A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher Williams, of first degree premeditated murder and of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it admitted his confession into evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Brandon McKinnie appeals the denial of his motion seeking a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). He believes that he presented numerous extraordinary and compelling reasons to support the reduction, including the Havis error in his original sentencing, none of which were accepted by the district court. We agree with the district court that McKinnie’s arguments lack merit and therefore affirm.

The Defendant, Edwin Alfonso Reeves, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of Count I, criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony; and Count II, possession with the intent to sell or deliver a Schedule II controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-212 (2018) (criminally negligent homicide); 39-17- 417(a)(4), (c)(2)(A) (2018) (subsequently amended) (possession with intent to sell or deliver a Schedule II controlled substance); 39-17-432 (b)(1)(B) (establishing drug-free zones) (2018) (subsequently amended). The Defendant also pleaded guilty to Count III, possession with intent to sell or deliver a Schedule II controlled substance in a drug-free zone. The court sentenced the Defendant to serve two years for criminally negligent homicide, four years for one possession conviction, and three years for the other possession conviction. The court imposed the sentences consecutively to each other, for an effective nine-year sentence, to be served consecutively to a sentence the Defendant was serving at the time of sentencing. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions in Counts I and II of criminally negligent homicide and possession of a Schedule II drug, and that the court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Justin Richard Norton, pleaded guilty to one count each of aggravated assault, theft of property, evading arrest, resisting arrest, and violating an order of protection. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-102 (2018) (subsequently amended) (aggravated assault); -13-113 (2018) (subsequently amended) (violation of order of protection); -14-103 (2018) (theft of property); -16-602 (2018) (resisting arrest); -16-603(a) (2018) (subsequently amended) (evading arrest). The Defendant received an agreed three-year, splitconfinement sentence. The Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing that the pleas were made under duress and that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The trial court denied his motion. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Phillip Daniel Morton, of first degree premediated murder. The Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction. The Petitioner timely filed a post-conviction petition, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Appellant, Jimmy Heard, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

A Knox County jury convicted Robert Alexander Grisham, Petitioner, of observation without consent, unlawful photography, and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. State v. Robert Grisham, No. E2015-02446-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1806829, at *11 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 20, 2017). On appeal, a panel of this Court modified Petitioner’s especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor conviction to attempted especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and affirmed the two misdemeanor convictions. Id. at *26. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief alleging two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The postconviction court denied relief and Petitioner appealed. Petitioner died while his appeal was pending. Accordingly, we conclude that this appeal should be dismissed.

The Appellant, Michael Brown, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received an effective six-year sentence with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentence, including his request for judicial diversion. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied diversion and ordered that he serve the sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his requests for judicial diversion and full probation. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a United Postal Service (“UPS”) worker who was injured when her foot went through the porch of a residence at which she was delivering a package. The UPS worker sued the property management company who leased the property, alleging it was liable for her injuries. The trial court dismissed the case on summary judgment, finding the property management company had no duty to the UPS worker. Because the record on appeal does not contain the lease agreement the trial court relied upon in granting the property management company’s motion for summary judgment, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case to the trial court.

This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that several grounds for termination as to the mother were proven: (1) abandonment by failure to support; (2) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (3) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for failure to support; (4) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for wanton disregard; (5) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (6) persistent conditions; (7) severe child abuse; and (8) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to care for the children. The juvenile court also found that termination was in the best interests of the children. The mother appeals. On appeal, the Department of Children’s Services does not defend the grounds of abandonment by failure to support and abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home. We reverse the juvenile court in part and affirm in part.