The Appellant, Terrance F. Arnold, appeals the Henderson County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation, arguing that there was no “substantial evidence” that he violated his probation. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns a bid protest. UWork.com, Inc., d/b/a Covendis Technologies (“Covendis”) successfully bid on a contract to manage a network of temporary workers for the State of Tennessee. Guidesoft, Inc. d/b/a Knowledge Services (“Knowledge Services”), an unsuccessful bidder, filed a protest with the Central Procurement Office (“the CPO”). The CPO dismissed Knowledge Services’ bid for insufficient bond. Knowledge Services appealed to the State Protest Committee (“the Committee”), which denied the appeal. Knowledge Services then filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). After a hearing, the Trial Court dismissed Knowledge Services’ amended petition. Knowledge Services now appeals to this Court, arguing that under Tenn. Code Ann. § 12-3-514(d), its protest bond should be based on 5% of the lowest evaluated cost proposal rather than 5% of the State’s estimated maximum liability as found below. We hold, inter alia, that the protest bond statute is meant to protect the State, and the appropriate protest bond amount is based on the costs the State may incur rather than a bidder’s proposed cost. Further, the fee relied upon by Knowledge Services to calculate its protest bond is but a small portion of the contract at issue, which is estimated to cost the State $190,000,000. The Committee did not exceed its jurisdiction or act illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently. We affirm the Trial Court.

This is a collection lawsuit to recover the balance Appellant allegedly owes on a promissory note held by Appellee. On Appellant’s motion, the trial court stayed the proceedings and remitted the matter to binding arbitration pursuant to the terms of the promissory note. Appellant brings the instant appeal under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a). Because the order appealed is not final, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Furthermore, neither the Federal Arbitration Act nor the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act provides a mechanism for appeal of Appellant’s issues to this Court. Appeal dismissed.

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. Raymond Cartwright Jr. is serving a twenty-four-year sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). When Cartwright was last convicted and sentenced in 2005, seven of his past convictions qualified as violent felonies. But in 2015, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 602 (2015), invalidating ACCA’s residual clause. Johnson removed at least four of Cartwright’s offenses from the category of violent felonies. Cartwright brought a habeas petition challenging his ACCA status by arguing that his remaining convictions for burglary and aggravated assault do not support his ACCA sentence. The district court held that, even after Johnson, Cartwright still had at least three ACCA predicates because his Tennessee first- and second-degree burglaries qualified as violent felonies. We hold that these crimes are not “generic” burglaries and therefore REVERSE the district court and REMAND for further proceedings.

The Defendant-Appellant, Thomas McLaughlin, was convicted by a Union County jury of vehicular homicide. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-213. The Defendant also pleaded guilty to one count each of driving on a revoked license, violating the financial responsibility law, driving without registration, and driving without registration plates. The trial court classified the Defendant as a persistent offender and imposed a total effective sentence of 15 years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: 1) he was unfairly prejudiced by the introduction of evidence of his toxicology reports and license status; 2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for vehicular homicide; and 3) his sentence is unlawful because the trial court erroneously applied aggravating factors. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Robert Joseph McBride, was indicted by the Bedford County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor involving a number of materials exceeding 25; eight counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, each involving a number of materials exceeding 100; and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor involving a number of materials exceeding 50. Following the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant to search Defendant’s house and computer, Defendant entered guilty pleas to eight counts of sexual exploitation of a minor involving materials exceeding 100, all Class B felonies. The agreed upon sentence was 12 years on each count, to be served concurrently. Defendant reserved for our review eight certified questions of law. We conclude that only Defendant’s question regarding the staleness of the information supporting the search warrant, is dispositive. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Darious Fitzpatrick, appeals as of right from his convictions for first degree felony murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery, for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of life plus twenty years. The Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is whether his sentence is unconstitutional in light of his status as a juvenile at the time of the offenses. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her daughter. The trial court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that the mother had abandoned her child by wanton disregard and by committing severe child abuse against her. The court also concluded that the evidence was clear and convincing that termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We agree and affirm.

This appeal arises from a post-divorce proceeding. The father filed a petition to modify child support, and the mother filed a civil contempt action against the father for failure to pay child support as ordered by the court. Following trial, the trial court found that a significant variance existed from the previously ordered child support obligation and granted the father’s petition to modify child support. The trial court retroactively modified the father’s child support obligation from the date the petition was filed, resulting in three modifications while the petition had been pending. In the respective child support worksheets for the modifications, the trial court declined to include a credit to the mother for the health insurance premiums she had paid for the child, determining such expense of additional insurance coverage not to be “a reasonable necessity or requirement.” In consideration of the mother’s civil contempt complaint, the trial court found that the father had been in contempt of court due to his failure to pay child support as ordered by the court but that he had cured his contempt due to an involuntary payment from his income tax refund proceeds and the retroactive modification of his obligation and resultant overpayment of child support while the petition to modify was pending. The trial court further denied an award of attorney’s fees to either party. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court in all respects.

BOGGS, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Phillip Gibbs appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claims that the Michigan trial court violated his public-trial right by barring his family and other members of the public from entering the courtroom during voir dire. On direct appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals remanded for the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue, but the trial court did not hold such a hearing and denied any relief. The Michigan Court of Appeals then held that Mr. Gibbs’s claim was defaulted because he did not contemporaneously object to the courtroom closure during voir dire. But Mr. Gibbs alleges that he and his attorney were completely ignorant of the trial court’s closure rule and that they had no reason to know that they should have objected to a closure.

If Mr. Gibbs’s allegations be true, then he would have had no reason to object. The application of the ordinarily adequate contemporaneous-objection rule would, in such unique circumstances, be an inadequate bar to federal review. Because it is unclear from the record whether Mr. Gibbs was aware of or reasonably should have been aware of the courtroom closure, we remand for the district court to determine these key facts and proceed accordingly.