The Defendant, Jim George Conaser, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a Class C felony, for which he is serving a twelve-year sentence as a Range III, persistent offender. See T.C.A. § 39-13- 102(a)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. 2017) (subsequently amended). On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a denial of unemployment compensation benefits. Specifically, a former employee contends that there existed good cause as to why he resigned from his employment such that he should be entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. The Commissioner’s Designee found that no good cause existed as to why the employee terminated his employment and therefore determined that he was not entitled to benefits. The employee then filed a petition for judicial review. The trial court thereafter affirmed the Commissioner’s Designee’s decision. On appeal, we conclude that there is substantial and material evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s Designee’s decision, and therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. This is a case about Ohio’s billboard regulations. In Ohio, to place an advertising billboard on a highway, you must apply for a permit from the Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT). But under one of its regulations, known as the compliance rule, ODOT will not process a permit application if the applicant has outstanding fees, changes his billboard without prior approval from ODOT, or maintains an illegal advertising billboard.

This controversy began when ODOT put Kenjoh’s billboard permits on hold under the compliance rule, alleging that Kenjoh was maintaining an illegal billboard. In turn, Kenjoh sued ODOT, asserting that the compliance rule is an unconstitutional prior restraint. It asked for a permanent injunction and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed both claims, and Kenjoh appealed. But while the case was pending on appeal, the Ohio legislature amended a key definition in the relevant statute. This changes how the regulation applies. So we VACATE and REMAND the injunction claim to the district court to consider the constitutionality of the regulation given the amendment. But as to damages, we AFFIRM the grant of qualified immunity despite the amendment. That’s because we look at the law as it existed at the time of the official action.

Jeremy Jones, Petitioner, was convicted of attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. His convictions were affirmed on appeal. State v. Jeremy Jones, No. W2015-01528-CCQA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 7654954 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 20, 2017). Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on various grounds, including ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s lack of communication and trial strategy. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief and dismissed the petition. We affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

Defendant, Jermaine Elvey Crawford, appeals from the revocation of his probationary sentences in Carroll County Circuit Court case 14-CR-115 and Henry County Circuit Court case 15793. By agreement between the parties, a combined hearing was held on the probation violation warrants in both cases. Defendant asserts that there was no substantial evidence that he violated his probation. Based on the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial courts.

The Petitioner, Dewey Abbott III, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his second degree murder conviction and his agreed upon fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the postconviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal concerns an issue of whether a modular home violates a subdivision’s restrictive covenants. Katie Price (“Price”) wanted to place a modular home on her property in Fort Loudon Estates subdivision. Cathy McKeehan (“McKeehan”), a longtime resident of Fort Loudon Estates, sued Price in the Chancery Court for Loudon County (“the Trial Court”). McKeehan alleged that Price’s modular home violated a subdivision restriction against temporary structures. After a bench trial, the Trial Court found in favor of Price. McKeehan appeals. The evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s finding that Price’s home is not a temporary structure. We hold, as did the Trial Court, that Price’s modular home is not prohibited by the subdivision’s restrictions. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The employer appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion to dismiss the employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits, contending the trial court abused its discretion in denying its motion. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court’s decision and remand the case.

The defendant, Timothy M. Dawson, appeals his Loudon County Criminal Court jury conviction of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, arguing that he is entitled to a new trial on grounds that he was incapacitated during the Momon colloquy. See Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999). Discerning no error, we affirm.

Question: Does the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners have to promulgate a rule before a disciplinary proceeding can be instituted against a physician who prescribes a medication—such as ivermectin or hydroxychloroquine—for “off-label” use for the treatment of COVID-19?

Opinion: Yes. While disciplinary proceedings may generally be instituted against physicians under Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-214(b) in the absence of a rule, Tenn. Code Ann. § 14-4-104 requires the Board of Medical Examiners to promulgate a rule before it conducts a disciplinary proceeding against a physician “regarding the dispensing or prescribing of medication for COVID-19.”