The Defendant, Anthony Lee Carter, appeals from his Madison County Circuit Court conviction for driving as a motor vehicle habitual offender (“MVHO”), for which he received a six-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that after his arrest and before his trial, our legislature amended the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act such that the Defendant was entitled to the benefit of a lesser penalty under our criminal savings statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. 39-11-112 (savings statute), 55-10-601 (MVHO Act). Following our review, we conclude that when the legislature removed the offense of driving as a MVHO and the associated penalty and replaced it with a mechanism for MVHOs to petition for reinstatement of their driver’s licenses, the legislature enacted a lesser penalty. As a result, the Defendant should benefit from the lesser penalty pursuant to the criminal savings statute.

In 1997, a jury convicted the Petitioner, Montez Adams, of first degree felony murder, especially aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit especially aggravated burglary, and theft over $500, and he received an effective life sentence. On appeal, this court vacated the conviction for especially aggravated burglary and ordered the entry of a conviction for aggravated burglary and an accompanying ten-year sentence. State v. Montez Antuan Adams, et. al., No. 02C01-9709-CC-00352, 1998 WL 556174, at *1, 2 n.1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 1, 1998), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 5, 1999). In the following years, the Petitioner litigated post-judgment motions, including a petition for post-conviction relief. It appears that a new judgment form reflecting the Petitioner’s conviction for aggravated burglary rather than especially aggravated burglary was not entered until 2019. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed this instant second petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that the new judgment form reset the statute of limitations with regard to his claims of post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, concluding that it was not timely and that the claims had been either previously determined or waived. We conclude that the delayed entry of the corrected judgment, as mandated by this court in 1998, does not permit the Petitioner to relitigate the postconviction claims raised in his petition. Accordingly, the dismissal is affirmed.

In this divorce action, the husband appeals the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro to the wife. Because the trial court’s final order contains no findings of fact or conclusions of law to support its alimony award under Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we vacate the alimony award and remand this case to the trial court for the entry of a more detailed order.

In this action for breach of an insurance policy, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant insurance company upon finding that, pursuant to an occupancy clause, the insurance policy had become “automatically void” when the plaintiff homeowner had vacated the insured residence and had allowed other individuals to occupy the insured residence without obtaining the insurance company’s written consent. The trial court subsequently certified its summary judgment order as final, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02, determining that although the plaintiff’s claims were dismissed, the insurance company would be allowed to pursue a counter-complaint it had filed against the plaintiff. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In this action involving a collision between an automobile and a bull that escaped its enclosure and entered the roadway, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of one of the defendants, who had maintained a leasehold interest in the property from which the bull escaped. The trial court determined that no genuine issues of material fact were in dispute and that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiffs had failed to show that the defendant owned the bull in question and because the defendant had terminated the lease before the accident occurred. The plaintiffs have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. This is the third time these parties have appeared before this panel in a Tennessee election law dispute. This time, defendants appeal the district court’s order granting plaintiffs a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of a law preventing first-time voters from voting by mail. We previously denied defendants’ motion to stay the injunction pending this appeal. However, after the benefit of full briefing and oral argument, we now vacate the preliminary injunction.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Gary Hughbanks, a death-row prisoner in Ohio, appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. Hughbanks contends that the State withheld material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and he asserts that the Ohio Court of Appeals unreasonably determined that his trial counsel did not offer ineffective assistance at his mitigation hearing. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court denying Hughbanks habeas relief.

An inmate petitioned for a common law writ of certiorari after the Tennessee Board of Parole denied him parole. The trial court dismissed the petition. In this appeal, the inmate argues that the Board’s action was illegal and arbitrary and that the rules and procedures in place at the time of his crimes should have governed his parole. We affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The Defendant, Riley Christopher Wilburn, was convicted of driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor, by a Giles County Circuit Court jury. See T.C.A. 55-10-401 (2020). The trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with thirty days to be served in jail and the balance to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on the basis that the indictment was fatally flawed because it alleged two offenses in a single count. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Aggrieved of his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated kidnapping, assault, domestic assault, and interfering with an emergency call, the defendant, Jay W. Edwards, appeals. The defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence seized following his arrest, the propriety of the jury instructions, and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review, we affirm the defendant’s convictions but remand the case for the entry of corrected judgment forms reflecting the merger of the defendant’s convictions in Counts 4, 5, 6, and 8.