Gwendolyn Jumper (“Employee”) filed this action against Kellogg Company (“Employer”), seeking workers’ compensation benefits for an injury to her back. Following a hearing, the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims denied Employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Employee has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.

Grandparents sought to terminate the parental rights of a mother and a father to their two children on the statutory ground of abandonment. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence that Mother had abandoned the children by failure to visit or support them during the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned the children by exhibiting wanton disregard for their welfare. And the court ruled that termination of both parents’ rights was in the children’s best interest. Because Mother proved that her failure to visit was not willful and her support under the circumstances was not “token,” we reverse the termination of Mother’s parental rights. But the record contains clear and convincing evidence that Father abandoned the children by exhibiting wanton disregard for their welfare and that termination is in the children’s best interests. So we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights.

This is an appeal of a health care liability case. Although the matters presented for our review were taken under advisement following oral argument, we hereby dismiss the appeal with prejudice pursuant to the stipulation of the parties.

This appeal involves review of a trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s lawsuit pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act. The trial court determined that the Tennessee Public Participation Act was not applicable and denied the motion, finding that the defendant’s activity was not protected. The defendant now appeals, contending that the underlying matter involves the exercise of her right to free speech and her right to petition. We agree and find that the defendant engaged in protected activity in the filing of a Title IX complaint. Because we find that the defendant’s appeal is limited to that part of the trial court’s judgment relating to the allegations in plaintiff’s lawsuit concerning defendant’s Title IX complaint, we reverse in part the trial court’s cited basis for denial and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion and the Tennessee Public Participation Act.

This case involves a pro se complaint to quiet title filed by several plaintiffs challenging a deed that was executed over twenty years ago. This is the second appeal in this matter. After the plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed in 2016, only one plaintiff/appellant appealed to this Court. The remaining plaintiffs did not participate in the first appeal. The matter was remanded for findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the appellant died at some point. After a second order of dismissal was entered containing the requisite findings, the instant appeal was filed by counsel purportedly on behalf of the original plaintiffs. We conclude that the appeal must be dismissed because the plaintiffs who did not participate in the first appeal are bound by the first order of dismissal, which became final as to them when they did not appeal. Also, the sole appellant from the first appeal has died, and the attorney who filed the notice of appeal has admittedly never communicated with the appellant or anyone acting on behalf of his estate. As such, this appeal is hereby dismissed.

The Defendant, Lashawn Shannon, appeals his convictions for aggravated robbery and facilitation of aggravated kidnapping, for which he received an effective sentence of nine years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, George H. Person, pled guilty to two counts of driving after having been declared a motor vehicle habitual offender (“MVHO”), two counts of driving on a canceled, suspended, or revoked license, and a violation of the light law. The Defendant’s sentencing took place after an amendment to the statute that was the basis of his MVHO conviction went into effect, so that the Defendant’s conduct was no longer criminalized and, concomitantly, triggered no penalty. The trial court ruled that the Defendant was entitled to the lesser penalty of the amended statute under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-112, and the State appeals. We conclude that the savings statute applies and that the Legislature’s act of removing punishment for the offense constitutes a lesser penalty. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Defendant-Appellant, Quinton Devon Perry, entered guilty pleas to eighteen counts of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class C felony, and six counts of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor where the number of exploitive materials exceeded twentyfive, a Class B felony under Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-17-1004(a)(1) and (2). The trial court ordered partial consecutive sentencing and imposed an effective sentence of eighteen years’ imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues the trial court erred in applying certain enhancement factors and in imposing partial consecutive sentencing. Upon review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Stanley Jefferson, of aggravated rape, two counts of especially aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and theft of property valued at more than $1,000, and he received an effective sentence of fifty-eight years. The sole issue raised on appeal is the sufficiency of the convicting evidence for the aggravated rape conviction. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, and we affirm the convictions. We remand for any further proceedings necessary to correct an error in the sentence related to the Defendant’s theft conviction.

The Defendant-Appellant, Douglas Eugene Horton, was convicted by a Henderson County jury of nineteen counts of various drug related offenses, for which he received a total effective sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions, (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments, and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in ordering partial consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court in Counts 3, 4, 5, 6, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23, 24, 25, and 26; we reverse the judgments of the trial court in Counts 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 31 due to insufficient evidence, and we vacate these convictions; and we remand the case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.