This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The Trial Court found the mother to be indigent and appointed counsel to represent her. The Trial Court conducted a trial and entered an order finding that two statutory grounds of abandonment existed for termination of the mother’s parental rights and that termination was in the children’s best interest. There is no transcript or statement of the evidence included in the record to permit appellate review of the mother’s issues on appeal concerning the termination of her parental rights. As such, we vacate the Trial Court’s judgment terminating the mother’s parental rights to the children and remand to the Trial Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Following a severe coughing episode precipitated by inhaling vapor from an electronic cigarette (“e-cigarette”), the employee lost consciousness and fell backwards from a wall on which he had been sitting in a designated smoking area near his workspace. The employer denied the employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits, contending his injuries were idiopathic and did not arise primarily out of and in the course and scope of the employment. After filing a petition for benefits, the employee requested an expedited hearing and decision on the record without an in-person hearing. A subsequent status hearing order noted written discovery was complete, the employee had been deposed, the central issue was compensability, and the court would decide the compensability issue using the expedited hearing standard of “likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits.” After advising the parties of the documents the court would consider in deciding the compensability issue, the court determined the employee was likely to prevail at trial in establishing he suffered a compensable injury but did not address any claim for temporary disability or medical benefits. The employer has appealed. We vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case.

The employee was injured in an assault by a former friend and co-employee in the employer’s parking lot. Reasoning that the assault arose out of an inherently private dispute, the employer denied the employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits and filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied the employer’s motion, concluding that determining whether the assault stemmed from an inherently private dispute would require the court to weigh the evidence and make credibility determinations. The employer has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s order denying the employer’s motion for summary judgment and remand the case.

The defendant, Bobby Joe Young, Jr., appeals the revocation of the sentences of probation imposed for his convictions of aggravated assault, robbery, and escape, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the balance of the total effective sentence in confinement and that the trial court miscalculated the remaining balance of the total effective sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, a state prison inmate, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for a declaratory judgment, in which he alleged that the respondents, Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”); TDOC Sentence Management; TDOC Commissioner Tony Parker; and CoreCivic, Inc., Records Officials (“CoreCivic”) (collectively, “Respondents”), miscalculated his release eligibility date and sentence expiration date. The trial court dismissed the petition upon finding that the petitioner had failed to comply with the court’s two orders notifying the petitioner that his case would be dismissed if he did not pay the initial partial filing fee required under Tennessee Code Annotated 41-21-807, file an affidavit of indigency, and submit copies of his petition and summons for each respondent with the court clerk. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because there is no evidence of bias that would require recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Randy Massey, appeals the Giles County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his six-year sentence for aggravated assault in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Warren County jury convicted the Defendant, Joshua Travis Griffith, of three counts of aggravated statutory rape, and the trial court sentenced him to a total effective sentence of three years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court: (1) erroneously allowed the State to present evidence outside the scope of the indictment, as well as evidence of his transmission of hepatitis B to the victim, which should have been excluded pursuant to Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b); (2) erroneously failed to declare a mistrial after the State’s motion to amend the indictment in the presence of the jury; and (3) erroneously failed to grant his motion for judgments of acquittal. He lastly contends that the cumulative effect of the errors violated his right to a fair trial. After review, we conclude that errors occurred during trial; however, consistent with our conclusion that those errors were harmless, the trial court’s judgments are affirmed.

This is an appeal from a divorce involving one minor child. In fashioning an initial parenting schedule, the trial court named the mother primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child and entered a parenting plan awarding 242 days of parenting time to the mother and 123 days to the father. The father appealed. Because we conclude that the trial court’s order regarding the residential parenting schedule does not contain sufficient findings of fact such that meaningful appellate review is possible, we vacate the order as to the parenting plan and remand for findings of fact and conclusions of law to facilitate appellate review.

The issue in this appeal is whether the Plaintiff’s lawsuit is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Plaintiff originally filed suit against the Defendant in the Circuit Court for Shelby County in May 2014. Unbeknownst to the parties, the trial court sua sponte dismissed the lawsuit for failure to prosecute. Upon learning of the dismissal over ten months later, the Plaintiff moved to set aside the dismissal. The trial court denied the Plaintiff’s request to set aside the dismissal but, articulating an erroneous reading of Rule 41.02(3) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, entered an order that stated the dismissal did not bar the Plaintiff from refiling its lawsuit. When the Plaintiff refiled its lawsuit in August 2017, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of res judicata. Despite language to the contrary in its prior order, the trial court granted the Defendant’s motion, holding that the dismissal of the original lawsuit operated as an adjudication on the merits. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the second lawsuit. We conclude that the doctrine of res judicata does not bar the Plaintiff’s lawsuit. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, vacate the trial court’s judgment, and reinstate the Plaintiff’s lawsuit.