The Petitioner, Marlon Sontay, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and rape. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The pro se Defendant, Jeffrey T. Siler, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s order summarily dismissing his motion to correct a clerical error. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Marlon Jermaine Johnson, acting pro se, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his convictions for the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417(c)(2)(A) and for possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417(c)(1). On appeal, the Petitioner argues his sentence is illegal because the trial court entered his judgment incorrectly, resulting in errors on the face of the judgment. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment summarily dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The petitioner, Tavares Dewayne Buchanan, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

This is an appeal from a termination of parental rights proceeding. As to the mother of the child at issue, we vacate the trial court’s termination of her parental rights due to procedural concerns that are acknowledged by the Department of Children’s Services. With respect to the father of the child, however, we conclude that one ground for termination was properly established. We further conclude that the evidence clearly and convincingly shows that the termination of the father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

ALAN C. STOUT, Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judge. In this consolidated appeal arising from two separate Chapter 13 cases, Debtors/Appellees (collectively “Debtors”) objected to priority unsecured claims that Creditor/Appellant United States of America on behalf of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) filed based on Debtors’ failure to pay the “shared responsibility payment” (“SRP”) for failing to obtain health insurance as required under the “individual mandate” within the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (the “ACA”).1 The bankruptcy court sustained Debtors’ objections in both cases, determining that the SRP is not “a tax on or measured by income or gross receipts” or “an excise tax on . . . a transaction” entitled to priority treatment under either 507(a)(8)(A) or (E).2 The IRS now appeals the bankruptcy court’s decision. For the reasons stated below, the bankruptcy court’s decision is REVERSED.

JESSICA E. PRICE SMITH, Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judge. This appeal arises from a Memorandum Opinion and Order Regarding Debtor’s Stay Violation, Attorneys’ Fees, Confirmation, and Case Disposition entered April 23, 2019 (the “Stay Violation Order”).

Michelle Dougherty-Kelsay (“Debtor”) and Michael Stephen Kelsay (“Creditor”) were married in 2001 and have three children. Their divorce proceedings began in July 2007 and a decree of dissolution was entered in July 2008. Domestic support and child custody issues have continued to be litigated. In 2017, Creditor obtained primary custody of the children. In May 2017, he filed a Motion for Child Support and Motion for Contempt in the Kenton County Circuit Court (“Family Court”) seeking an order “establishing a sum of child support to be paid by Debtor to Creditor for the parties’ three minor children.” A monthly support amount was determined. At issue in this appeal are expenses for medical care and extra-curricular activities, payment of past due support obligations, and the judgment for payment of the outstanding obligations and related contempt findings. Pre-petition, the Family Court established that the parties would split the cost of medical care and extra-curricular activities for the children, with Creditor paying 68% of those costs, and Debtor paying 32%. Creditor was seeking reimbursement for Debtor’s share of incurred expenses when the bankruptcy petition was filed. The Family Court held a hearing, post-petition, on Creditor’s request for payment, made findings on the obligation due and payment of the obligation, and found Debtor in contempt of a prior order. Debtor filed a motion with the Bankruptcy Court requesting sanctions for violation of the automatic stay for the post-petition hearing and Creditor’s collection efforts made pursuant to orders issued by the Family Court. In the Stay Violation Order, the Bankruptcy Court found that some actions violated the automatic stay and awarded attorneys’ fees as actual damages and punitive damages. For the reasons set forth below, the Bankruptcy Court’s Stay Violation Order is AFFIRMED.

Week of March 14, 2022 - March 18, 2022

The employee suffered multiple injuries when she was involved in a car accident while in the course and scope of her employment. The employer accepted the claim as compensable and provided workers’ compensation benefits, including extensive medical care. Upon reaching maximum medical improvement, the parties were unable to agree regarding the extent of the employee’s vocational disability. After a trial, the court found the employee to be permanently and totally disabled. The employer has appealed. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court’s decision and certify the trial court’s order as final.

Question 1: Are voting procedures in Tennessee governed by state or federal law?

Opinion 1: While the State is primarily responsible for regulating federal, state, and local elections, Congress has the authority, pursuant to the Elections Clause of the federal Constitution, to override state regulations with respect to federal elections. Additionally, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution, Congress may enact federal legislation that pre-empts state laws, including state laws governing voting procedures. States must also adhere to the federal constitutional requirements of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments with respect to voting.

Question 2: If a county uses hand-marked ballots, may it meet its obligation to accommodate disabled voters by offering assistance with the hand-marked ballots?

Question 3: If an electronic machine is required to accommodate disabled voters and assuming such machines are portable, could the requirement be met by making the machine be available upon demand or by having at least three machines equidistant to any precinct so that they would be available if needed?

Question 4: Is a county permitted to ensure accommodation for disabled voters without purchasing for every precinct an electronic machine that may not be needed?

Opinions 2-4: The answers to Questions 2-4 would depend upon the particular facts and circumstances in any given situation.