This is a mandamus action in which the plaintiffs seek to compel the City of Chattanooga (“the City”), pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 6-51-108(e), to complete the plans of services arising from a 1972 annexation and to publish annual reports of its progress pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 6-51-108(c). Two areas of the 1972 annexation are at issue: (1) an area known as “Tiftonia” or “Area 4” and (2) an area known as “Wauhatchee–Williams Island” or “Area 12.” The plaintiffs also seek a declaration that all annexations by the City since 1981 were void due to the City’s violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 6-51-102(b)(5), which prohibits a municipality from annexing additional territory while in default on a prior plan of services. After three years of trial preparation, but prior to trial, the court imposed monetary sanctions against the City under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37.03 in the amount of $263,273.08 for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses caused by the City’s failure to supplement discovery responses. Thereafter, the case was tried in three phases. Following the first phase of the trial in 2017, the court found the City complied with its obligations as to Area 4; however, it found the City “materially and substantially failed to comply” with its obligations to provide street paving, street construction, and sanitary sewers in Area 12. Following the second phase of the trial in 2019, the court found the City’s failure to comply with its obligations as to Area 12 was not excused in that it was not caused by “unforeseen circumstances.” As a consequence, the court ordered the City to submit a proposed scope of services to be provided, which would, inter alia, be the subject of the Phase 3 trial. After the third and final phase of the trial in 2020, the court found the City’s proposed scope of services was insufficient and issued a writ of mandamus ordering the City to bring all streets up to current standards and install, inter alia, a gravity-fed sewer system for Area 12 within 48 months. The court also ordered the City to publish annual reports of its progress and enjoined the City from further annexations until the services were provided. Finally, the court found the plaintiffs were not entitled to additional relief for the City’s past violations of §§ 6-51-102(b)(5) and - 108(c). Both parties appealed. The plaintiffs contend, inter alia, that the trial court erred by finding the City complied with the plan of services for Area 4 and by denying their request for additional relief under §§ 6-51-102(b)(5) and -108(c). The City contends that § 6-51-102(b)(5) and § 6-51-108(c) and (e) do not apply to the annexations of Area 4 and Area 12 because the statutes were enacted after the annexation ordinances were passed. The City also contends that the plaintiffs lack standing, and that their claims are barred by the doctrine of laches and the applicable statute of limitations. In the alternative, the City asserts that the trial court erred by finding it failed to materially and substantially comply with the plan of services for Area 12. The City also appeals the trial court’s award of sanctions for noncompliance with discovery under Rule of Civil Procedure 37.03. Following a thorough review, we reverse and modify the trial court’s judgment regarding the standards that apply to the City’s provision of street paving and construction in Area 12; vacate its judgment regarding the City’s provision of sanitary and storm sewers in Areas 4 and 12; and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm the court’s judgment in all other respects.

This appeal arises from the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor children upon the juvenile court’s finding the statutory grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of and financial responsibility for the children. The juvenile court further found that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We vacate the statutory ground of persistent conditions because we are unable to verify that this finding was the independent judgment of the juvenile court. We affirm the remaining grounds for the termination of the mother’s parental rights, as well as the juvenile court’s determination that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest.

The Defendant, Justin Kenneth Blankenbaker, was convicted by a jury of first-degree premeditated murder, arson, and abuse of a corpse, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus five years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for first-degree murder, specifically, challenging the element of premeditation; and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for arson because he did not knowingly damage any structure. Following our review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Stephen Jacob McKinney, pled guilty in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony, in exchange for an eightyear sentence with the method and manner of service to be left to the trial court’s determination. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court concluded that the Defendant was ineligible for probation pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40- 35-303(a), which includes vehicular homicide by intoxication as one of the conviction offenses for which probation is not available. The trial court, therefore, sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to eight years in the Department of Correction at thirty percent release eligibility. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by not construing Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-303(a) in conjunction with Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-213(b)(2)(B), which provides that a defendant convicted of a first offense vehicular homicide by intoxication must serve a mandatory minimum sentence of forty-eight hours of incarceration before release from confinement on probation. The Defendant contends that the statutes are not in conflict if the release from confinement in the vehicular homicide statute is interpreted as release on parole. Based on our review, we conclude that the clearly worded intent of the legislature, as expressed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-303(a), was to remove vehicular homicide by intoxication as an offense for which probation is available. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jessica R. Adkins, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her conviction and resulting life sentence for felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child neglect. The Petitioner’s conviction was based on her failure to seek medical treatment for her two-month-old daughter, who sustained blunt force trauma while in the care of the child’s father, Russell Dean Long, who was tried with the Petitioner. In this appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that she received effective assistance of trial counsel. The State argues that the post-conviction court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition because it was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations and the Petitioner “made no efforts to show that she complied with the requirements of Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 28 § 2(G) by delivering her pro se petition to the appropriate prison official within the time fixed for filing.” Because the post-conviction court treated the petition as timely from the outset of the hearing, thereby preempting any proof the Petitioner may have presented to show that she delivered her petition to the appropriate prison official for mailing within the time for filing of the petition, we remand to the post-conviction court for an evidentiary hearing on the timeliness of the petition.

A parolee petitioned for a common law writ of certiorari after the Tennessee Board of Parole revoked his parole and did not credit his sentence with a portion of the time he spent on parole. The chancery court concluded that the Board did not act arbitrarily, fraudulently, illegally, or in excess of its jurisdiction. The chancery court dismissed the petition. We affirm.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother and father’s parental rights to their son, Riley S. The trial court found that DCS established several grounds for terminating both parents’ parental rights and that termination of their rights was in Riley’s best interest. On appeal, neither parent challenges any of the grounds for termination; instead, they contend DCS failed to prove, and that the trial court made insufficient findings to establish, that termination of their parental rights was in Riley’s best interest. Following a careful review of the record, we have determined that DCS proved several grounds for termination as to each parent. We have also determined that DCS proved, and the trial court made sufficient findings to establish, that termination of their parental rights was in the best interest of Riley. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s termination of the mother and father’s parental rights.

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services denied an application for adoption assistance payments because the adoptive children did not meet federal eligibility criteria. The adoptive family petitioned for judicial review. And the chancery court reversed. We conclude that the administrative agency’s decision was based on an erroneous interpretation of federal law. So we affirm the chancery court’s decision.

This appeal arises from a premises liability action filed by Bonnie S. Bodine (“Plaintiff”) against an incorrect defendant. After learning that she had sued the wrong defendant, Plaintiff waited over four months to file a “Motion to Correct Misnomer,” requesting that she be permitted to “replace” the correct defendant in the action. This motion was not heard until five months later, after the defendant asked the trial court to place the case on the docket for both Plaintiff’s motion and the defendant’s summary judgment motion. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion to correct misnomer and subsequent motion to alter or amend, citing Plaintiff’s “extreme lack of due diligence.” Plaintiff appeals. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

The Defendant, Noreeldeen I. Abdulkarim, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to attempted aggravated rape, for which he is serving a twelve-year sentence as a Range II offender. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because (1) the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered and (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Both claims relate to his allegation that he was not advised that being listed on the sex offender registry and being subject to community supervision for life would be a consequence of the guilty plea. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.