland did not suffer a constitutional violation, Tyree was entitled to qualified immunity and the jail could not be held liable. Westmoreland appeals, arguing the district court used the incorrect test to evaluate his claim. Because our court recently determined that Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), requires modification of the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference test for pretrial detainees, we vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remand Westmoreland’s claims for proceedings consistent with Brawner v. Scott County, Tennessee, 14 F.4th 585 (6th Cir. 2021).

Appellee, a tenured high school teacher, petitioned for judicial review of Appellant Shelby County Board of Education’s decision to terminate his employment. Without making findings to explain its reasoning, the trial court remanded the case to the school board for a second hearing. From our review, neither party argued that the school board’s initial hearing was procedurally deficient. As such, the trial court’s decision to remand the case to the school board, without findings to support such decision, was error. Vacated and Remanded.

Appellants purchased a home from Appellee that was contaminated with mold. Appellants therefore filed suit against Appellee. The trial court granted summary judgment in Appellee’s favor. Because the trial court’s order does not comply with Rule 56.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure or Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc., we vacate and remand.

The Defendant, Sonya Nale, is charged by indictment with bribery of a public servant, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. 39-16-102 (2018). After the trial court granted the Defendant’s motion to disqualify the Twelfth Judicial District Attorney’s office, we granted the State’s application for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 to review the trial court’s order. We reverse the trial court’s order disqualifying the district attorney general’s office from prosecuting the case.

The Defendant, Michael Ray Hogan, appeals as of right from the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of the remainder of his four-year sentence based upon his committing new offenses, failing to report his arrests to his probation officer, and for failing to report to his probation officer. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) finding that the Defendant violated his probation because the firearm and suspected marijuana were seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights; (2) considering proof that occurred after the violation warrant was filed; (3) and requiring the Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in custody. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The employee alleged a work-related repetitive injury to his right hand. He initially sought unauthorized medical treatment and then selected an authorized physician from an employer-provided panel. Following a compensation hearing, the trial court concluded the employee was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits because he did not prove his alleged injury was primarily caused by his work for the employer. The employee has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decision and certify it as final.

The Shelby County Grand Jury issued an indictment charging Defendant, Stanley Allen, with aggravated statutory rape, solicitation of a minor, and sexual battery. Following a trial, a jury found Defendant guilty of solicitation of a minor and sexual battery. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the charge of aggravated statutory rape. Defendant later entered a no contest plea to a lesser-included offense of assault by offensive touching on this charge. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective one-year sentence suspended to three years of supervised probation, and the court denied Defendant’s request for judicial diversion. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for sexual battery and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying judicial diversion. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Corey Allen Harris, was convicted after a jury trial of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and he received an effective eighteen-year sentence. The Defendant filed a motion for a new trial asserting that the evidence was insufficient and that the prosecutor’s argument was so improper as to constitute plain error. On appeal, the Defendant renews the challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the prosecutor’s closing argument, and he asks for relief based on the omission from the jury instructions of the statutory definition of attempt. Because the jury was not properly instructed on the elements of the offense of attempted second degree murder, we reverse the convictions for attempted second degree murder and employment of a firearm during the commission of attempted second degree murder, and we remand for further proceedings. The aggravated assault conviction is affirmed.