In 2018, a Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Demetrious Tommy Lee, for attempted first degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, reckless endangerment, evading arrest while operating a motor vehicle, and domestic assault. In 2019, a superseding indictment was returned, elevating the Defendant’s kidnapping charge to especially aggravated kidnapping and adding a charge for employment of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony but keeping all other charges the same. One week prior to trial, the Defendant filed a motion for a continuance, which the trial court denied following a hearing. At trial, the jury found the Defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder as well as the charged offenses of especially aggravated kidnapping and employment of a firearm but found the Defendant not guilty of evading arrest. The charges of reckless endangerment and domestic assault were dismissed. Thereafter, the trial court imposed an effective eighteen-year sentence to be served at 100% for these convictions. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to continue his trial after the State superseded the indictment and presented him with additional discovery shortly before trial; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude evidence that violated State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999); (3) the trial court committed plain error in not requiring the State to make an election of offenses with regard to the especially aggravated kidnapping count; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for attempted second degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Jody Alan Hughes, was convicted in the Bradley County Criminal Court of first degree premeditated murder; kidnapping, a Class C felony; tampering with evidence, a Class C felony; and conspiracy to commit tampering with evidence, a Class D felony. After a sentencing hearing, he received an effective sentence of life plus fourteen years. On appeal, the Appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred by denying his “numerous” requests to represent himself; (3) the trial court erred by not allowing defense counsel to comment about the codefendants’ exposure to prison sentences during counsel’s opening statement; (4) the trial court erred in its wording of a curative instruction to the jury; (5) the trial court erred by limiting a codefendant’s cross-examination about a false statement the codefendant made in a previous criminal case; (6) the trial court erred by limiting a detective’s testimony regarding the codefendants’ inconsistent statements; and (7) the trial court erred by not allowing testimony about a codefendant’s pretrial statement to impeach the codefendant. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Bedford County jury convicted the defendant, Keontis Dontrell Cunningham, of two counts of aggravated assault, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of five years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and argues the trial court erred in instructing the jury on selfdefense. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Freddie McNeill Jr. was convicted and sentenced to death in Ohio state court for the aggravated murder of Blake Fulton. McNeill appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus, in which he argued that the prosecution in his case failed to turn over material under Brady v. Maryland and created a false impression in violation of Napue v. Illinois. The alleged Brady material included two police reports, one summarizing an interview with the prosecution’s primary witness, Robert Rushinsky, who initially failed to—but ultimately did successfully—identify McNeill as the culprit, and the other detailing a potential suspect who was quickly dismissed as a suspect by the police. It also included three audio recordings, one of the same Rushinsky interview addressed in the report, a second Rushinsky interview, and a third interview with a potential alibi witness, Marko Roseboro. The warden concedes that these materials were withheld (with the exception of the audio recording of the first Rushinsky interview, which was actually played at trial), but argues that McNeill’s arguments are procedurally defaulted and, in the alternative, that none of the evidence was material as defined by Brady. We agree as to the materiality of the evidence and affirm the district court. We also agree with the district court that the prosecution did not create a false impression at trial.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. In this death penalty habeas case, appellant Danny Hill seeks collateral review of his conviction for the murder of Raymond Fife, a twelve-year-old boy. The case has been to the Supreme Court once and before panels of this court twice. The core issue in the underlying state case was whether Hill was ineligible for the death penalty because he is intellectually disabled, a question that became pertinent after the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in Atkins v. Virginia. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Before us, the issues are whether, under governing AEDPA review principles, the state court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We conclude that the state court’s resolution of the issue does not meet either of the criteria that would permit a federal court to disturb a state conviction. Thus, we affirm the district court’s denial of Hill’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Petitioner, Frank Layman Glavin, appeals the denial of his petition to expunge his evading arrest conviction claiming that the trial court misapplied the expunction statute. See T.C.A. § 40-32-101(k)(Supp. 2020). We conclude that Petitioner does not meet the plain language requirements of section 40-32-101(k) of the Tennessee Code, and accordingly affirm the trial court’s order.

The Petitioner, Lemaricus Davidson, was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of numerous offenses against the two victims, Christopher Newsom and Channon Christian, including multiple counts of first degree felony and premeditated murder, and the jury imposed sentences of death for each murder conviction. After this court and our supreme court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentences, he filed post-conviction and coram nobis petitions, seeking relief from those first degree murder convictions and death sentences. The post-conviction court found that trial counsel were deficient for not requesting a change of venue but that no prejudice resulted from trial counsel’s deficient performance and denied relief. The coram nobis court also denied relief. In this consolidated appeal, the Petitioner raises various issues, including that the post-conviction court erred by denying his request for expert services; that the post-conviction court erred by determining that a codefendant’s anticipated testimony at another codefendant’s upcoming trial was not relevant to the Petitioner’s claim for post-conviction relief; that trial counsel were ineffective because they failed to request an out-of-county jury, improperly handled voir dire, and failed to raise certain issues on direct appeal of his convictions; and that he is entitled to coram nobis relief because a codefendant’s new testimony may have led to a different verdict as to the first degree premeditated murders of the victims. Based upon our review of the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the post-conviction court erroneously determined that a codefendant’s anticipated testimony at another codefendant’s upcoming trial was not relevant to the Petitioner’s claim for post-conviction relief because the testimony would have invalidated one of the four aggravating circumstances found by the jury to impose the Petitioner’s death sentence for Mr. Newsom. However, we also conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree with the post-conviction court that trial counsel were deficient for not requesting a change of venue and that the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s deficient performance. Therefore, we affirm the denials of post-conviction and coram nobis relief.

This case involves a dispute over a parcel of real property. The appellant filed suit alleging fraudulent conveyance of the property. The trial court granted a judgment in favor of the appellee, finding that the appellant did not meet her burden of proof to establish fraud, undue influence, or lack of capacity. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s decision. Additionally, we award the appellee her attorney’s fees on appeal.

The employee alleged suffering a work-related injury to his hand that became infected, requiring emergency surgery. The employer denied the employee’s claim, asserting that the alleged injury did not arise primarily out of the employment and that the employee failed to give timely notice of his injury. Following an expedited hearing, the trial court determined the employee was unlikely to prevail at trial in establishing he gave timely notice of his injury but that the employer failed to establish that it was prejudiced by the late notice. The court awarded some of the medical benefits the employee requested and denied the employee’s request for temporary disability benefits. The employer has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s award of medical benefits and remand the case.

The Petitioner, Jarus Smith, appeals as of right from the Hickman County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for facilitation of attempted second degree murder, possession of contraband in a penal institution, and two counts of aggravated assault. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that (1) he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional right to a twelve-person jury, and (2) he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel relative to counsel’s advice about proceeding with an eleven-person jury. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.