The trial court granted the cross-plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Because this case is inappropriate for rendering judgment on the pleadings, we reverse.

Question 1: Does 2021 Tennessee Public Acts, chapter 550 give the county mayor or the county health officer authority to issue county-wide health mandates?

Opinion 1: Public Chapter 550 gives the county health officer—not the county mayor—authority to issue county-wide health mandates necessary to protect the general health and safety of the citizens of the county.

Question 2: If the county health officer has authority to issue county-wide health mandates, who prevails if there is a conflict between the county health officer and the county mayor regarding such mandates? Can the county mayor countermand a health regulation issued by the county health officer?

Opinion 2: When there is a special statute, like a Private Act, that gives the county mayor authority to issue a county-wide mandate to protect the public health under specified circumstances, the authority granted under that statute prevails. But in most instances the county health officer will be the official authorized to issue county-wide health mandates by virtue of the recent passage of Public Chapter 550.

Question 3: How far does the authority to issue county-wide health mandates extend? Is the institution of business-capacity limits or county-wide curfews permissible? May face coverings in public spaces be mandated?

Opinion 3: A county health officer’s ability to issue county-wide health mandates pertaining to communicable diseases via rules and regulations is limited—and can even be foreclosed—by state law. Thus, the validity of any county-wide health mandate issued by a county health officer would depend on its particular terms and applicable state law, including rules and regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of Health.

Question 4: If the county health officer has the authority to issue county-wide health mandates, what power does the county health officer have to enforce such mandates?

Opinion 4: Public Chapter 550 transferred the power to issue rules and regulations from county boards of health to county health officers, but the legislation did not transfer the power to enforce those rules and regulations—an enforcement power formerly held by county health directors—to county health officers.

Question 5: In light of Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-2-603, which states that the county health officer is appointed by the Tennessee Commissioner of Health, may a county mayor remove the county health officer from office without the permission of the Commissioner if the county health director, who was appointed by the county mayor, hired the county health officer?

Opinion 5: The Commissioner of Health is the sole person authorized to appoint the county health officer. Because the right of removal from office is an incident to the right of appointment when the tenure of an office is not prescribed by statute or the Tennessee Constitution, only the Commissioner of Health may remove a county health officer under Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-2-603. Accordingly, a county mayor may not remove the county health officer without the permission of the Commissioner of Health unless another law, i.e., a Private Act, gives the county mayor the power to do so.

LARSEN, Circuit Judge. Sofco Erectors, Inc. terminated its collective bargaining agreement with a local union. The Ohio Operating Engineers Pension Fund then assessed almost a million dollars in withdrawal liability against Sofco under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Sofco challenged the assessment on several grounds in ERISA-mandated arbitration. The arbitrator upheld the assessment, but the district court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Fund appealed, and Sofco cross-appealed. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, VACATE in part, and REMAND for further proceedings.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs Debra Chesnut and Glenn Chesnut appeal the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, as well as the judgment entered in favor of the United States, in this action brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671–80, for medical negligence and related claims arising from the amputation of Debra Chesnut’s right leg. The district court entered judgment for the United States after finding that the negligence of Dr. Joel Madden, the federal employee whose conduct is relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims under the FTCA, was not a substantial factor in causing Debra’s amputation. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the district court’s decision and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

For a second time, a father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. On remand after the first appeal, the trial court determined that there were two statutory grounds for terminating the father’s parental rights and that termination was in the child’s best interest. We conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support one ground for termination: incarceration under a sentence of at least ten years when, at sentencing, the child was under the age of eight. But, because the trial court’s order lacks sufficient findings regarding the child’s best interest, we vacate and remand.

A Monroe County jury convicted the Defendant of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to forty years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it did not suppress electronic evidence against him; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (3) the prosecutor’s closing argument was improper; and (4) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a new trial. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Venessa Baston, through counsel, appeals from the Morgan Criminal Court’s judgment summarily dismissing her petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s position is well-taken and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant filed a motion to accept late-filed notice of appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This case involves claims of malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy. The trial court dismissed the claims pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), determining that the plaintiff could not prove that the underlying criminal prosecution had terminated in his favor, a necessary element of a malicious prosecution claim. Regarding the civil conspiracy claim, the court determined that the conspiracy claim was only actionable if the underlying tort were actionable. Having found that the malicious prosecution claim could not stand, the court concluded that the conspiracy claim had to be dismissed as well. The plaintiff timely appealed. Based upon the applicable standard of review, we conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s claims, and we accordingly reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

Appellant debtor appeals the trial court’s decision to find certain affirmative defenses waived, to deny his motion to continue the summary judgment hearing in order to conduct discovery, and to grant summary judgment to the defendant bank. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.