The Petitioner, Joshua Nathan Brown, appeals from the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, wherein he challenged his guilty-pleaded convictions for evading arrest through the use of a motor vehicle creating a risk of death or injury to others, possession of a firearm by a convicted drug felon, and possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance with the intent to sell. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to recuse the district attorney general’s office after his previous attorney in this case was hired by that office. Following our review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment denying relief.

After the trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the “Emergency Motion to Alter or Adjust Sentence to Conform With the Principles of Compassionate Release” filed by Vern Braswell, Defendant, this appeal was initiated. On appeal, Defendant challenges the trial court’s dismissal of his motion. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. In most criminal cases, the prosecution cannot argue that a defendant is guilty of the charged offense because he committed similar acts in the past. But child-molestation cases are different. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 414(a), a court may admit evidence that a defendant previously molested a child to show that he is inclined to molest children. Rule 414(a)’s only express limitation is that the evidence must be offered on a relevant matter.

Defendant Gregory Lee Hruby asks us to further restrict certain Rule 414(a) evidence. Before his trial on child-molestation charges, he confessed to committing similar acts of child molestation. The district court admitted his confession and the jury convicted. On appeal, he argues that the government should have to corroborate a Rule 414(a) confession before the jury can consider it. Finding no support for a corroboration requirement in the Federal Rules of Evidence or elsewhere, we reject this argument. And because the district court did not otherwise abuse its discretion by admitting Hruby’s statements, we affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Joseph Sarkozy, appeals the revocation of his probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues the trial court erred by (1) finding the Defendant violated the terms of his probation when he did not possess the requisite intent for the domestic assault charges used as the basis for the revocation and (2) ordering the Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in prison. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Sean Mitchell A.K.A. Antwon Rainer, was indicted for rape and aggravated kidnapping, and a jury convicted Defendant as charged. The trial court sentenced Defendant, pursuant to the repeat violent offender statute, to two life sentences without the possibility of parole and ran the sentences consecutively. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay evidence, (2) that the chain of custody for Defendant’s penile swabs was not properly established, (3) that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, and (4) that the trial court erred by imposing excessive sentences. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Benton County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Lester Lee Doyle, for second offense driving under the influence of an intoxicant or drug (“DUI”) (Count One), violation of the implied consent law (Count Two), failure to illuminate the registration plate of his vehicle at all times when the headlights are illuminated (Count Three), and failure to maintain his vehicle as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane of a roadway divided into two or more lanes for traffic (Count Four). Following trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of DUI in Count One and not guilty of the traffic offenses in Counts Three and Four. On appeal, Defendant argues that because the jury found Defendant not guilty on Counts Three and Four, there was no reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant and therefore Defendant is entitled to a new trial or a reversal of the DUI conviction. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of conviction.

The mother of a seven-year-old child appeals the trial court’s decision to grant grandparent visitation. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm existed under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6- 306(a)(5), generally referred to as the Grandparent Visitation Statute, because the child lived with the grandparents for more than twelve months, a cessation of the relationship would create a danger of substantial harm, and visitation was in the child’s best interests based on the length and quality of the relationship and the existing emotional ties between the child and the grandparents. The trial court, however, made no finding concerning the threshold issue in -306(a): whether the mother opposed or severely reduced the grandparents’ visitation prior to their filing the petition. Following a de novo review of the record, we have determined that the grandparents failed to establish that the mother opposed or severely reduced their visitation prior to filing the petition. As a consequence, the Grandparent Visitation Statute was not implicated. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this matter is remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition.

The Notice of Appeal filed by the appellants, Jason Y. and Katina Y., stated that appellants were appealing the judgment entered on July 1, 2021. As the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Petitioner, Kevin Farrell Wells, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition arguing that the post-conviction court applied the incorrect burden of proof in evaluating his claims, erroneously denied him relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and entered its order beyond the sixty-day statutory deadline. After hearing oral arguments and following a review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this post-divorce case, Mother appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to modify the permanent parenting plan to designate her as the Child’s primary residential parent. Discerning no error, we affirm.