Week of September 7, 2021 - September 10, 2021

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Petitioners Ronald Morrell, Ricardo Edmonds, Anthony Thompson, and Ronald Kennedy each filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern District of Michigan asking for relief based on Michigan’s sentencing guidelines. The district courts held that the petitioners were entitled to relief because they were sentenced under Michigan’s formerly mandatory sentencing guidelines that included enhancements for judicially found facts. The district courts conditionally granted the petitions and remanded petitioners’ cases to their respective state trial courts for resentencing. The state now agrees that Michigan’s mandatory guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment and concedes that petitioners are entitled to some form of relief. The state argues, however, that instead of remanding for resentencing, the district court should have remanded petitioners’ cases for a more limited remedy known as a Crosby hearing where the trial court determines whether it would have issued a materially different sentence had the Michigan guidelines been advisory rather than mandatory at the time of the original sentencing. Because the district courts acted within their discretion to dispose of these habeas cases as law and justice require, we affirm the district courts’ judgment in each case.

SUTTON, Chief Judge. At stake in this § 1983 lawsuit is whether Marc Barrera’s refusal to provide his name during an investigatory stop gave law enforcement officers probable cause to arrest him under Michigan law. The district court rejected the claim. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Robert Derrick Johnson, appeals as of right from the Bedford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his conviction for robbery. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to (1) advise him of a statutory right to at least fourteen days to prepare for trial, see Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-14-105; (2) file a motion to continue the trial; (3) suppress the victim’s in-court identification of the Petitioner; (4) file a motion or object at trial to the destruction of video-recorded evidence; and (5) challenge the Petitioner’s second trial as violative of double jeopardy. The Petitioner also contends that the post-conviction court erred by striking his pro se amendment to the post-conviction petition. Following our review, we affirm.

A non-attorney filed a notice of appeal as next friend of Andrew Jackson Heaton. As a non-attorney next friend may not practice law while acting on behalf of an infant or incompetent, this appeal is hereby dismissed.

This appeal arose from a 2011 divorce decree awarding to the wife one-half of the husband’s military retirement pay that had accumulated during the term of the marriage. At the time of the husband’s retirement in 2018, the United States Defense Finance and Accounting Service would not disburse retirement funds to the wife due to deficient award language contained in the 2011 order. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service explained in a letter addressed to the wife that the 2011 order had failed to provide a method to calculate the marital portion of the husband’s retirement pay and that it had no way to calculate retirement pay that had “accumulated during the term of the marriage.” In order to effectuate the enforcement of its intended division of the husband’s military retirement pay, the trial court attempted to correct its order by replacing “accumulated during the term of the marriage” with language compliant with the United States Department of Defense Financial Management Regulations (“DoD Regulations”) and specifying that the wife should be awarded fifty percent of the husband’s disposable military retired pay based upon his military pay grade rank and his creditable service years as of the date of the divorce. The trial court subsequently signed and entered two identical Military Retired Pay Division Orders, submitted by the wife, on September 1 and November 13, 2020. The husband has appealed. Upon review of the husband’s argument that the trial court impermissibly revised its 2011 order, we conclude that the trial court maintained subject matter jurisdiction to clarify and correct its 2011 judgment. However, we determine that the language of the Military Retired Pay Division Orders is inconsistent with the intended division of military retirement pay outlined in the 2011 order and subsequently clarified in the August 2019 order. In addition, the orders do not provide sufficient findings of fact to explain the trial court’s conclusion that the husband had obtained the pay grade of E7 and twenty-nine years of creditable service at the time of the divorce. We therefore vacate the trial court’s August 2019 order and Military Retired Pay Division Orders entered on September 1 and November 13, 2020; remand the case to the trial court; and direct the court to incorporate language compliant with DoD Regulations while providing sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding variables necessary for either a formula award or hypothetical retired pay award.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff DeAnna Johnson appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) on her racial harassment and racially hostile work environment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and striking portions of her declaration. Because the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Ford and abused its discretion in striking a portion of Johnson’s declaration, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings.

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. In these consolidated cases, plaintiffs sought attorney’s fees from the federal government under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). Both district courts awarded fees, but not in the amounts requested. Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that one district court erred by holding that the EAJA does not authorize fees for work performed after the judgment becomes final and that both district courts abused their discretions by awarding below-market hourly rates. We agree on both points, so we vacate the district courts’ fee awards and remand.

Kareem Jackson, an Ohio death-row prisoner represented by counsel, has filed two motions. He requests leave to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). He also moves the Court to remand his pending petition to the district court, arguing that his petition is not “second or successive” such that his claims must meet the requirements of § 2244(b). For the following reasons, Jackson’s motion to remand is DENIED; his application for permission to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition is GRANTED.

The Defendant, Quindarius Lamonta Jordan, pleaded guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and unlawful possession of a firearm, a Class A misdemeanor See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210 (2018) (second degree murder); 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt); 39-13- 102 (2018) (aggravated assault); 39-17-1307 (2018) (unlawful weapon possession). The trial court imposed eleven years for attempted second degree murder, five years for aggravated assault, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the firearm violation. The court imposed partial consecutive service, for an effective sixteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering confinement and consecutive service. Although we affirm the judgments of the trial court, we remand the case for the entry of judgment forms reflecting a dismissal of the charges in indictment Counts 1, 4, 5, and 6.