The Defendant, LaVonte Lamar Douglas, appeals as of right from his convictions for first degree felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery, for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment. The Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because his involvement was based upon uncorroborated accomplice testimony and no direct evidence linked him to the offenses; (2) his right to confront a witness was violated when a police witness referenced a nontestifying co-defendant’s statement; and (3) his mandatory life sentence is unconstitutional in light of his status as a juvenile at the time of the offenses. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Brian Adams, filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery and the resulting ninety-year sentence. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to adequately cross-examine the victim and failed to object to hearsay evidence from hospital personnel. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the Petitioner relief.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing an inmate’s petition for common law writ of certiorari. Because the inmate did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Appellants, the children’s biological mother and father, appeal the trial court’s termination of their respective parental rights to the four children on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent by wanton disregard, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv); (2) substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plans, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(g)(2); (3) persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A); (4) severe child abuse, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4); and (5) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody, Tenn. Code Ann. §36- 1-113(g)(14). Appellants also appeal the trial court’s determination that termination of their respective parental rights is in the children’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The employee requested the trial court to order the employer to authorize knee surgery recommended by the authorized physician. The employer declined to provide the treatment, relying on its medical expert’s causation opinion. Following an expedited hearing, the trial court concluded that the authorized physician’s causation opinion was not entitled to a statutory presumption of correctness because the physician was not selected from a panel. Further, the trial court determined the employer’s physician’s causation opinion was entitled to greater weight than the opinion of the treating physician because his explanation was more thorough and detailed. The trial court denied the employee’s request for relief, concluding the employee did not present sufficient medical proof from which the court could determine that the employee would likely prevail at trial in proving the requested surgery was causally related to the employee’s work injury. The employee has appealed, asserting the trial court erred in concluding the authorized physician’s causation opinion was not entitled to a statutory presumption of correctness. The employer asserts that the employee’s filing of the transcript of the proceedings of the expedited hearing and the employee’s brief were untimely and, therefore, should not be considered. Additionally, the employer asserts the trial court did not err in concluding the preponderance of the medical proof supported its expert’s causation opinion. We conclude the employee’s filing of both the transcript of the proceedings and his brief were untimely and should not be considered. We affirm the trial court’s decision denying medical benefits based on the opinion of the employer’s physician, and we remand the case.

Universal Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, acting as the Surety in the criminal cases of Shalisha Monique Settles (“defendant”), appeals from the judgment of the Williamson County Circuit Court ordering final forfeiture of her bond in the amount of $40,000. On appeal, the Surety argues it is entitled to relief based on its belief that the defendant was incarcerated under an alias in another state, making it “impossible” to fulfill its bond obligation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Aggrieved of his Hickman County Circuit Court jury conviction of attempted domestic assault, the defendant, Zachary Smith, appeals, arguing that the trial court should have dismissed Count 1 of the indictment as duplicitous. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from an action for default on a promissory note. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, as certificate trustee on behalf of Bosco Credit II Trust Series 2010-1 (“Plaintiff”), filed suit against Thomas S. Jackson (“Defendant”) in the Chancery Court for Sevier County (the “trial court”), alleging causes of action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment arising from a note executed in 2006. Defendant moved the trial court for summary judgment, alleging that he defaulted on the note in 2007 and that the property was foreclosed in 2008. Defendant averred that Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued when Defendant’s remaining debt was accelerated in 2008 and that Plaintiff’s cause of action was therefore time-barred by Tennessee’s six-year statute of limitations on breach of contract actions. Plaintiff responded to Defendant’s motion but failed to cite to any facts in the record that created a dispute as to Defendant’s statements and failed to produce any countervailing evidence. Accordingly, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion and Plaintiff filed a timely appeal to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is but the latest appeal in what has been a prolonged course of litigation between the parties. In a prior appeal, this Court ruled in favor of Ms. Strong on all issues raised by the professional corporation and also held, among other things, that an injunction regarding disputed funds in the case should be dissolved. On remand, the trial court accordingly dissolved the injunction and ordered the court’s Clerk & Master to pay the disputed fund proceeds to Ms. Strong and her attorneys. The professional corporation now appeals from this decision. We affirm and hold that the funds should be immediately disbursed to Ms. Strong pursuant to the trial court’s order. Further, finding the professional corporation’s appeal to be frivolous under Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122, we remand the case for a determination of Ms. Strong’s damages incurred on appeal.

An inmate petitioned for a writ of certiorari after the Tennessee Board of Parole denied him parole. The Board moved to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court concluded that, in the absence of a verification attesting to the truth of the contents of the petition and proper notarization of the petition, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. So the court dismissed the petition. We affirm.