The Defendant, Angela Kilgore, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated arson, and theft of property valued $2,500 or more but less than $10,000. After merging the felony murder conviction into the premeditated murder conviction, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective term of life plus eighty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by overruling her motion to suppress the results of the search of her pickup truck, the evidence was insufficient to sustain her convictions for first degree murder, aggravated arson and especially aggravated robbery, her dual convictions for especially aggravated robbery and theft violate principles of double jeopardy, and the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for a corrected judgment in count six to reflect that the theft conviction merges into the conviction for especially aggravated robbery.

Pro-se petitioner, Tracy Lynn Harris, appeals from the Carroll County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A police officer appealed his termination by the Town of Greeneville to the Greeneville Civil Service Board, which upheld it. Appellant then appealed to the trial court, which also upheld the termination. Because we conclude that the record lacks information necessary to conduct appellate review, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand the case to the Board for further proceedings.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. This case arises from an assault upon Walter J. Himmelreich, a federal inmate, by another inmate while Himmelreich was incarcerated at FCI-Elkton. Himmelreich’s subsequent lawsuits alleged numerous claims against prison officials, including a claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Himmelreich claims that the captain at FCI-Elkton, Janel Fitzgerald, threatened to transfer him to a higher-level security institution if he filed a grievance regarding the assault and that she later admitted that she placed him in the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”) for filing a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, thereby violating his First Amendment rights. Fitzgerald moved for summary judgment only on the ground that there is no Bivens remedy for a First Amendment retaliation claim. The district court denied her motion for summary judgment.

Fitzgerald appeals the district court’s recognition of Himmelreich’s Bivens claim for First Amendment retaliation and the district court’s denial of summary judgment on that claim. We DISMISS Fitzgerald’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because her appeal concerns neither a final order nor a non-final order entitled to review under the collateral order doctrine. Given that we dismiss Fitzgerald’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, we will waive appellate fees with respect to her appeal.

The Defendant-Appellant, Vincent Rodolphus Helser, pleaded guilty to one count of violation of the sexual offender registry in case number 2018-CR-129 and one count of sale of methamphetamine over 0.5 grams in case number 2018-CR-205. The Defendant received a two-year probationary sentence in case number 2018-CR-129 and an effective nine-year sentence, to be served on supervised probation after 180 days in confinement, in case number 2018-CR-205. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and ordering the remainder of his sentence to be served in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Shannon Bruce Foster, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2018). The Defendant was sentenced to seventeen years’ incarceration. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred by instructing the jury that he had the duty to retreat before engaging in self-defense, and (3) the trial court erred by admitting a photograph depicting the victim with his young children. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge. Civil Rule 54(b) permits a district court to enter final judgment “as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties” when it determines, using a multi-factor analysis, that “there is no just reason for delay.” Can a litigant circumvent the requirements of Rule 54(b) by the expedient of voluntarily dismissing her surviving claims in order to seek immediate appellate review of an adverse judgment on her resolved claims, with the intention of reinstating the dismissed claims should she obtain a favorable outcome on appeal? Eight years ago, we answered this question no, because such a dismissal does not create a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Page Plus of Atlanta, Inc. v. Owl Wireless, LLC, 733 F.3d 658, 658 (6th Cir. 2013). The answer is still no.

The Petitioner, Marcus Thomas, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty pleaded conviction to attempted first degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by dismissing his petition and denying relief on his claims alleging that his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing and that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We affirm in part and reverse in part the post-conviction court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Tabitha Gentry, of theft of property valued over $250,000 and aggravated burglary. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, this court affirmed the judgments. See State v. Tabitha Gentry, No. W2015-01745-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 4264266, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Aug. 12, 2016), perm. app. granted (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2016). On appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, the supreme court affirmed. State v. Gentry, 538 S.W.3d 413 (Tenn. 2017). The Petitioner timely filed a post-conviction petition, alleging that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After multiple hearings, the post-conviction court denied relief, concluding that the Petitioner had not proven that Counsel was deficient or that the Petitioner was prejudiced by Counsel’s representation. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the postconviction court’s judgment.

In this parental rights termination case, the trial court ruled that DCS proved five grounds for terminating Mother’s parental rights to her two children: mental incompetence, persistence of conditions, abandonment by failure to support, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody of the children. The trial court also ruled that termination of Mother’s rights was in the children’s best interest. We reverse the trial court’s rulings as to the grounds of mental incompetence and abandonment by failure to support. We also reverse the trial court’s ruling that termination of Mother’s rights is in the children’s best interests.