The Petitioner, Athanasios D. Edmonston, appeals from the Williamson County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and misdemeanor assault convictions and his effective twenty-four-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by determining that his petition was untimely and that due process did not require tolling the statute of limitations period. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The employee, an insulation installer, reported two incidents he alleged caused injuries to his shoulders and neck. The employer initiated the payment of benefits after the second reported incident but allegedly paid no benefits with respect to the first reported incident. After the employer denied a request for surgery, the employee filed a petition for benefits, listing the date of the second reported incident as the date of injury. The employer argued that the need for surgery was caused by the first reported incident and that the employee did not file a petition for benefits within the limitations period applicable to that accident. The employee asserted the discovery rule and the employer’s voluntary payment of benefits tolled the applicable statute of limitations. Following an expedited hearing, the trial court declined to order the benefits the employee sought and concluded it had insufficient information to address whether the limitations period for the first reported incident had expired. The employee has appealed. Upon careful consideration of the record, we affirm the trial court’s order and remand the case.

Week of February 14, 2022 - February 18, 2022

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. At first blush, this case has the familiar attributes of a classic bribery scheme: public officeholders raising money, a lucrative public contract, and suspicious campaign contributions to those officeholders from a company seeking the contract. Those attributes led federal authorities to open a grand jury probe into bribery allegations against two Lexington City Council members. Along the way, the probe uncovered numerous illegal straw campaign contributions orchestrated by local real estate developer Timothy Wayne Wellman, purportedly as quid pro quo for choosing Wellman’s firm to fulfill the public contract. As federal investigators closed in, Wellman falsified documents and cajoled his straw contributors to lie about the fraudulent contribution scheme. That cover up proved worse than the purported underlying crime: federal prosecutors indicted Wellman for falsities and obstruction during the bribery investigation, but never bribery itself. A jury convicted Wellman on all counts.

On appeal, Wellman argues that insufficient evidence supports his convictions because, at most, he obstructed an investigation into violations of Kentucky campaign finance laws, not federal bribery. Wellman also alleges errors in his trial and sentencing. But a reasonable jury could conclude that Wellman corruptly obstructed, influenced, or impeded a federal grand jury proceeding. His other arguments are likewise unavailing. Accordingly, we affirm.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. After working underground in coal mines for three decades, Casey Samons developed pneumoconiosis (commonly known as black-lung disease). His widow, Mabel Samons, sought benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901–44. It took the Department of Labor 17 years to decide (and ultimately deny) her claims. During this time, the claims bounced back and forth between an administrative law judge and the agency’s appellate body, the Benefits Review Board. In the last appeal, the Board also rejected one of Samons’s main arguments on what Samons likely views to be a legalistic ground (“law of the case”) without ever reaching the merits. The Department of Labor then delayed things further by filing an incomplete and disorganized administrative record in our court. We thus understand Samons’s frustrations with the agency’s handling of her claims. But while its actions perhaps could be described as poor customer service, they do not show any reversible legal error in the agency proceedings. To the contrary, the Board could lawfully invoke the discretionary law-of-the-case doctrine to avoid reexamining an issue on which it had affirmed the administrative law judge years before. And the judge’s credibility findings about the conflicting medical opinions pass muster under our deferential “substantial evidence” test. We thus affirm the Board’s decision.

A Knox County grand jury indicted the defendant, David Ware, for unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and simple possession of marijuana. A jury subsequently convicted the defendant as charged, and the trial court imposed an effective six-year sentence suspended to supervised probation after six months of service in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm and argues the trial court erred by granting one of the State’s peremptory challenges during jury selection. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Eric Dewayne Wallace, of first degree felony murder and attempted first degree murder for offenses committed in 1992, and he was sentenced to consecutive terms of life imprisonment and fifteen years. After discovering in 2021 that the Defendant was mistakenly assigned 1,174 days of pretrial jail credit and 312 days of behavior credit to both convictions, the trial court entered an order and corrected judgment for the conviction for attempted first degree murder, removing the credits to correct a clerical error under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court’s order on the basis that it abused its discretion, violated his due process rights and the prohibitions against double jeopardy, and failed to comply with Rule 17 of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court and Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-209. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Michael McVay, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding his petition untimely. Upon our review of the record, the applicable law, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the dismissal of the petition as barred by the one-year statute of limitations.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Bruce Antione Cole, of aggravated assault and being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of forty-five years in confinement and ordered the defendant pay $25,474.16 in restitution. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing and its restitution order. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentence but remand for a hearing on the matter of restitution.

Petitioner, Quincy D. Scott, was convicted of aggravated robbery and was sentenced to seventeen years as a Range II, multiple offender at eighty-five percent to be served consecutively to sentences in two other counties. After this court affirmed the judgment and the supreme court denied permission to appeal, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. The post-conviction court granted Petitioner a delayed appeal to allow him to raise multiple evidentiary issues. In this delayed appeal, Petitioner challenges the admission of the same pieces of evidence and the testimony of three of the State’s witnesses. He also challenges the omission of evidence regarding the professional misconduct of a detective. The State contends Petitioner is entitled to no relief. The State also contends Petitioner was erroneously granted a delayed appeal because the record does not demonstrate prejudice. We are precluded from reviewing this issue based on the post-conviction court’s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-111(b). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court granting a delayed appeal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.