A jury convicted the Defendant, Bernard Woodard, of burglary of a building other than a habitation, theft of property valued $2,500 or more, and Class E felony evading arrest in a motor vehicle, and he received an effective sentence of eighteen years in prison as a career offender. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that his right to an impartial jury was violated by the racial composition of the jury venire, that the State did not establish the value of the stolen property, that the prosecutor committed misconduct in closing argument, and that the trial court erred in imposing partially consecutive sentences. After a thorough review, we discern no error and affirm the judgments.

The Petitioner, Levie Roberts, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his conviction of second degree murder and resulting twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel did not notice before trial that the State’s “key” witness gave inconsistent statements to the police and because trial counsel failed to recall the witness to the stand in order to question her about the inconsistencies. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a controversy between a homebuyer, the plaintiff, and a residential developer/contractor concerning the construction and sale of a newly constructed custombuilt home and lot within a subdivision with restrictive covenants. The parties executed a fill-in-the-blank “Purchase and Sale Agreement” (“the Agreement”) pursuant to which the defendant agreed to construct a custom home and sell the home and lot to the plaintiff. The principal matter in dispute is whether the defendant was contractually obligated to provide a brick veneer on the retaining wall installed by the defendant. The Agreement did not expressly include the construction of a retaining wall; however, the parties agree that a retaining wall was to be constructed and included in the sale. Although the brick veneer had not been installed and the hotly disputed issue remained unresolved, the sale closed. Shortly thereafter, the buyer commenced this action in which she asserted, inter alia, claims for breach of contract and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to finish the retaining wall with brick veneer as required by the subdivision’s restrictive covenants and implicitly required by the Agreement. In its answer, the defendant denied liability and asserted that it had no obligation to provide a veneer finish on the retaining wall. The case proceeded to a jury trial, after which the jury awarded the plaintiff $6,800 on her breach of contract claim. Thereafter, the trial court awarded the plaintiff $201,255.50 in attorney fees and expenses. This appeal followed. The defendant seeks to set aside the jury verdict, arguing that the Agreement was fully integrated and did not include an obligation to build a retaining wall. The defendant also appeals the amount of the award of attorneys’ fees, arguing that the plaintiff was not entitled to an award for time spent on her unsuccessful claims. We affirm the trial court’s decision in all regards.

This is an action to quiet title to a strip of land used as an ingress/egress for property perpendicular to the land at issue. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff. We affirm.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. The immigration laws give the Attorney General discretion to grant asylum to “refugees”—a term that includes those who have suffered persecution in their home countries because of their political beliefs. Exercising this discretion, the Attorney General has instructed immigration judges that they generally should deny asylum to refugees who have suffered past persecution if changed conditions in their countries make future persecution unlikely. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A). This case requires us to consider the type of evidence that permits the Board of Immigration Appeals to find these disqualifying changed country conditions.

Even though Jonas Nsongi Mbonga previously suffered political persecution in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Board of Immigration Appeals denied him asylum because his own political party had since assumed power in the country. The Board reasoned that this change in the government made any future political persecution unlikely. Nsongi Mbonga argues that this generic evidence about a national governmental change did not suffice and that the Board needed to rely on specific evidence tailored to his local situation. His argument gets things backwards under our caselaw. The Board can find a disqualifying change in conditions using general evidence showing that the political party that persecuted a refugee has lost power, which shifts the burden to the refugee to identify specific evidence proving that persecution still remains likely. Because Nsongi Mbonga did not present such evidence, we deny his petition for review.

The Appellant, Laseena Tirree White, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of theft of property valued $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony, and sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to three years in the Department of Correction, suspended to supervised probation. On appeal, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that there was insufficient proof of her identity as the perpetrator and of the value of the stolen items. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Joseph Lawrence Street, appeals the denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 motion to reduce the sentence imposed for his 2018 convictions of automobile burglary. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The trial court granted the parties a divorce instead of the annulment Husband requested, among other findings. Husband now appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court.

In this case involving termination of the father’s parental rights to his children, the Hickman County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) determined that several statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The plaintiff challenges the order of the Sullivan County Circuit Court (“trial court”) granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Liberty Insurance Corporation1 (“Liberty”), and dismissing his complaint on the merits with prejudice. The trial court granted summary judgment to Liberty based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and its conclusion that the plaintiff would be unable to produce sufficient evidence at trial to withstand a motion for directed verdict. Because the plaintiff’s claims are barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Liberty, albeit for a different reason than that found by the trial court.