The petitioner, Harry Pearson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Upon our review of the record, arguments of the parties, and pertinent authorities, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The employee, a truck driver, reported low back pain, leg numbness, and other symptoms following an incident in Oklahoma. After certain authorized medical evaluations were completed, the employer denied the claim, asserting the employee’s medical condition was not causally related to the alleged work accident. Following a compensation hearing, the trial court concluded the employee had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that her medical condition arose primarily from the reported work accident, and the employee appealed. Upon careful consideration of the record, we affirm the trial court’s order and certify it as final.

This appeal arises from an action before the Tennessee Claims Commission for personal injuries filed on behalf of a minor child who broke her arm when she fell from playground equipment at Tims Ford State Park. The complaint asserted claims for negligence, gross negligence, and gross negligence per se. It alleged that the State was negligent by failing to adequately maintain its property, and by failing to discover, rectify, and/or warn against a dangerous condition, and allowing park visitors “to use the playground which did not have a safe surface area.” The State denied liability under Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8- 307(a)(1)(C), insisting it had no notice of any dangerous condition; it also raised the “Recreational Use Statute,” Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 70-7-101 to -105, as an affirmative defense. Following discovery, the State filed a motion for summary judgment, which the claims commissioner granted. The commissioner found the State was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on two grounds. The commissioner found that Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7- 102 of the Recreational Use Statute provided immunity to the State as a landowner against premises-liability claims and that the gross negligence exception under the statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-104(a)(1), did not apply. The commissioner also held that the claimants failed to show that notice of the alleged dangerous condition had been provided to the State, which is an essential element of the Claims Commission Act. The plaintiffs appeal one issue, asserting a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning whether the State’s failure to maintain the playground was gross negligence. We affirm the Commissioner’s decision on both grounds.

The Defendants, Tony Thomas and Laronda Turner, were convicted of three counts of firstdegree premeditated murder and received life sentences on each count. On appeal, they raise the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support their convictions, specifically whether the co-defendant’s testimony was reliable and sufficiently corroborated; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment due to the State’s Ferguson violation by failing to preserve the photographic lineups shown to the witnesses and the co-defendant’s cell phone taken upon his arrest; (3) whether the trial court erred by not granting a new trial because the State committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose all inconsistent statements made by the co-defendant during proffer sessions; (4) whether the trial court committed error when it sua sponte prohibited the introduction of the printout of the co-defendant’s message to his girlfriend implicating himself in the murders, and in so doing, made an improper comment on the evidence; and (5) whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury by including the language “or either of them” throughout the jury instructions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, William Jesse Clouse, pleaded guilty in the Putnam County Criminal Court to three counts of vehicular assault, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-106 (2018) (subsequently amended). The trial court imposed an eight-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for split confinement. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves the applicability of Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-105, the bad faith penalty statute, to automobile insurance policies. The trial court granted the insurance company’s motion for summary judgment holding that Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-105 did not apply to automobile insurance policies. The insured appeals. We affirm.

An agency determined that a tour bus leasing company mischaracterized its tour bus drivers as independent contractors rather than employees, for the purposes of unemployment taxes. The company sought review in chancery court, which affirmed the agency’s determination. Because there is substantial and material evidence to support the agency’s determination, we affirm the trial court.

A foreign corporation sought to have a default judgment entered against it set aside on the basis that service of process was ineffective, rendering the judgment void. Because the proof before the court at the time it entered the default fails to demonstrate that service by mail complied with Rule 4 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, vacate the default judgment, and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Clark Derrick Frazier, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Monroe County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Robert Charles Atkins, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced the Appellant to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction, contending that the State failed to establish that he was the perpetrator of the crime or, in the alternative, that he acted with premeditation. The Appellant also contends that the trial court erred by allowing a State’s witness to testify regarding threats he received prior to trial to explain his nervous demeanor in court. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.