McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Dana Johnson first brought his claim against SmileDirectClub, LLC (SmileDirect) in court. But, in light of an arbitration agreement, he later voluntarily dismissed his claim and submitted it for arbitration to the American Arbitration Association (AAA). Before the claim got to an arbitrator, an AAA administrator determined that the claim implicated various AAA policies that precluded arbitration unless the parties signed a post-dispute arbitration agreement or a court otherwise ordered arbitration. Johnson declined to sign a new agreement and instead returned to court.

The district court held that Johnson satisfied his obligations under the arbitration agreement. In effect, this meant that the arbitration agreement did not cover the instant dispute. But whether an arbitration agreement covers a dispute is a gateway question of arbitrability, and here the parties delegated such questions to an arbitrator. Under the agreement and the incorporated AAA rules, it was improper for an administrator to effectively answer that gateway question or to overlook it altogether by binding the parties to AAA’s views of sound policy.

We reverse and remand to send the question to an arbitrator.

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. At least in part out of self-interest, Jonathan Barger, a union member, accused other union members of overbilling a client. Barger’s union prosecuted him under the union’s constitution, so Barger filed suit against the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (“UBC”), Indiana/Kentucky/Ohio Regional Council of Carpenters (“IKORCC”), and UBC Local Union 2 (“Local 2”) under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”), alleging that his speech was protected. The district court granted the unions’ motions for summary judgment. The question before us today is whether Barger’s speech was protected as a matter of “union concern.” We find that Barger’s speech was protected, and REVERSE in part, AFFIRM in part, VACATE in part, and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Defendant, Cedrick Leroy Shelton, was convicted by a jury of simple possession of marijuana, possession of more than 0.5 ounces of marijuana with intent to deliver, possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, possession of drug paraphernalia, and improper display of a license plate. Defendant also pled guilty to two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court imposed an effective fourteen-year sentence, as a Range II multiple offender, to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues: that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for possession of more than 0.5 ounces of marijuana with intent to deliver and possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony; that the jury rendered inconsistent verdicts; and that his sentence was excessive. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for correction of a clerical error on the judgment forms for counts seven and eight to reflect that Defendant pled guilty to those counts rather than being found guilty by a jury. Additionally, the judgment form in count eight should reflect that it is merged with count seven.

A Montgomery County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Paul Steven Murphy, of rape and incest. The trial court ordered the Appellant to serve concurrent sentences of ten years for the rape conviction and four years for the incest conviction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his convictions and the length of the sentences imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jared Scott Aguilar, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s determination that his coram nobis petition, wherein he challenged his multiple child pornography convictions, failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the coram nobis court erred by finding that he had not presented newly discovered evidence entitling him to relief, specifically, evidence that the search warrant affidavit was deficient due to the investigating officer’s allegedly untrue statement therein that he discovered three child pornography files in the Petitioner’s shared computer folder, that the detective who performed a forensic examination of the Petitioner’s laptop allegedly committed perjury at trial by stating that he found the incriminating files in the Petitioner’s shared folder, and that the investigating officer had undisclosed contact with the Petitioner’s wife. Following our review, we affirm the denial of relief because the Petitioner is merely presenting “repackaged claims” that have been previously determined and which do not state a cognizable claim for relief in the coram nobis context.

This is a case for the enforcement of a restrictive covenant prohibiting commercial use of lots in a residentially restricted neighborhood. The trial court awarded the plaintiffs nominal damages in the sum of $500 against one defendant and denied the plaintiffs’ requests for specific equitable performance and injunctive relief and for punitive damages. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

This is a negligence case that was dismissed in the Tennessee Claims Commission for several articulated reasons, including that Tennessee’s recreational use statute barred the plaintiffs’ claims. For the specific reasons stated herein, we affirm the decision of the Claims Commission.

A store clerk packaged a customer’s personal property for shipment. When the property was damaged during shipment, the customer sued the store and the clerk for compensatory damages. At the close of the plaintiff’s proof, the defendants moved to dismiss because the plaintiff did not come forward with sufficient proof of damages. The trial court granted an involuntary dismissal. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(2). On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erroneously excluded his evidence. We conclude that the excluded evidence, if admitted, would not have affected the outcome. So we affirm.

Generally at issue in this litigation is the propriety of a foreclosure. The trial court held that summary judgment should be entered in the appellee’s favor due to, among other things, the appellant’s lack of standing. The appellant’s principal brief only raises issues connected to the trial court’s determination on standing, although even these issues have now been disclaimed by the appellant on appeal. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The employee reported suffering an injury to her right wrist and hand when she twisted her hand in an effort to catch a falling automotive part. She further alleged that repetitive job duties contributed to or aggravated her right wrist condition. The employer denied the claim, asserting the employee’s medical condition did not arise primarily out of the employment. Following an earlier expedited hearing, the trial court determined the employee was entitled to temporary partial disability benefits but did not show a likelihood of prevailing on the issue of ongoing medical benefits. That order was not appealed. Thereafter, the employee filed a request for a second expedited hearing and submitted a Standard Form Medical Report (Form C-32) from a physician. The employer objected to the trial court’s consideration of the Form C-32, arguing it was deficient in several respects. Following the second expedited hearing, the trial court concluded the employee had come forward with sufficient evidence to indicate a likelihood of prevailing on her claim for additional medical benefits, and the employer has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s order and remand the case.